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Abstract
This thesis aims at explaining how firms competing in the product market and benefiting
from technological spillovers decide about its location and R&D cooperation.
First, we intend to evaluate if firms’ decision about location revises when firms cooper-
ate or compete in R&D. Through a strategic interaction model where firms decide about
location, R&D and output, we concluded that if firms compete in R&D, the clustering of
firms only occurs for a convex spillover function, while if R&D activities run coopera-
tively, clustering is always observed if there is an increased information sharing between
firms.
A related topic concerns with the inuence of spatial competition on firms’ decision about
location and R&D cooperation. We concluded that, for sufficiently high transport costs,
cooperating firms prefer to disperse between regions than to agglomerate, while if trans-
port costs are low, firms will agglomerate if uncertainty is high.
In the final chapter, we intend to evaluate the determinants of firms’ location choice, ac-
cording to its technological intensity and structure. We focus on the location choices
made by Portuguese new manufacturing plants. The set of explanatory variables includes
production costs, demand indicators, agglomeration economies and R&D expenditures.
The model is based on the random utility maximization framework and proceeds through
a Poisson model and a Negative Binomial regression. We then concluded that for the
total manufacturing sector, the main determinants for firms’ location decision are the ag-
glomeration economies and both labor and land costs. However, when we consider firms’
structure, we observed that new multi-plant firms are particularly sensitive to urbanization
economies, land costs and local market, while new single-plant firms are more responsive
to labor costs and agglomeration economies. Additionally, when considering the high-
tech sample, we notice that the costs variables lose importance, while the urbanization
economies and the R&D expenditures gain a particular relevance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since long time ago, economic agents – households and firms – concentrate in few places
- cities or industrial clusters1. During the last decades, this apparently widely accepted
evidence has gained a very special attention in the core of urban and regional science
but also attracted economists from other fields of economic science, like international
economics, industrial organization or growth theory.
The evidence and secular tendency for the agglomeration of economic activities lead us
to formulate some questions: why do households concentrate in large metropolitan areas
even though empirical evidence suggests that the cost of living is typically higher than
in smaller urban areas (Richardson [168])? Or, why competing firms agglomerate in in-
dustrial clusters if competition there is fiercer (Becattini [23])? Broadly speaking, what
In fact, the percentage of world urban population increased from 29.1% (1950) to 47.1% (2000)
of total population (UN [187]). Furthermore, examples of specialized and highly productive industrial
clusters, such as the Silicon Valley and Route 128 (USA), the industrial districts in Italy (Prato, Sassuolo,
Toscana, Emilia Romana and others), France (Troyes, Besançon, Choletais), Spain (Valles) or Portugal
(Vale do Ave, Marinha Grande, Entre Douro e Vouga), among others, spurred literature (Mota [144]).
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determines the location decision of economic agents and, therefore, the spatial organiza-
tion of economic activity?
These questions are at the heart of location theory, and therefore, in the core of regional
science. According to Greenhut and Norman [76], location theory aims at explain the use
of a finite resource - space - by explicitly recognizing that economic activities consume
space and are separated by costly distance. Location theory has a long historical tradition,
as it goes back, for instance, to Smith and Ricardo, but its interest has been historically
cyclical. In fact, alongside with some remarkable developments, such as Von Thünen
[193], Launhardt [126], Marshall [136], Weber [195] and Lösch [131], location theory has
seen some less enthusiastic periods. Fortunately, in the last decades, economists have been
increasingly recognizing the relevance of space and location theory. Particularly, it has
been realized that location theory is remarkably powerful as a method and can be applied
to a wide range of microeconomics problems that arise, for instance, in new industrial
economics or in social choice - see, for instance, the theory of product differentiation,
rooted in Hotelling [98].
A typically divorced topic deals with the cooperation in Research and Development (R&D)
activities by competing firms. Assigned to industrial economic literature, R&D cooper-
ation models usually assume that firms may engage in R&D cooperation, even if being
strong competitors in the product market, in order to internalize R&D spillovers. Since
the earlier contributes of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin [48] and Kamien, Muller and Zang
[118], several extensions were made, focusing, in particular, on the R&D spillovers and
considering them as endogenous, asymmetric or uncertain. But, although it seems to be
reasonable that firms’ decision about R&D cooperation relates with its geographical loca-
tion, very few articles make the R&D spillover and the R&D cooperation decision depend
on firms’ geographical distance and accordingly, on location choice2.
Understanding the motivations that lead firms to select its location is the main purpose of
this research. More precisely, we expect that this research would help us to explain how
firms competing in the product market and benefiting from technological spillovers de-
See, at this purpose, Long and Soubeyran [130], Baranes and Tropeano [19] and Piga and Poyago-
Theotoky [161].
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cide about its geographical location and about cooperation in R&D. Inspiration was found
on literature about industrial clusters, which evidences that competing firms geographi-
cally co-located frequently adopt mechanisms of cooperation between them3. Addition-
ally, literature on the geography of innovation also evidences the relevance of knowledge
spillovers for the clustering of firms and for the emergence of cooperative behaviors4.
The research background includes location choice models that put emphasis on knowl-
edge spillovers and strategic interaction between firms. Additionally, we will have under
consideration R&D cooperation models that assume endogenous knowledge spillovers
that depend on firms’ location.
The thesis will have three main chapters that correspond to autonomous essays under the
main research topic of firms’ location choice. The research questions explored in each
chapter are the following ones:
1st) Does firms’ decision about location revises if they cooperate or compete in R&D and
benefit from diverse knowledge spillovers?
More precisely, we intend to evaluate if competing firms that benefit from endogenous
knowledge spillovers that are distance-sensitive revise their location choices if they com-
pete or cooperate in R&D. Inspiration was found on empirical literature about Marshal-
lian industrial districts that evidences a strongly competitive environment between firms,
which benefit from external economies but simultaneously develop cooperative agree-
ments.
Having under consideration both location choice models and R&D literature, we devel-
oped a strategic interaction model where firms decide about location, R&D and after-
According to Brusco [31], the interactions between firms in an industrial cluster include cooperative
and strategic alliances that results from the characteristics of "social networks" of the cluster. Also, Camagni
[33] suggests that cooperation between firms in an industrial cluster might be characterized by explicit
cooperation networks or informal collaboration between firms. He also suggests that cooperation facilitates
collective learning processes and reduce uncertainty, which favours innovation.
The clustering of innovative-related firms is largely demonstrated in literature [e.g. Jaffe, Trajtenberg
and Henderson [116], Carrincazeaux, Lung and Ralle [35] and Verspargen and Schoenmakers [191],
among others), while some authors demonstrated the relevance of knowledge spillovers for cooperation
between firms or between firms and other R&D interfaces (e.g. Cassiman and Veugelers [36], Belderbos,
Carree and Diederenetal [24] and Fritsch and Franke [63]).
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wards engage in Cournot competition. Firms’ decision about location determines a R&D
spillover, which is inversely related to the physical distance between firms but could be
increased through cooperation. Additionally, the R&D output is assumed to be cost-
reducing and exhibit diminishing returns. Our results allow us to conclude that there is a
positive relationship between R&D output equilibrium and the distance between firms if
firms act independently, while the opposite happens if firms cooperate in R&D. Addition-
ally, if firms compete in R&D, the clustering of firms only occurs for a convex spillover
function, while if R&D activities run cooperatively, clustering is always observed if there
is an increased information sharing between firms.
2nd) Does spatial competition among firms inuences its decision about location and co-
operation in R&D?
A related question concerns with firms’ decision about location and cooperation in R&D
under spatial competition. In this case, we adopt a broad approach to the location-R&D
cooperation problem that could reproduce, for instance, the location choice of competing
firms between countries and its impact on the R&D cooperation decision. For our purpose,
we developed a three stage game between two firms to evaluate if its location choice in
two symmetric regions affects its decision to cooperate or compete in R&D. Firms face
positive transport costs between regions and may benefit from a knowledge spillover if
they were agglomerated, while if they were dispersed, no spillover will occur. In the R&D
stage, firms must decide about its cost-reducing R&D output, independently or under
cooperation. Moreover, if firms cooperate in R&D, they must decide about the amount
of know-how to disclose to the research joint project. We then assumed that proximity
between firms augments the confidence between entrepreneurs and reduces uncertainty in
the disclosure of know-how.
From our results, we were able to conclude that, if transport costs are sufficiently high,
firms will disperse between regions and cooperate in R&D in order to overcome the ab-
sence of R&D spillovers. In contrast, if transport costs are low, cooperating firms will
agglomerate if the probability of disclosing information is low, while they will disperse if
this probability is high in order to lessen the weight of transport costs.
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3rd) What determines firms’ location choice?
Specifically, we intend to evaluate the importance of both geographical, sectorial and tech-
nological determinants for firms’ location choice, according to its technological intensity
and structure. For that purpose, we make use of micro-level data for the Portuguese man-
ufacturing sector and focus on the location choices made by new starting plants. We
considered the entire manufacturing sector, and also samples according to the number of
plants and firms’ technological intensity. The set of explanatory variables includes vari-
ables that are traditionally stressed by urban and regional theory, such as production costs,
demand indicators and agglomeration economies, as well as technological variables, such
as R&D expenditures. The model is based on the random utility maximization framework
and proceeds through a Poisson model and a Negative Binomial regression.
From our results, we were able to conclude that for the total manufacturing sector, the
main determinants for firms’ location decision are the agglomeration economies and both
labor and land costs. However, when we consider the multi-plant versus the single-plant
location choices, we observed that new multi-plant firms are particularly sensitive to ur-
banization economies, land costs and local market, while new single-plant firms are more
responsive to labor costs and agglomeration economies. Additionally, when considering
the high-tech sample, we notice that the costs variables lose importance, while the urban-
ization economies and the R&D expenditures gain relevance.
The thesis is organized as follows. Next chapter is devoted to a brief dissertation about
the importance of space and location theory in economic science. Afterwards, we pro-
ceed through economic modeling to study the inuence of firms’ decisions about location
on R&D cooperation under knowledge spillovers. Subsequently, we evaluate if spatial
competition among firms inuences its decision about location and cooperation in R&D.
Finally, we proceed through empirical modeling to evaluate the importance of geograph-
ical, sectorial and technological determinants for firms’ location choice. We finish with
some final remarks.
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Chapter 2
Location and Spatial Economics
One of the most salient features of the world economic development is the agglomeration
of economic activity in a small number of cities or industrial clusters. As researchers, we
are therefore led to ask: how does economic theory explains the agglomeration of eco-
nomic activity? Answering this question applies for the development of economic models
that specifically integrates space in economic analysis. But what is spatial economics?
Briey speaking, and according to Duranton [54], spatial economics is concerned with
the allocation of resources over space. Clearly, its main focus is location choice, but it
could deal with almost anything economics is concerned about.
We then turn to a central question: how does economic models deals with space and
explain the location choices of economic agents? Our starting point is the neoclassical
paradigm, which assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale. So, is spatial
economics only about adding a spatial dimension to the neoclassical models? According
to Fujita and Thisse [67], the neoclassical economic theory is developed on the basis of
a set of simplifying assumptions that avoid the assimilation of space in the analysis. If
6
we have under consideration the orthodox model of Arrow and Debreu [13], then each
commodity would be defined by all its characteristics, including its location: the same
good traded in different locations must be treated as a different good. This seems to
obviate the need for a theory that specifically integrates space. So, under the constant
returns to scale and perfect competition paradigm, economic activities will be evenly
distributed across the homogenous space.
But, as Starrett [179] enunciated in his Spatial Impossibility Theorem, if space is homoge-
nous and transportation of goods is costly, then any possible competitive equilibrium (if
it exists) is such that no transportation of any good can occur in the entire economy. This
means that if economic activities are perfectly divisible and transport is costly, then there
exists a competitive equilibrium such that each location operates as an autarchy to save on
transport costs and no agglomeration is observed. We then have that the perfect compet-
itive price mechanism, alone, cannot endogenously generate economic agglomerations.
Instead, if we assume imperfect divisibility of economic activities, which justifies pos-
itive transportation costs between locations and the non-convexity of the set of feasible
locations, then there is no competitive equilibrium.
In consequence, and according to Fujita and Thisse [67], to understand the spatial dis-
tribution of economic activities, and in particular, the formation of economic agglomera-
tions, we must adopt at least one of the following assumptions: space is heterogeneous,
as in comparative advantage models or in pioneering static location models markets are
imperfect, as in spatial competition theory or in monopolistic competition models with
increasing returns there are externalities in production and/or in consumption, as in ex-
ternality models.
2.1 Comparative advantage models
One possible way to deal with space in economics is founded on the international trade
framework. This approach assumes that space is heterogeneous by considering the uneven
distribution of immobile resources and amenities across space, as well as the existence of
7
transport nodes. It builds on David Ricardo’s theory of economic rent that relies on dif-
ferentials on land relative productivity, which was later extended to the consideration of
Hecksher-Ohlin’s theory of trade that assumes differences in relative factor endowments
over space. The Ricardian-Hecksher-Ohlin approach then explains the location of eco-
nomic activities based on the existence of (exogenous) comparative advantage among
locations, which gives rise to interregional and intercity trade. Additionally, it retains the
assumption of constant returns and perfect competition, and so, it can be easily incor-
porated in Arrow-Debreu’s framework. However, and according to Duranton [54], this
approach plays a minor role in the development of spatial economic theory, as it provides
a partial explanation for the location patterns within a country.
2.2 Static location models
Instead, pioneers in spatial economics have focused on location choice by assuming that
there are non-convexities in the set of feasible allocations that result from positive trans-
port costs. This was the case of Von Thünen [193], who developed the first formalization
of spatial economics. Von Thünen intended to study the patterns of land use when land
is homogeneous and transportation costs to a monocentric city are costly. Under these
assumptions, spatial equilibrium typically involves concentric rings around the city, be-
ing the use of land determined by both the output revenue and the inputs costs, land rent
and transportation costs. According to Fujita and Thisse [66], Von Thünen’s model is still
compatible with the competitive paradigm, as it assumes constant returns to scale and
perfect competition and, as a result, the market outcome is likely to be socially optimal.
Despite the now well recognized importance of its contributes, Von Thünen’s ideas idled
for more than a century without attracting significant attention. Subsequent research on
land use includes Alonso [3], who extended the von Thünen’s central concept of bid-rent
curves to urban context in which the monocentric city is replaced by a central business
district.
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It was almost at the end of the nineteenth century that space emerged again on the eco-
nomic analysis, with the works of Launhardt and Weber. Focusing on the industrial loca-
tion choice, Launhardt [126] explained the optimal location choice of an industrial plant
as the site where the transport costs of both inputs and output were minimum. However,
the most prominent author on industrial location theory is Weber [195], who studied the
location choice of a competitive and indivisible firm that faces transport costs for both
inputs and output. In Weber’s framework, all buyers are concentrated at a given buying
center and each seller locates with respect to the buying center. Price is given and there
is no location interdependence between firms. Then, the optimum location of the firm
depends on the ratio between quantities of inputs and outputs and also on the relative
transport rates on each of the goods shipped.
In spite of abstracting from input substitutability, market demand or the location interde-
pendence between firms, Weber’s inuence was universal. With the exception of Palander
[156] and Hoover [97], who were concerned with the size of the firm’s market area and
therefore, with demand variables, most subsequent works abstract from market variables.
For instance, Predöhl [165] and Isard [112] developed a cost analysis, Moses [143] al-
lowed for input substitution and concluded for a simultaneous co-determination of both
optimum input combination and optimum location of the firm and Linke [129] stressed la-
bor and agglomerative differentials in explaining and measuring industrial displacements
from transport centers.
2.3 Spatial competition models
Another line of research in spatial economics develops on the contributes of Hotelling
[98], Fetter [57], Lerner and Singer [128] and Chamberlin [37] and focus on the spatial
interaction between firms by assuming oligopolistic competition between them. In this
case, firms are no longer price-takers and make price policy dependent on the spatial
distribution of consumers and firms. This generates some form of direct interdependence
between firms and households that may produce agglomeration, while the market outcome
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is inefficient. It departs from oligopolistic competition models, which assumes a finite
number of large agents who interact strategically by accounting for their market power.
In Hotelling [98]’s model, firms simultaneously choose its location and afterwards set
their prices. He assumed that buyers were scattered over an area and production costs
were equal at all locations, while delivered price varies with location. Each firm is able
to sell to the nearest buyer at delivered prices if they are lower than its rivals’ ones, which
lead the seller to become a local monopolist. As a result, spatial competition between
firms lead firms to concentrate, a result known in the literature as the principle of minimum
differentiation.
In a subsequent work, Chamberlin [37] demonstrated that Hotelling’s principle of agglom-
eration was not robust, being necessary to introduce agglomeration economies. Lerner
and Singer [128] demonstrated that the optimal location of the firm is inuenced by the
elasticity of the industrial demand curve, the height of the freight cost and the charac-
teristics of the marginal production costs. They also concluded that agglomeration only
occurs if demand is inelastic and in the absence of fixed transportation costs. Treading on
Hotelling’s footsteps, Kaldor [117] assumes that consumers will buy from the firm with
the lowest "full price", including transport cost, and therefore, each firm competes only
with its neighbors, independently of the total number of firms in the industry.
In a world wide cited paper, d’Aspremont, Gabzewics and Thisse [47] have shown that no
price equilibrium exists if firms were located close enough to each other. They concluded
that spatial competition between firms does not imply agglomeration because firms whish
to differentiate in order to reduce the intensity of price competition. Therefore, the princi-
ple of minimum differentiation could only hold if an additional differentiation dimension
is allowed. For instance, by assuming product differentiation (Ben-Akiva, De Palma and
Thisse [27]) or consumers heterogeneity (De Palma et al [49] and Anderson, De Palma
and Thisse [7]) or by considering spatial Cournot competition (Hamilton, Thisse and
Weskamp [84] and Anderson and Neven [8]).
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2.4 Monopolistic competition and increasing returns
According to Fujita and Thisse [66], the assumption of increasing returns is essential for
the explanation of the emergence and growth of economic agglomerations. In fact, scale
economies are a strong centripetal force, either because it makes profitable for firms to
concentrate in a few number of plants, or because it makes larger markets more attractive
for firms, thus triggering a cumulative process of agglomeration. Actually, under non-
increasing returns and a uniform distribution of resources, the economy would reduce to
a Robinson Crusoe type, where each individual would produce only for his own consump-
tion5. This was recognized by early location theorists, such as Christaller and Lösch, and
undertaken by new economic geographers, like Krugman and Venables.
2.4.1 Early contributes
Christaller and Lösch assumed that scale economies in production, as well as in trans-
portation costs, were essential to understand the location of economic activities. Chistaller
[41]’s Central Places Theory focus on the location choice of services that are market
oriented. In his model, population and demand were homogeneously distributed in an
isotropic space while supply was concentrated in cities. As a result, it emerges a hierar-
chical system of places around a city (the centre of the community) that results from the
correspondence between the spatial distribution of supply and demand, the strength of this
correspondence varying from function to function and being dependent on the economies
of scale and transportation costs. The Christaller hexagonal system then provides a plausi-
ble spatial structure, involving a hierarchical system of centres, but somewhat restrictive,
as it was difficult to apply. Extensions and modifications to Christaller’s Central Places
Theory have been proposed, the foremost contribution is due to August Lösch.
According to Fujita and Thisse [66], an unequal distribution of resources seems to be insufficient
to serve as the only explanation for location choice. Accordingly, we can therefore conclude that increas-
ing returns to scale are essential for explaining the geographical distribution of economic activities ("folk
theorem of geographical economics").
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Lösch [131] developed a model of monopolistic competition that assumes indivisibilities
in production and positive transport costs. He conceived a homogeneous and isotropic
landscape where population has identical preferences and is evenly and continuously dis-
tributed. Additionally, he assumed that firms face identical technological conditions and
entry is free. As consumers pay for transport costs, which are linear with the distance, he
was able to derive the demand over space for a single-good and, therefore, each seller’s
market area. He then concluded that positive profits will induce rivals to enter in the mar-
ket, which results into a hexagonal zero-profit market-area for each seller. Lösch recog-
nized that different industries would possess different-size hexagons which in turn would
generate different inter-industry concentrations. The extent of the concentration of pro-
duction depends both on increasing returns to scale and on the transportation costs6. He
then generalized his model to the n-good case, which revealed to have too many inconsis-
tencies to yield a stable system-wide equilibrium.
Subsequent research includes Isard [112], who reformulates spatial economic theory by
integrating the contributes of Von Thünen, Weber, Christaller and Lösch, and also Green-
hut [74] [72], who focus on the profit maximization location choice and on the spatial
distribution of firms and its relation with pricing policies.
2.4.2 The new economic geography
In recent years, a new approach emerged within economic geography that puts emphasis
on pecuniary externalities and merges them into a general equilibrium model of monop-
olistic competition. On one side, imperfect competition is more suitable to encompass
pecuniary externalities, as prices do not perfectly reect the social values of individual
decisions. On the other side, general equilibrium analysis allows to account for the inter-
action between the product and labor markets. Additionally, and as the explanation for the
agglomeration of the economic activity is based on some distortions of the market mech-
anism, market outcomes are likely to be inefficient. This new approach finds its roots
In fact, we have that the greater the extension of the increasing returns to scale, the smaller the number
of production points. Similarly, the higher level of transportation costs, the greater the number of production
points (Parr [157]).
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on the seminal paper of Krugman [124] and it has become known as the “new economic
geography”.
Krugman [124] suggested that industry agglomeration is the result of demand linkages
between local firms developed by the interaction of transport costs and economies of
scale. The starting point for his approach is the monopolistic competition model à la Dixit
and Stiglitz [53], which assume that each firm is negligible in the sense that it may ignore
its impact on other firms, but retains enough market power (given by increasing returns)
for pricing above marginal cost, regardless of the total number of firms. Also, each firm’s
demand depends on the actions taken by all firms in the market, but, although firms are
price-makers, strategic interactions between them are very weak7.
Combining the Dixit-Stiglitz model with an iceberg-type transport cost, Krugman exam-
ine the conditions under which a country can endogenously become differentiated into
an industrialized “core” and an agricultural “periphery”. The model is simply described
as a two-sector economy, where agriculture and industry produce, respectively, a homo-
geneous good under constant returns and a differentiated good under increasing returns.
The development of the model and its resolution for the transport costs parameter allows
for the prediction of a monotonic decreasing relationship between the degree of agglom-
eration and the level of transport costs. Krugman also suggested that the details of the
geography that emerges - the regions “core” and the regions “periphery” – depends sen-
sitively on the initial conditions, so that history matters8.
In the last decade, this strand of the literature has grown exponentially (see Fujita, Krug-
man and Venables [64] for a comprehensive analysis). Several extensions to the origi-
nal Krugman’s model have been proposed, which introduced more realistic assumptions:
Krugman’s approach offers a formalization of Myrdal [145]’s theory of circular and cumulative
causation and Hirschman [93]’s model of unbalanced growth with backwards and forwards linkages.
In spite of the relevance of Krugman’s findings, it becomes necessary to find out how they are re-
lated with its model’s assumptions and whether its assumptions are realistic. In fact, the use of both CES
utility and iceberg transportation costs, while extremely convenient, conicts with research in spatial pric-
ing theory and may be unrealistic. Additionally, the assumption of interregional labour mobility seems to
conict with some empirical cases, as, for instance, the European case. Other assumptions could also be
relaxed, as the assumption of zero transport costs for the homogenous good or the homogeneity of work-
ers’ preferences. Additionally, the assumption of free entry and exit leads to zero profit so that a worker’s
income is just equal to his wage. Last, the difference between price competition and quantity competition
is immaterial in a monopolistic competition setting.
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Venables [190] assumed inter-sectorial rather than interregional labor mobility Fujita,
Krugman and Venables [64]) assumed positive transport costs for both traditional and
modern sector Ottaviano [153] considered the inuence of workers’ expectations on the
process of agglomeration Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse [154] introduced quasi-linear
utility functions and linear trade costs Tabuchi and Thisse [184] assumed that workers’
preferences were heterogeneous. Extensions to a dynamic setting were also developed,
as it was the case of Martin and Ottaviano [137], who merged a model of endogenous
growth with a new geography model and demonstrate that aggregate growth and spatial
agglomeration were self-reinforcing processes.
Although the details of the agglomeration process vary with the models, there is, in gen-
eral, support for the emergence of a core-periphery structure and for a trade-off between
transport costs and agglomeration. These conclusions agree with the evidence of a secu-
lar fall in transportation costs and the intensification of the geographical concentration of
economic activities.
2.5 Externalities
Another reason for agglomeration comes from external economies. According to Mar-
shall [136], the clustering of firms may arise from (i) mass-production (or internal scale
economies) and external economies, such as (ii) the formation of a highly specialized la-
bor force based on accumulation of human capital and face-to-face communications, (iii)
the availability of specialized input services and (iv) the existence of modern infrastruc-
tures.
The now standard classification of Marshallian external economies9 is attributed to Hoover
[96] and distinguishes between urbanization economies, which are external to firms and
	The concept of external economies has been subject to a great effort of precision. According to
Scitovsky [174], there are two concepts of external economies: technological externalities (or spillovers)
and pecuniary externalities. The former deals with the effects of non-market interactions, which are realized
through processes directly affecting the utility of an individual or the production function of a firm. By
contrast, the latter refers to the benefits of economic interactions, which take place through usual market
mechanisms via mediation of prices. Marshallian externalities are a mixture of both technological and
pecuniary externalities.
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industries but internal to a city, and localization economies, which are external to firms
but internal to an industry. More precisely, and according to Henderson [90], urbaniza-
tion economies reect the benefits from operating in large population centres with cor-
respondingly large, overall labor markets and large, diversified service sectors to interact
with manufacturing. On the other hand, localization economies could reect economies of
intra-industry specialization that permit a finer division of the production function among
firms, labor market economies that reduce search costs for firm seeking workers with
specific training and communication economies that can speed up the adoption of inno-
vations.
The evidence shows that both types of external effects are at the origin of several spe-
cialized and prosperous areas. According to Porter [162], externalities are maximized in
regions with geographically specialized and competitive industries, and so, localization
economies are the main reason for the success of industrial clusters. In contrast, Jane Ja-
cobs [114] believes that the most important knowledge transfers come from outside the
core industry, which supports the relevance of urbanization economies.
Typically, externality models appeal to the constant returns and perfect competition par-
adigm while assuming that the main forces for agglomeration comes from non-market
interactions between firms and/or households. Literature frequently focus on city forma-
tion, as it was presented by Henderson [89] and Black and Henderson [28], as well as on
industry clustering modelling, such as Glaeser el al [70], Soubeyran and Thisse [177] and
Belleame, Picard and Thisse [26].
2.6 Some final remarks
According to Simões Lopes [176], although space has been neglected in the mainstream
of economic theory, its importance is recognized for a long time. As we mentioned above,
traditional general equilibrium models employ space as an additional characteristic of
each commodity but revealed to be unable to explain the endogenous formation of eco-
nomic agglomerations. As a consequence, and in order to account for space in economic
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questions, it is necessary to introduce additional assumptions, such as heterogeneity in
space, imperfect markets or externalities.
What is spatial economics concerned with? If we adopt a broad perspective and think that
economic activity has to take place somewhere, then spatial economics may relate with
almost anything economics is concerned about. In fact, and according to Duranton [54],
topics such city growth, technological spillovers or social networks still have a spatial
dimension, whilst its importance remains to be determined. Undoubtedly, the main focus
of spatial economics concern with the location choice of economic agents. Questions
such as: why do firms cluster in some regions, or, why do cities exist, are at the core of
spatial economics.
The overview of main contributes for spatial economics is the starting point for our re-
search, which focus on the topic of firms’ location under knowledge spillovers.
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Chapter 3
Firms’ Location and R&D Cooperation in an Oligopoly
with Spillovers
3.1 Introduction
Ever since Marshall [136], it is widely accepted that firms gain from their joint location
because they benefit from economies on the transport of goods, people and ideas. How-
ever, if firms are rivals in the product market, geographical proximity makes competition
between them fiercer and this acts as a centrifugal force. Obviously, the outcome of both
centripetal and centrifugal forces depends on their relative strengths. Additionally, even if
being strong competitors in the product market, firms frequently adopt a cooperative be-
havior in what concerns, for instance, Research and Development (R&D) activities (e.g.
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin [48] and Kamien, Muller and Zang [118]).
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This chapter aims at explaining if firms’s decision about location revises when firms co-
operate or compete in R&D and benefit from diverse knowledge spillovers. For that pur-
pose, we developed a three-stage game amongst three firms where each firm decides about
location, R&D and output. We assumed that firms’ decision about location determines a
R&D spillover, which is inversely related to the distance between firms. Also, the R&D
output is presumed to be cost-reducing and exhibit diminishing returns. As expected, co-
operation is only allowed in the R&D stage.
Our results allow us to conclude that there is a positive relationship between R&D output
equilibrium and the distance between firms when firms act independently. When firms
cooperate in R&D, the R&D output for a cooperating firm increases with the degree of
information sharing between them, as well as with a reduction of the distance between
cooperating firms. Firms’ decision about location is also affected by R&D activities:
if R&D activities run independently, the clustering of firms only occurs for a convex
spillover function if R&D activities run cooperatively, clustering is always observed if
there is an increased information sharing between firms.
In the next section, we discusses the theoretical framework on R&D cooperation games
and location choice. Subsequently, we proceed with a sketch of the model, which is
presented in two scenarios - competition and cooperation in R&D - and enunciate the
propositions concerning our research goal. Finally, we will end with some concluding
remarks.
3.2 Research Background and Motivation
It has been long recognized that knowledge spillovers are a major inuence on firms’ lo-
cation choice, alongside with the access to a pooled market for skilled labor, the availabil-
ity of specialized inputs and the existence of modern infrastructures (Fujita and Thisse
[65]). The idea is rather simple: spillovers occur more easily if geographical proxim-
ity is observed, as ideas ow more easier over shorter distances. In effect, literature on
the geography of innovation usually confirms the existence of geographically mediated
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spillovers that are distance-sensitive (e.g. Jaffe [115], Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson
[116], Anselin, Varga and Acs [9], Carrincazeaux, Lung and Ralle [35], Adams [1], Arun-
del and Geuna [14], Verspargen and Schoenmakers [191] and Audretsch, Lehmann and
Warning [18], among others). At the same time, knowledge spillovers seem to be at a
great extent responsible for the emergence of cooperative behaviours between firms or
between firms and other R&D interfaces (e.g. Cassiman and Veugelers [36], Belderbos et
al [24], Fritsch and Franke [63] and Veugelers and Cassiman [192]).
The purpose of this research is to evaluate wether firms’ decision about location revises
if firms cooperate or compete in R&D and benefit from knowledge spillovers. For that
end, we will develop a strategic interaction model that merges the topic of firms’ location
within a R&D decision game. Two strands of the literature converges to our goal: on one
side, the industrial economics approach to the topic of R&D cooperation on the other
side, the regional economics research on the issue of firms’ location.
3.2.1 R&D cooperation games
It is generally recognized that R&D activities have some public good features, as firms
cannot fully appropriate the returns of their R&D investments, due to the existence of
R&D spillovers. As a result, R&D expenditures are usually less than socially optimal. For
this reason, R&D cooperation frequently emerges, so as to internalize spillovers. Other
advantages of R&D cooperation are to capture the economies of scale or complementar-
ities in R&D, as well as potential beneficial effects coming from firms’ coordination of
research activities and the diffusion of know-how and R&D output among cooperating
firms. Against these advantages is the fear that the participating firms may free-ride on
other firms, as well as the possibility of reduction of competition in the product market,
which would result in a welfare loss.
Cooperation in R&D is usually identified with research collaboration and is often inves-
tigated in the context of two-stage oligopoly models in which firms make their R&D de-
cisions in a first pre-competitive stage and their quantity/price setting in a second stage.
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The first attempt to analyze R&D cooperation in oligopolist markets was made by Katz
[121], who proposed a four-stage model of process innovation to examine the formation
of a Research Joint Venture (RJV). He assumed that firms behave noncooperatively, but
can agree to form an independent R&D lab. Katz concluded that industry-wide agree-
ments tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree of product competition is
low, when there are R&D spillovers and when the agreement concerns basic rather than
development research.
The most inuential article on R&D cooperation is due to d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
[48], who assumed that there are spillovers in R&D output and concluded that, for a large
spillover coefficient, the collusive level of R&D was higher than the non-cooperative one.
Another prominent work is Kamien, Muller and Zang [118], which proposed spillovers in
R&D expenditures and allowed for different R&D organization models that may involve
R&D expenditures cartelization and/or full information sharing. They have shown that
Research Joint Venture (RJV) competition was the least desirable model as it yields higher
product prices, while RJV cartelization was the most desirable, because it provides the
highest consumer plus producer surplus under Cournot competition, and, in most cases,
under Bertrand competition10.
Since these starting articles, a lot of scientific models emerged around the topic of R&D
cooperation, providing numerous extensions to those original models. Particularly rel-
evant for our research are the extensions to a oligopolistic scenario with industry-wide
agreements. This was the case of Suzumura [182], who concluded that for large spillovers,
neither noncooperative nor cooperative equilibria achieve even second-best R&D levels,
while in the absence of spillovers effects, the noncooperative equilibrium seems to over-
shoot the social optimal level while the cooperative R&D does not reach a social opti-
mum. Also in the context of an oligopolist industry but allowing for cooperation among
a subset of firms is Poyago-Theotoky [163]. She demonstrated that there was an inverse
relationship between the development of R&D activities and the degree of an exogenous

Although Kamien, Muller and Zang’s model seems a priori more appropriate for an universal use,
most literature adopted D’Aspremont and Jacquemin’s methodology (see Amir [4] for an analytical com-
parison of both models).
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R&D spillover: as the spillover coefficient increases, firms see a larger proportion of the
results of their R&D activity ow over to the other firms, which lead them to reduce its
R&D activities.
Additionally, we found some quite interesting articles that make the R&D spillover en-
dogenous. It was the case of Katsoulacos and Ulph [120], who intended to examine
the effects of a RJV when R&D spillovers are endogenous. They considered that the
spillovers among firms depend both on the adaptability of the research and on the amount
of information sharing among them. They demonstrated that noncooperation can produce
maximal spillovers and that a RJV may behave in an anti-competitive way by choosing
partial RJV spillovers or by closing a R&D lab. Also, Poyago-Theotoky [164] considered
a typical R&D-output duopoly game but assumed that the R&D spillover results from a
strategic decision made by firms. After having evaluated the scenarios of R&D compe-
tition and R&D cooperation, she concluded that R&D cooperation leads firms to engage
in more R&D but also make them completely disclose its know-how. As well, in Amir,
Evstigneev and Wooders [5]’s article, cooperating firms choose the optimal level of the
spillover parameter. It is shown that the optimal cartel always prefers extrema spillovers.
Other authors considered some specificities or asymmetries in R&D spillovers. Vonortas
[194] considered diverse degrees of spillover between cooperating firms, according to the
type of research: generic research would produce higher spillovers than specific research.
He then concluded that joint ventures that simply allow members to coordinate their ac-
tions can improve firms’ incentives for R&D over non-cooperation only in the presence of
high knowledge spillovers, while if joint ventures additionally improve information shar-
ing among firms will raise social benefits, even in the presence of relatively insignificant
spillovers. Steurs [180] tried to evaluate the importance of both inter and intra-industry
R&D spillovers. He concluded that inter-industry R&D spillovers have a very important
effect on firms’ incentives to invest in R&D both directly and indirectly, because of their
inuence on intra-industry R&D spillovers. Also, R&D agreements that cut across indus-
tries may be more socially beneficial than cooperatives whose membership comes from
a single industry. Amir and Wooders [6] assumed one-way spillovers from the firm with
higher R&D activity to its rival (but never vice-versa) through a binomial function. They
21
demonstrated that no equilibrium can be symmetric even though the two competing firms
were ex-ante identical. Thus, an industry configuration emerges with a R&D innovator
and a R&D imitator. Additionally, they compared the performance of a RJV with a join
lab or pure R&D competition and concluded for the superiority of the joint lab over R&D
competition.
Other approaches introduce the concept of absorptive capacity, which means that each
firm needs to conduct its own R&D in order to realize spillovers from other firms’ R&D
activity [Cohen and Levinthal [43], Kamien and Zang [119] and Grünfeld [77]]. Alter-
natively, some papers involve dynamic models, as it was the case of Petit and Tolwinski
[160], who extended the existing literature on cooperative/competitive R&D into a con-
text of a dynamic model. Finally, and in the context of uncertainty and contracts theory,
several articles have been produced, from which we may distinguish Macho-Stadler and
Pérez-Castrillo [132], Choi [39], Morasch [142], Pérez-Castrillo and Sandonís [159] and
Cabral [32], among others.
3.2.2 Location choice under knowledge spillovers
According to Isard and Smith [113], one of the basic problems which has long plagued
location theorists has been the question of interdependent location decisions. In recent
times, it emerged a large body of literature that recurs to game theory in order to study the
topic of location choice. Historically, one set of these location games has centered around
the Weberian agglomeration problem, while another has centered around the Hotelling
spatial-competition problem.
As we have alraedy seen, Weber [195]’s theory of industrial location assumed a pure
competition framework, as all buyers were located in a given buying center and the de-
mand for each product was unlimited at the prevailing price. Also, the quantities of inputs
used for production as well as the places where they were purchased were given a pri-
ory. Under this scenario, the optimal location of the firm corresponds to the site where
the transportation costs of both inputs and output were minimum (Greenhut [75]). Ex-
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tensions to Weber’s model include Hoover [97], Palander [156], Predöhl [165] and Isard
[112], among others.
On the other hand, spatial competition models typically assume that firms interact strate-
gically with respect to location, as they encompass oligopolistic rivalry (Fujita and Thisse
[65]). This approach finds its roots in the seminal work of Hotelling [98], according to
whom competition for market areas is a centripetal force that would lead firms to con-
gregate, a result known in the literature as the Principle of Minimum Differentiation. In a
subsequent paper, d’Aspremont, Gabzewics and Thisse [47] demonstrated that the Princi-
ple of Minimum Differentiation was invalid, and since then, a considerable effort has been
devoted to restoring the validity of that principle. For instance, by introducing enough
heterogeneity in consumers (e.g. De Palma et al [49]) or by considering explicitly price
collusion (e.g. Friedman and Thisse [62]).
Recently, location models have been extended to capture the topic of firms’ location under
knowledge spillovers11. Some authors focus on the relevance of Marshallian technologi-
cal externalities for the location decision made by firms. This was the case of Belleame,
Picard and Thisse [26], who assume that the formation of regional clusters depends on the
relative strength of three forces: the magnitude of localization economies, the intensity of
price competition and the level of transport costs. They considered an oligopoly where
firms producing a differentiated product decide to locate in two possible regions and then
compete in prices. Also, they assumed that the marginal costs of production are a decreas-
ing function of the number of similar firms located together. Then, they concluded that
the impact of localization economies on location choice rises as transport costs between
regions fall and as the market size increases. Soubeyran and Weber [178] considered an
oligopoly where firms are heterogenous, due to distinct "stand-alone" district-dependend
production and transportation costs. Every firm chooses its location among a set of indus-
trial districts and its production costs is affected by local socio-economic spillovers that
depend on the number of firms existing in that district. Thus, firms had under consider-
In recent years, an alternative approach that puts emphasis on pecuniary externalities and merges them
into a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition emerges. This new approach finds its roots
on the seminal paper of Krugman [124] and becomes known as the core-periphery models. However, it
clearly overhead the purposes of this research that focus on technological externalities.
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ation the reciprocal nature of cost-reduction as by joining a district, they engage in tacit
cooperation: firms reduce its own costs but also the costs of their rivals. They demonstrate
that a dispersed equilibria might emerge if firms and districts’ characteristics possess suf-
ficiently heterogeneity.
In a very interesting paper, Soubeyran and Thisse [177] focus on the collective learning-
by-doing process and its impact on the development of industrial districts. They assumed
that the cost function of a firm is a decreasing function of the total output produced in
the past by the firms established in that local. Know-how is assumed to be individual
workers-specific, which are immobile. They studied the dynamic of the regional system
and concluded that the economy converges toward a balanced/unbalanced spatial struc-
ture, depending on the way workers interact to build their stock of knowledge.
In a rather different framework, Lai [125] proposed to evaluate the impact of technological
spillovers on the location choices of duopolistic firms in a Weber triangle. He assumed
that the technological spillover was decreasing with the distance between firms and it
is cost reducting. He then concluded that, when the distance to the market is constant,
then each firm’s optimal location is independent of a demand shock. However, when the
distance to the market is variable, a firm’s optimal location will not be independent of a
demand shock if one of the duopolistic firms has a non-linear technology. However, these
authors do not model R&D spillovers explicitly.
Other approaches explicitly considered R&D spillovers but focus on its inuence on the
localization of R&D activities. Franck and Owen [60] focus on the role of country-specific
stocks of knowledge on the R&D localization decision made by firms. Each firm’s tech-
nological efficiency depends not only on its investment in applied R&D, but also on its
absorption of domestic and foreign fundamental R&D, as well as the extent to which the
later are substitutes or complements. Also, firm’s absorption of foreign fundamental R&D
depends on the decision to locate R&D activities abroad. They concluded that, in the case
foreign and domestic knowledge stocks are substitutes, firms have fewer incentives to lo-
cate R&D in the foreign market, while the opposite happens when knowledge stocks are
complementary.
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Making difference between internal and external spillovers, Gersbach and Schmutzler
[69] model a duopoly where firms choose production and innovation locations before
Bertrand competition takes place. They allow for both internal communications and ge-
ographically bounded external spillovers. In their model, they find that higher external
spillovers do not necessarily make agglomeration more likely, while efficiency of internal
transfers promotes agglomeration of innovation. Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers [171]
focus on the trade-offs that a multinational (MNE) faces when organizing its R&D decen-
tralized versus centralized. They allowed for both internal and external knowledge ows
but ignore interaction effects with potential rival MNE’s. They demonstrate that the rel-
ative market size loses relevance as a locational factor for R&D decentralization if the
cost of intra-firm communications falls. Also, Belderbos, Lygogianni and Veugelers [25]
model the R&D location choice made by two multinational firms competing both abroad
and in their home markets. They considered both local inter-firm knowledge ows and
international intra-firm R&D spillovers. In equilibrium, the shares of R&D performed
abroad depend on the importance of spillovers, the strength of product market competi-
tion, the efficiency of intra-firm transfers and wether the firm is a technology leader or
technology laggard.
Additionally, some articles focus on the role of R&D spillovers on production-location
choice. Mai and Peng [133] presented a very simple model of spatial competition à la
Hotelling that introduces an element of tacit cooperation through information exchanges
between firms that are distance-sensitive. They have shown that equilibrium location can
be achieved in a wide range from minimum to maximum differentiation depending upon
the relative strength of the cooperation effect over competitive effect. Additionally, they
concluded that the larger is the externality between firms, the less will be the location dif-
ferentiation between them. Agata and Santangelo [2] developed a three-stage noncooper-
ative R&D game with endogenous spillovers, where firms decide about its technological
profile and geographical localization, R&D level and Cournot quantities. They assumed
that the R&D spillovers are inversely related with the geographical distance between firms
but also depend on the cognitive distance between firms. They then concluded that suc-
cessful spillovers require co-localization and exclude technological sameness and tech-
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nological dissimilarity. Also, Piga and Poyago-Theotoky [161] developed a three-stage
duopoly model à la Hotelling where firms choose location, quality-enhancing R&D and
price under the assumption that R&D spillovers depend on firms’ geographical distance.
They demonstrated that the higher is the degree of product differentiation (or alternatively,
the higher the transportation costs), the higher is the distance between firms and the R&D
effort.
To our knowledge, very few articles merges R&D cooperation decision with some models
of location choice under R&D spillovers. It was the case of Long and Soubeyran [130],
who conditioned the R&D spillovers to firms’ decision about location and investigated
how firms’ decision about location is affected by the shape of the spillover function and
by the decision of firms to cooperate or not in R&D. They concluded that the only Nash
equilibrium for a duopoly with symmetric locations is the agglomeration one, while for
an oligopoly with asymmetric locations, agglomeration is only guaranteed if the spillover
effect is convex in distance. They also allow for R&D cooperation between a subset
of firms and investigate under which conditions agglomeration and dispersion equilibria
might emerge. In the context of asymmetric information games, Baranes and Tropeano
[19] intended to explain why spatial proximity makes knowledge sharing between firms
easier in the context of clusters of competing firms. They developed a model where firms
must decide about location, researchers’ wages, research’s team formation and prices.
Information asymmetry arises, as firms are unable to observe the researcher’s effort or to
verify the innovation size. Several equilibria emerge, depending upon both the transport
costs and the research spillovers.
3.2.3 Motivation
The purpose of this essay is to explain if firms decision about locations revises under R&D
cooperation or competition in the context of competing firms and knowledge spillovers.
For that purpose, we developed a three-stage game amongst three firms where each firm
decides about location and R&D expenditures and after that engage in Cournot compe-
tition. Similar to Long and Soubeyran [130] and others, we also considered that firms’
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decision about location determines a R&D spillover coefficient, which is inversely related
to the physical distance between firms. As in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin [48], R&D
output is assumed to be cost reducing and exhibit diminishing returns. Finally, inspired in
Poyago and Theotoky [163], we also consider that only a subset of firms may cooperate
in R&D through an increase of the spillover coefficient.
The model we developed is related to Long and Soubeyran [130], who considered a model
of location choice by Cournot oligopolists with exogenous R&D expenditures. We ex-
tended it by introducing an intermediate stage where firms decide about R&D output.
This allows us to evaluate the sensitivity of R&D output to the distance between firms, as
well as to consider endogenous R&D outputs either if firms run R&D independently or
in cooperation. Additionally, Long and Soubeyran evaluated how firms’ decisions about
location are affected by their decisions on R&D cooperation. However, as R&D expen-
ditures’ decisions are not taken under consideration, they assumed that firms cooperate in
their location decisions if they collusively decide about R&D expenditures. Unlikely, we
study the problem of an entrant firm choosing its location among two incumbent firms in
a scenario of independent or R&D cooperation, whilst cooperation is only allowed in the
R&D game. This corresponds to an updating to previous research, as there is no evidence
that cooperation in both location and R&D decisions were perfectly correlated.
Through the resolution of the model, we intend to evaluate if firms’ decision about lo-
cation changes if they develop its R&D activities independently or in cooperation and
benefit from different knowledge spillovers. We then proceed with a sketch of the model,
which is presented in two scenarios - independent and cooperation in R&D - and present
main results.
3.3 The Model
There are  identical firms that produce a homogeneous output, whose inverse demand
function is given by
    (3.1)
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where  is total output (  ) (    and   	).
Each firm chooses its location in an open convex space 
 . As a result of location deci-
sions, firms will benefit from a R&D spillover,  , which is inversely related with ,
where     is a measure of the physical distance between firms  and     
The spillover function is such that       and    , that is,   is
a positive and decreasing function of the distance  between firms. For simplicity, we
will denote it by     
As it is typical in R&D cooperation models (e.g. d’Aspremont and Jacquemin [48]), we
will assume that R&D output is cost reducing through an additive formulation, that is:
    

 
   (3.2)
where  accounts for stand-alone marginal costs (identical to all firms)      and 
measures firm ’s R&D output. Additionally, it will be assumed that there are diminishing
returns to R&D expenditures, that is,     and    . In order to ensure
positive quantities, we will impose  

    .
The profit of firm  is then given by:
        (3.3)
As we focus on the geographical distance between firms and its impact on R&D activities
through a spillover function, we will neglect the transport costs to the product market.
It is proposed a three-stage game, where firms decide about location, R&D and produc-
tion. The timing is the following:
) Firms choose its location in space 
 , from which results    and    
	) Firms simultaneously choose the level of R&D output,   , independently or
under cooperation
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) Firms simultaneously choose the level of output,   , through Cournot compe-
tition.
For our purposes, we will assume   
     , whilst our results remain valid for
a larger number of firms. Additionally, and as in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin [48], we
will consider a specific functional form for the R&D cost function,   .
The game will be solved by backward induction to ensure subgame perfectness and we
will consider two alternative scenarios: R&D Competition, where firms choose its R&D
output independently, and R&D Cooperation, where a subset of firms cooperate and co-
ordinate R&D output in order to maximize joint profits.
3.3.1 Competition in R&D
Firm ’s profit function is given by:
           (3.4)
where     	      	     	 	 and   		
From the Cournot game it is straightforward to determine output equilibrium:
 
  
   	  
  	    
	  	  	

(3.5)
and second-stage profit function comes:
 
   


  
   	  
  	   (3.6)



	  	  

	
  
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After taking first-order condition and assuming that firms make a symmetric choice (that
is,     	  ), we may determine R&D output equilibrium (12)(13):
 


   	

 
  
   	 	  		  		   (3.7)
where  
   	 	  		  		     in order to ensure an interior
and positive solution for R&D output and quantities14.
Proposition 3.1 When firms run R&D independently, there is a positive relationship
between R&D output equilibrium and the physical distance between firms, if   		.
Proof. Taking partial differentiation of R&D output to the physical distance between
firms we get:





  

  	 
   	
  
   	   	  		  		



	
	
	

  

  	 
   	
  
   	   	  		  		

	
Given our assumptions, we have  	 	    and   , 	  . If we assume
  	 
   	   (15), then we will have 	   and 		  .
As a result,

	

   and 			  .
This result accords with intuition: as the distance between firms increases, firms will
perform a higher R&D output because a lower proportion of its R&D results will ow
over the other firms. Two effects give reason to this result. On one side, the inverse
relationship between firms’ distance and R&D spillovers, 	  , which derives from
Second order condition implies   ,        
According to Henriques [91], it is necessary to set proper parameter restrictions for the existence and
stability of equilibrium:   ,        
An interior solution is guaranteed for   ,       .
This assumption only recquires that   ,        
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our assumptions and can be ascertained for instance, in Mai and Peng [133] and Long and
Soubeyran [130]. On the other side, the well documented negative effect between R&D
spillovers and R&D output, 	  . In fact, several authors concluded that when
firms run R&D independently, its R&D output (or expenditure) is higher for a lower
R&D spillover. d’Aspremont and Soubeyran [48] concluded that, for the non-cooperative
solution, R&D output decreases with R&D spillover. In an extensive survey on the topic
of spillovers and R&D cooperation, Bondt [29] concluded that with low spillovers, Nash
rivals are supposed to invest more in R&D than with high spillovers. Also, he concluded
that positive and symmetric intra-industry spillovers tend to reduce the incentive for non-
cooperative investments in R&D. Poyago and Theotoky [163] demonstrated that, if firms
run R&D independently, the incentive to carry out R&D is greatly reduced in the presence
of high R&D spillovers because the benefits of R&D are common to all firms.
First-stage profit function then becomes:
 
   
  

  
   	
  
   	   	  		  		 (3.8)
In the location game, we will focus on firms’ best response for different R&D spillover’s
shapes, whilst spatial competition is leaved apart. For that purpose, we will consider the
problem of a single firm  choosing its location in a convex space where firms  and 
were located. So, firm  must choose  and 	, given 	.
Formally, given other firms’ location, firm  must choose its location subject to the fol-
lowing triangle inequality:
  	  	
Additionally, and as 	  , we must have:
	  
  
Without loss of generality, we will impose:
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	    
If we assume 	   and   , then 	   is always true, and so, this constraint
may be avoided.
Firm  will then solve the following problem:

 

 
  
     	  	  
  	    
    
The Lagrangean function corresponding to the maximization problem is then defined by:
     
       	  	   	      (3.9)
where      and     	 	
Through Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we have:
 






        (3.10)
 
	


	
	
	
      (3.11)
with                      and    	  	 
  	        
We now turn to first-stage profit function (3.8) and through simple arithmetic, we get
partial differentiates of firm ’s profit function with respect to its physical distance:





	  



 	  		  	
 
   	
  
   	   	  		  		 


(3.12)
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
	
	
	

	  



 	  		  	
 
   	
  
   	   	  		  		 

	
(3.13)
Given our assumptions, we have  	 	    and   , 	  . Addi-
tionally, if we assume 

 	  		  	
  
   	  (16), then
 	

   and  		 	  (17).
Allowing for different location choices, we will evaluate the best location choice for the
entrant firm, assuming first, that the incumbent firms were agglomerated and second, that
the incumbent firms were dispersed. We may then formulate the following propositions:
Proposition 3.2 If two firms were close located and no cooperation is allowed, then the
best location choice for an entrant firm is agglomeration, if   	  .
Proof. Assume 	  , that is, firms  and  are close located in space 
 . Under this
scenario, we may have agglomeration   	   or dispersion   	  . For
  	, then

 	

  

 		 

	  , and so, firm  will choose to be as
close as possible to incumbent firms.
Example 3.1 Suppose          and    For simplicity, let’s assume
  	 	   . If firms  and  were close located, then 	   and   	.
In this case, we could have agglomeration   	   or dispersion   	  .
Let’s consider a linear spillover function,      , whilst similar results
would be gathered with different spillover functions. We then have     	   
      	    	. So, given that firms  and  were joint located,
the best response for firm  is to join them.
We have 

	    
 
      for 
    , which ac-
cords with Amir [4], which imposed that for the consistency of the additive nature of the spillover process,
we must have    

	
 

.
Previous research on this topic confirms these results (e.g. Long and Soubeyran [130] established
that 

   and 

  ).
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Note that, as 	   and   	  , the entrant firm will always prefer to reduce its
distance to both firms in order to benefit from maximal spillovers. But what will happen
if the incumbent firms were dispersed?
Proposition 3.3 If two firms were dispersed in a convex space 
 and no cooperation is
allowed, then the best location choice for an entrant firm is in the straight-line between
incumbent firms, if   	  , that is:
  	  	
Proof. Assume false, that is, suppose that firm  chooses to locate in the vertices of a
triangle. In this case,  is non-binding and   . Then, giving our assumptions, we
may have one of the following situations: either (a) 	   or (b) 	   .
(a) If 	  ,  is binding and the remaining restrictions are non-binding. Then,
Kuhn-Tucker conditions may be resumed to:
(3.10)  	    
which is incompatible with (3.12), while
(3.11)  		 	    
is compatible with (3.13).
(b) If 	   , all restrictions are non-binding and Kuhn-Tucker conditions become:
(3.10)  	  
(3.11)  		 	  
which are incompatible with (3.12) and (3.13).
This proposition is quite intuitive: as the spillover is a decreasing function of the physical
distance between firms, firm  will proceed to be as close as possible to both firms, and so,
she will be located in the straight-line between them. The exact location will be sketch in
the following proposition:
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Proposition 3.4 If two firms were dispersed in a convex space 
 and no cooperation
is allowed, then the best location choice for an entrant firm depends on the shape of the
spillover function, if   	  :
(i) If  is a strictly concave function of the distance between firms, then the entrant firm
will be located exactly in between the incumbent firms
(ii) If  is a linear function of the distance between firms, then any location along the
straight line is possible
(iii) If  is a strictly convex function of the distance between firms, then the entrant firm
will choose to cluster with one of the firms or in between the incumbent firms.
Proof. From previous proposition, we have that   	  	. Then, we may have one
of the following mutually exclusive locations:
(a) Firm  locates at the same local of firm  and away from firm 
In this case,    	  	  , and so,  and  are binding. Kuhn-Tucker
conditions then come:
(3.10)  	      
(3.11)  			    
which accord with (3.12) and (3.13). Additionally, through simple arithmetic manipula-
tion of Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we have:
(3.10)-(3.11)  	   			    
which is compatible with
3.12)-(3.13)  	 			 


	







if and only if   	, that is, for a convex or linear spillover function, given 	 
  .
(b) Firm  locates along the straight line joining  and  but nearer to firm 
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In this case,     	 and so, only  is binding. Kuhn-Tucker conditions then
come:
(3.10)  	    
(3.11)  			    
which accord with (3.12) and (3.13). Additionally, through simple arithmetic manipula-
tion of Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we have:
(3.10)-(3.11)  	   			  
which is compatible with
(3.12)-(3.13)  	   			 



	







if and only if   	, that is, for a linear spillover function, given 	    .
(c) Firm  locates exactly at the middle point of the straight line joining  and 
In this case,   	     	  ,and so,  and  are binding. Kuhn-
Tucker conditions then come:
(3.10)  	    
(3.11)  			      
which accord with (3.12) and (3.13). Additionally, through simple arithmetic manipula-
tion of Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we have:
(3.10)-(3.11)  	   			  
which is compatible with
(3.12)-(3.13)  	  			 
	

	

if   	, that is, for any shape of the spillover function, given   	
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Our results allow us to conclude that the entrant firm will always cluster with one of the
firms if the R&D spillover is linear or convex in firms’ physical distance, while for the
case of a strictly concave spillover function, no clustering is observed, as the entrant firm
chooses to stay in between the two incumbent firms. This conclusion is simply justified
by the shape of the spillover function:
(i) If the spillover function is linear in distance, then it is indifferent for firm  to cluster or
not with an incumbent firm, as any location yields the same total spillover effect (figure
3.1):
Bij Bik
Bij+Bik
dij dik
Figure 3.1. Firm i’s total spillover with a linear spillover function
(ii) If the spillover function is concave, then locating at the middle point between the
incumbent firms is the best choice as it yields the maximum total spillover for firm 
(figure 3.2):
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Bij Bik
Bij+Bik
dij dik
Figure 3.2. Firm i’s total spillover with a concave spillover function
(iii) Finally, if the spillover function is convex, then clustering with one of the incumbent
firms is the best choice, as it yields the maximum total spillover for firm  (figure 3.3):
Bij Bik
Bij+Bik
dij dik
Figure 3.3. Firm i’s total spillover with a convex spillover function
At last, let’s make use of an example to fully clarify our proposition:
Example 3.2 Assume          and    For simplicity, let’s assume
  	 	    and   	  	  . In this case, we could have agglomeration
   	   or dispersion   	  . We will have different choices for
different shapes of the function:
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For a linear spillover function,      , agglomeration and dispersion are
equivalent:     	         	    
For a convex spillover function,    



, agglomeration is the best choice
for firm :    	           	    
For a concave spillover function,      , dispersion is the best choice for
firm :     	    
       	    
So, from our results we were able to conclude that the best location’ s strategy for an en-
trant firm depends on the shape of the spillover function: if the spillover function is linear
or convex in firms’ physical distance, then clustering is observed, while if the spillover
function is strictly concave then no clustering emerged. Clearly, our conclusions are de-
rived in a context where an entrant firm choose its location, given other firms’ location.
Alternatively if we consider that all firms choose their locations sequentially, then the
result will be an agglomeration equilibrium, whilst it would be gathered faster if the R&D
spillover is convex in distance. In fact, if the spillover function is convex, then a sequential
game implies that the first firm chooses its location, and after that all firms, sequentially,
cluster with her. If the spillover function is concave, the entrant firm locates in between
the other two firms, but sequentially, each other firm will locate in between the other firms.
At the end, all firms will be agglomerated in a single point. Also, if we consider that all
firms choose their locations simultaneously, then all of them anticipate that each other´s
best response either is in the middle point location if the R&D spillover is concave, or to
cluster if the R&D spillover is convex. In any case, but faster in the last case, the result
will be an agglomeration equilibrium.
3.3.2 Cooperation in R&D
Cooperation in R&D may involve different dimensions and run through different design
models. Typically, cooperation involves R&D cartelization, that is, the coordination of
R&D expenditures in order to maximize joint profits. Most of the literature usually as-
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sumes industry-wide agreements (e.g., d’Aspremont and Jacquemin [48], Kamien, Muller
and Zang [118], Suzumura [182] and Vonortas [194]), while others analyze cooperation
within a subset of firms of a given industry (e.g., Poyago-Theotoky [163]). Frequently,
the size of the R&D cartel is exogenous, whilst few papers aim at endogenize it (e.g., Katz
[121] and Atallah [15]). Besides R&D cartelization, cooperating firms may jointly agree
to internally raise the spillover parameter. In the limit, the sharing of R&D results could
be set to its maximal value, a scenario described by Kamien, Muller and Zang [118] as
cartelized RJV. Usually, the degree of information sharing between cooperating firms is
assumed to be exogenous, while some articles aim at endogenize it (e.g., [120], Poyago-
Theotoky [164], Piga and Poyago-Theotoky [161] and Amir, Evstigneev and Wooders
[5]).
In this research, we will assume that a subset of firms cooperate and form a R&D cartel,
whilst cooperation in the location decision or the production stage is never allowed. In
our approach, R&D cooperation involves both R&D cartelization and increasing the in-
formation sharing between cooperating firms. Formally, this may be modelled through
an increase of the spillover through a coefficient   , where   . Throughout this
approach, we intend to separate the effect of the location’s decision  from the effect of
the cooperation decision  on total spillover, . Having in mind Kamien, Muller and
Zang [118]’s typology, we will have, for the case of RJV cartelization,   , while for
the R&D cartelization case, we will have    and   .
Assume firms  and  decide to cooperate in R&D. Unit production costs then become:
       		
       		
	   	  	  	
where   
Firms’ second-stage profit function then comes:
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 
   


  
   	 



  	  

 (3.14)



	  	  

	
  
where     	 	 and      	.
In the R&D stage, cooperation implies that each firm within the R&D cartel will choose
its R&D output in order to maximize joint profits, while non-cooperating firms will max-
imize individual profit:
  
     
   	  
 	 
   		  
(3.15)
Imposing symmetry between cooperating firms (     = R&D output for a cooper-
ating firm) and non-cooperating firms (	   = R&D output for a non-cooperating firm)
and solving for  and  gives us R&D output equilibrium18:
      	    
 	  	 	  	  	 
				
				
					
	  		  
	  	    
  	  		  	 
			 

	 			 
	 		  	 			 		 


	  	  	  	    	  		
   	   
 	  	    	     	   	]/
[	(
								
		

			 	 										
													
Second order condition recquires   	       and    Sufficient condition
for the stability of equilibrium recquires          and    (Henriques [91]).
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Literature usually refers that R&D output equilibrium for cooperating firms is higher
than R&D output equilibrium for non-cooperating firms when R&D spillovers are high
because in this case, it can avoid resources duplication (see, at this purpose, Katsoulacos
and Ulph [120], Bondt and Henriques [30], Steurs [180] and Bondt [29]).
Simple simulations on R&D output equilibrium for cooperating and non-cooperating
firms also confirms this conclusion (figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6).
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Figure 3.4. R&D output equilibrium for cooperating (x) and non-cooperating (y) firms
when delta*Beta = 1
In fact, we have that for the RJV cartelization case

  

, R&D output for cooperat-
ing firms is always higher than R&D output for non-cooperating firms. However, if there
is no increasing of information sharing between cooperating firms (  ) and focus-
ing on the clustering location

   	  	 	  	

and on the dispersion loca-
tion

  	  	   	

, then R&D output equilibrium for cooperating firms is
higher than R&D output equilibrium for non-cooperating firms only for high spillovers
between cooperating firms.
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Figure 3.5. R&D output equilibrium for cooperating (x) and non-cooperating (y) firms
when delta=1 and Beta(ik)=Beta(jk)
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Figure 3.6. R&D output equilibrium for cooperating (x) and non-cooperating (y) firms
when delta=1 and Beta(ij)=Beta(ik)
Let’s now evaluate how R&D output is sensitive to the distance between firms.
Proposition 3.5 When a subset of firms cooperate in R&D, its R&D output equilibrium
will be higher for a higher degree of information sharing and for a lower physical distance
between them, if   		
.
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Proof. Given our assumptions, we have  	 	   ,   , 	   and
   Then, through simulation, we have that for   	
	, 	  	  
and then

	

  .
These results are quite intuitive and find confirmation in related literature. In fact, and
leaving apart the inverse relationship between firms’ distance and R&D spillovers, the
positive relationship between R&D output equilibrium and the spillover between coop-
erating firms is well documented in R&D texts. After evaluating different R&D design
models, Kamien, Muller and Zang [118] found that R&D effective output is higher in the
RJV cartelization case, where   , when comparing with simple R&D cartelization,
where   . Comparing a secretariat RJV (  ) with a operating RJV (  ),
Vonortas [194] concluded that the operating entity is more effective than the secretariat
in improving firm’s performance over the non-cooperative industry. Particularly, he ob-
served that the operating entity members always invest more in R&D than the members
of a secretariat, even when they both spend less than the non-cooperative case. Bondt [29]
reached that cooperative R&D investments are typically stimulated by larger spillovers.
The following corollary completes previous proposition:
Corollary 3.1 R&D output equilibrium for cooperating firms increases with the distance
to non-cooperating firms, if   	
	.
Proof. Given our assumptions, we have  	 	   ,   , 	   	  
and    Then, through simulation, we have that for   	, then 			 
. Similarly, for   	
	, we have, through simulation, that

		

	  .
So, when taking under consideration cooperating and non-cooperating firms, proposition
3.1 remains valid: there is a positive relationship between the R&D output and the dis-
tance between cooperating and non-cooperating firms. Additionally, we expect that R&D
output equilibrium for non-cooperating firms increases with the distance to cooperating
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firms19. This behavior is justified by the need to avoid that R&D output spillovers to com-
peting firms.
First-stage profit function then becomes:
 
     


  	  	  	  	  (3.16)

	  	  

    
where  and   are the R&D output for cooperating and non-cooperating firms, respec-
tively.
In the location decision game, we will consider again the problem of a single firm  choos-
ing its location in a delimited space where firms  and  were located. Note that cooper-
ation is not allowed in the location stage, and so, the formulation of the problem is very
similar to the independent case:

 

 
    
     	  	  
  	    
    
Applying Kuhn-Tucker conditions to the Lagrangean function gives us similar expres-
sion to (3.10) and (3.11). Through tedious calculations, then, for    , 

	  ,
  	 	       ,   , we have, though simulation that, for  
	
	 




  (3.17)

	
	
	
  (3.18)
	As        and   , we have, through simulation, that for   	, 



 and for   	, 



 
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After evaluating different scenarios for location, we may conclude that the location choice
when incumbent firms are agglomerate is invariant with a cooperative or competitive be-
havior in R&D:
Proposition 3.6 If two firms were close located and cooperation in the R&D stage is al-
lowed, then the best location choice for an entrant firm is agglomeration, if   	
	.
Proof. Assume 	  . Under this assumption, firm  have two hypothesis: either firm 
chooses to locate near  and    	   or firm  chooses to locate away from firms
 and    	  .
(a) If   	   (agglomeration), then all restrictions are binding with the associated
multipliers non negative. Kuhn-Tucker conditions then come:
(3.10)  	      
(3.11)  			      
which accord with (3.17) and (3.18) and confirms that agglomeration is an equilibrium.
(b) If   	   (dispersion), then only  is binding and Kuhn-Tucker conditions
come:
(3.10)  	    
which is incompatible with (3.17), while
(3.11)  			    
accords with (3.18. So, dispersion is not an equilibrium.
Next example will complement previous proposition:
Example 3.3 Suppose          and    For simplicity, let’s assume
  	 	   . If firms  and  were close located, then 	   and   	.
In this case, we could have agglomeration   	   or dispersion   	  .
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As before, we consider a linear spillover function,      , whilst similar
results would be gathered with different spillover functions. We then have:
If firms do not increase the information sharing   , then
    	      

    	    		
If firms totally increase the information sharing between them   	, then
    	    	  

    	    		
So, given that the incumbent firms were agglomerated, then the best location choice for
the entrant-cooperating firm is to join them.
So, if two firms are joint located, the best response for a R&D cooperating firm is ag-
glomeration. But whatever if they were geographically separated? As in the independent
case, the best location choice for the entrant firm is in the straight-line between incumbent
firms:
Proposition 3.7 If two firms were dispersed in a convex space 
 and cooperation is
allowed in the R&D stage, then the best location choice for an entrant firm is in the
straight-line between incumbent firms, if   	
	, that is,
  	  	
Proof. Assume false, that is, suppose that firm  chooses to locate in the vertices of
a triangle. In this case,  is non-binding. Then, we may have one of the following
mutually exclusives situations:
(a) Firm  chooses to locate at the same distance to both firms   	. In this case,
only  is binding and Kuhn-Tucker conditions are resumed to:
(3.10)  	    
which is incompatible with (3.17), while
(3.11)  			    
47
accords with (3.18).
(b) Firm  chooses to locate closer to firm    	  In this case, all restrictions are
non-binding and Kuhn-Tucker conditions come:
(3.10)  	  
which is incompatible with (3.17), while
(3.11)  			  
accords with (3.18).
The exact location of the entrant-cooperating firm will be sketch in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 3.8 If two firms intend to cooperate in R&D through joint profit maxi-
mization and increased information sharing, then clustering is always observed if  
	
	.
Proof. Assume false, that is, assume firm  chooses to locate exactly in between firms
 and  so that   	, whilst   	  	  . Then Kuhn Tucker conditions are
resumed to:
(3.10)  	    
(3.11)  			      
which accord with (3.17) and (3.18). However, through simple calculations, we have,
[(3.10) - (3.11)]  	   			  	  
Having in mind that   	 	    and assuming   	
	 we have that, for
  ,    and so,
[(3.17) - (3.18)]  	   			  
which contradicts Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
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As it was expected, R&D cooperation affects firms’ decision about location: if there is
an increasing information sharing between firms and joint profit maximization, then the
entrant-cooperating firm always prefer to locate near the incumbent-cooperating firm for
every shape of the spillover function, and so, clustering is a immediate result from coop-
eration. However, to achieve this result it is required an increasing information sharing
between firms. In fact, if we assume   , then

 	
  		  , and so,
we can not eliminate the middle point location. Next example will help us to fully clarify
our proposition:
Example 3.4 Assume          and    For simplicity, let’s assume
  	 	    and   	  	  . In this case, we could have agglomeration
   	   or dispersion   	  .
For a linear spillover function,      , agglomeration is the best choice for
firm  
R&D cartel         	           	    	
RJV cartel         	    	


       	    		
For a convex spillover function,    



, agglomeration is also the best
choice for firm :
R&D cartel         	    	       	    	
RJV cartel         	    	
       	    		
For a concave spillover function,      , agglomeration is the best choice
for firm  if there is an increasing information sharing between cooperating firms:
R&D cartel         	    	       	    	
R&D cartel         	    	       	    	

RJV cartel         	    	
	       	    		
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3.4 Concluding remarks
Empirical research usually confirms the strong propensity for the clustering of innovative
related activities, which is commonly justified by the existence of knowledge spillovers.
Additionally, proximity is frequently cited as an explanation for the emergence of coop-
erative behaviors among firms or between firms and others interfaces (e.g. Universities).
Inspired in several empirical results, we intended to evaluate if firms’ decision about loca-
tion revises wether firms cooperate or compete in R&D. Through a simple game between
three firms, from which two of them intend to cooperate in R&D, it was possible to con-
clude that the clustering of firms is always true if firms run R&D cooperatively. In fact,
we demonstrated that if R&D runs independently, the entrant firm will cluster if the R&D
spillover function is convex in the physical distance between firms. On the other hand, if
R&D runs cooperatively between the entrant and an incumbent firm, then the entrant firm
will always prefer to stay close to the cooperating-incumbent firm if there is an increas-
ing information sharing among them. In any case, if the two incumbent firms were close
located, agglomeration is always observed.
Our results also concern about R&D output equilibrium. We demonstrated that if R&D
runs independently, then R&D equilibrium output is larger as the distance between firms
increases. The intuition is simple: as the distance between firms increases, firms will
perform an higher R&D output because a lower proportion of its results will ow over
the other firms. However, if R&D runs cooperatively, then R&D equilibrium output for
cooperating firms increases with the degree of information sharing between them, as well
as with the reduction of the distance between cooperative firms. On the other hand, it
reduces when the distance from cooperative firms to non-cooperative firms is shorter.
With respect to R&D equilibrium output for non-cooperating firms, results were similar
to the independent case.
Research on the topic of location choice and R&D cooperation may proceed in several
directions. One possible line of research is to introduce uncertainty with respect to the
R&D output (e.g. Choi [40], Combs [44] and Hauenschild [86]), which might affect firms’
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decision about location and R&D cooperation. Another research topic concerns with the
consideration of firms’ absorptive capacity (e.g. Kamien and Zang [119]), which might
affect firm’s decision about location and R&D cooperation. Finally, research may also
proceed with an evaluation of the implications of R&D policies for the location choice
and R&D cooperation (e.g. Hinlopen [92] and Leahy and Neary [127]).
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Chapter 4
A Spatial Competition Model with R&D Coopera-
tion
4.1 Introduction
Empirical research usually supports the hypothesis that knowledge spillovers have a pos-
itive inuence on the location and agglomeration of firms (e.g. Jaffe, Trajtenberg and
Henderson [116], Feldman [56], Carrincazeaux, Lung and Ralle [35] and Verspargen and
Schoenmakers [191]). Furthermore, the emergence of cooperative behaviors among com-
peting firms and its relation with knowledge spillovers is also evidenced (e.g. Cassiman
and Veugelers [36], Belderbos et al [24] and Fritsch and Franke [63]).
This research aims at evaluating if spatial competition between competing firms affects its
decision about location and R&D cooperation. For that purpose, we developed a strategic
interaction game between two firms to assess if its location choice affects its decision to
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cooperate or compete in R&D. We assumed that firms benefit from a knowledge spillover
if they were agglomerated, while if firms were dispersed, no spillover will occur. Also,
firms must decide to cooperate or compete in R&D. Additionally, if firms cooperate in
R&D, they must decide about the amount of know-how to disclose to the research joint
project, which is uncertain if firms are dispersed. Finally, firms are allowed to sell its
product in both internal and external market, having under consideration positive transport
costs between regions.
The resolution of the model allows us to conclude that, for sufficiently high transport
costs, firms prefer to disperse between regions and cooperate in R&D in order to overcome
the absence of spillovers. Accordingly, if transport costs are low, firms will agglomerate
if the probability of disclosing information is low, while if this probability is high, then
cooperating firms will disperse and thus lessen the weight of transport costs.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We start with a brief overview of
the literature on spatial competition and knowledge spillovers. Next, we proceed with a
description of the model, which is developed under two scenarios - agglomeration and
dispersion - and investigate how firms’ decision about location and R&D cooperation
were related. The final section concludes the chapter.
4.2 Related literature
Since the seminal paper of Hotelling [98], a large and rich literature on spatial competition
has emerged. Usually, location models are classified into shopping or shipping models. A
shopping model (or a mill pricing model) assumes that consumers bear the transport costs
(e.g. Hotelling [98]), while a shipping model (or delivered price model) assumes that
firms deliver the product and pay for the transport costs (e.g. Hoover [97] and Greenhut
and Greenhut [72]). According to Fujita and Thisse [65], shopping models seem to be
appropriate to study competition between sellers of consumption goods, while shipping
models would describe better competition between sellers of industrial goods. Though
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with different aims, both models have the same centrifugal and centripetal forces, thus
leading to similar location patterns under similar assumptions.
Spatial competition models may also encompass either Bertrand or Cournot competi-
tion20. Most literature deals with price competition and finds their roots in Hotelling [98]’s
model, who assumed that consumers have an inelastic demand and are uniformly distrib-
uted along a bounded linear market. He then concluded that the only Nash equilibrium for
the duopolists with a linear transport cost function is at the centre of the market. This re-
sult, known as the Principle of Minimum Differentiation, has been criticized and extended
since its publication. For instance, d’Aspremont, Gabzewics and Thisse [47] demon-
strated that agglomeration intensifies price competition between firms, which drives prof-
its to zero. As a result, firms will choose to maximize their spatial differentiation in order
to obtain positive profits. Eaton and Lipsey [55] examined the conditions under which the
Principle of Minimum Differentiation was valid and concluded for its corroboration only
for the duopoly case and if firms pursue a strategy of zero conjectural variation. Even
if assuming uneven consumers distribution (e.g. triangular markets) and simultaneous or
sequential firms entry, no agglomeration equilibria is obtained (e.g. Tabuchi and Thisse
[183] and Tsai and Lai [186]).
Under Bertrand competition, agglomeration only occurs if an additional differentiation
dimension is allowed. De Palma et al [49] restores the principle of minimum differen-
tiation by assuming enough heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes. Ben-Akiva, De Palma
and Thisse [27] assumed different brand specifications, besides location differentiation,
and concluded that firms agglomerate at the market centre when product differentiation is
large enough. Also, Friedman and Thisse [62] demonstrated that if partial price collusion
is allowed, then there is a unique location equilibrium that involves firms agglomeration.
Assuming that consumers maximize a random utility function, Anderson, De Palma and
Thisse [7] demonstrated that firms agglomerate at the market centre when price competi-
tion is weaken by sufficient heterogeneity in products/consumers. Recently, information

According to Gupta, Pal and Sarkar [83], studying Cournot or Bertrand competition depends largely
on the nature of the product. For instance, price competition is more likely when products are highly
advertised, while quantity competition is more likely in the case of heavy manufacturing.
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asymmetry or incomplete information have also been introduced as an explanation for
spatial agglomeration under price competition (e.g. Tropeano [185], Valletti [188] and
Christou and Vettas [42]).
A relatively smaller body of literature deals with Cournot competition and location games
and usually predicts that an agglomeration equilibria exists if population density is suf-
ficiently important21. Pioneering contributes are due to Greenhut and Greenhut [72] and
Norman [146], who assumed that firms behave as Cournot oligopolists and discriminate
over space. However, these authors were mainly concerned with the pattern of equilib-
rium prices resulting from Cournot competition and treated location as a non-strategic
variable.
A more recent approach, launched by Hamilton, Thisse and Weskamp [84] and Ander-
son and Neven [8], focus on the study of spatial Cournot competition with endogenous
location choice. They considered a location-quantity game in the traditional Hotelling’s
linear city model, with a linear demand and linear transportation costs. Hamilton, Thisse
and Weskamp [84] considered a duopoly and compared the outcomes of Bertrand and
Cournot competition, while Anderson and Neven [8] generalized for n-firms. They both
concluded that Cournot competition yields firms agglomeration.
Gupta, Pal and Sarkar [83] extended Anderson and Neven’s [8] research by allowing for
non-uniform consumer distributions along the interval [0, 1]. They established the ro-
bustness of the agglomeration equilibria for a broad class of consumer density functions,
concluding that (i) agglomeration of all n firms is an equilibrium and (ii) agglomeration
of duopolists is the only equilibrium. Also, Mayer [140] allowed the production costs to
differ across various locations, and concluded that agglomeration still emerges if produc-
tion cost are convex (or minimum at the center), while if production costs are concave,
then agglomeration is not observed.
Most work in spatial competition literature is based on the linear city model, while few
analyze endogenous location in Salop’s [170] circular city. Adopting an uniform dis-
According to Gupta et al [82], this result accords with empirical studies. So, the predictions arising
from a spatial Cournot model often describe the real world better than those arising from a spatial price
competition model.
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tribution of consumers along a circular city, Pal [155] demonstrated that both Bertrand
and Cournot competition yield dispersed and identical equilibrium location: firms locate
equidistant from each other on the circle so that total transportation cost are minimum.
Matsushima [139] also analyzed the location and quantity choice in a circular city and
demonstrated that firms may agglomerate at two points in a circular city, which differ
from Pal’s equidistant location pattern. In a subsequent paper, Gupta et al [82] demon-
strated that both agglomeration and dispersion location equilibria might emerge in a circu-
lar city. They have identified several equilibria, which predict either an equidistant, non-
equidistant, multiple or a continuum of locations. They have also demonstrated that ag-
glomeration equilibrium only involves a subset of firms, which contrast with the existing
literature. Also, Matsumura, Ohkawa and Shimizu [138] introduced non-linear transport
costs and demonstrated that Pal’s dispersion equilibria is more robust than Matsushima’s
partial agglomeration equilibria, as the first holds for any transport cost functions while
the later only holds for a linear transport cost.
4.3 Motivation
Over the recent years, a significant body of literature has emphasized the importance of
the exchange of information among firms (e.g. Becattini [23], Porter [162]). Particularly,
several researchers claim for the localized character of the diffusion of knowledge (e.g.
Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson [116], Audretsch and Feldman [16] and Feldman [56],
among others).
In this chapter, we intend to develop a model of spatial competition à la Hotelling that in-
corporates knowledge spillovers as a centripetal force. Inspiration was found in the work
of Belleame, Picard and Thisse [26], who considered an oligopoly where firms produc-
ing a differentiated product decide to locate in two possible regions and then compete in
prices. They have also assumed that firms benefit from localization economies that de-
pend on the number of firms that are co-located. Another relevant paper is Soubeyran
and Weber [178], who extended previous work by considering an arbitrary number of re-
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gions, strategic interaction captured by Cournot competition and heterogeneity of firms
transportation and production costs. Both articles generally support the relevance of lo-
calization economies as transport costs between regions fall.
Recently, spatial competition models have been extended to capture knowledge spillovers
that are R&D specific. It was the case of Mai and Peng [133], who presented a model of
spatial competition à la Hotelling that introduces an element of tacit cooperation between
firms through information exchanges that are distance-sensitive. Additionally, Piga and
Poyago-Theotoky [161] developed a three-stage duopoly model where firms choose loca-
tion, quality-enhancing R&D and price under the assumption that R&D spillovers depend
on firms’ geographical distance. They demonstrated that the higher the degree of prod-
uct differentiation (or alternatively, the higher the transportation costs), the higher is the
distance between firms and the R&D effort.
We intend to improve previous research by explicitly considering that firms engage in
either R&D cooperation or competition. Our purpose is to evaluate if firms decision about
cooperation or competition in R&D are affected by firms’ location choice in the context of
spatial competition and knowledge spillovers. To our knowledge, although some authors
focus on spatial competition between firms under R&D spillovers, no attempts have been
made to explicitly introduce a R&D cooperation decision.
This research will merge R&D cooperation models into a spatial competition framework,
which are typically disconnected in literature. As we have already seen in the previous
chapter, R&D models are built by means of an oligopoly model in which firms make
their R&D decision in a first pre-competitive stage and their quantity/price setting in
a second stage. The most prominent works are d’Aspremont and Jacquemin [48] and
Kamien, Muller and Zang [118], who proposed R&D cartelization under either R&D out-
put or R&D expenditures spillovers. Since these starting articles, a lot of scientific models
emerged around the topic of R&D cooperation, providing numerous extensions to those
pioneering articles. Particularly relevant for our research are the extensions that assume
uncertainty with respect to the success of a R&D project (e.g. Choi [40], Combs [44])
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and that consider asymmetries with respect to the disclosure effort (Pérez-Castrillo and
Sandonís [159], Rosenkranz [169] and Pastor and Sandonís [158]).
The model we developed is then related to Belleame, Picard and Thisse [26] and Piga
and Poyago-Theotoky [161] but we explicitly introduce a R&D stage where firms decide
to cooperate or compete in R&D and choose its know-how disclosure. More precisely, we
develop a three stage game between two firms, where each firm decides about location,
R&D expenditures and afterwards engage in Cournot competition. In the location game,
firms simultaneously decide about to locate in two symmetric regions. If both firms locate
in the same region (agglomeration), then they will benefit from a positive R&D spillover,
but if firms locate in different regions (dispersion), the R&D spillover will be zero. In
the R&D stage, firms must decide about its cost-reducing R&D output, independently
or under cooperation. Additionally, if firms cooperate in R&D, they must also decide
about the amount of know-how to disclose to the research joint project. Moreover, we
will assume that if firms locate in the same region, the disclosure effort is symmetric
and observable, whilst if firms disperse, they face uncertainty with respect to its rival’
disclosure effort. In the last stage, firms will decide about the quantities to sell in both
regions, having under consideration positive transport costs between regions.
4.4 The Model
We consider an economy with two firms,  and 	, producing a homogenous product. Both
firms decide first to locate in either two possible regions, ! and ". Afterwards, they will
decide to cooperate or compete in R&D and finally they will choose its quantities non-
cooperatively. Both regions are characterized by the same market conditions. We also
assume that markets are segmented, that is, each firm sets a quantity specific to the market
in which its product is sold. More precisely, the inverse demand functions in each market
are:
   
   
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where      and     .
Firms engage in R&D in order to reduce its production costs. Further, the R&D under-
taken by one firm may benefit its rival at no cost if firms locate in the same region. Addi-
tionally, the R&D spillover, denoted by , could be increased if firms cooperate in R&D
and voluntarily share its know-how. However, uncertainty emerges if firms locate in dif-
ferent regions, as in this case, firms are uncertain about its rival’s disclosure effort.
As it is typical in R&D cooperation models, we will assume that the R&D output is cost
reducing through an additive formulation, that is:
     
where  accounts for stand-alone marginal costs (identical to all firms)      and 
measures firm ’s R&D output    	. Additionally, it will be assumed that there are
diminishing returns to R&D expenditures, that is,     and    . In order to
ensure positive quantities, we will impose     . Also, and in order to guarantee
the existence of equilibrium, we will assume quadratic R&D costs,      		,
as in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin [48].
Each firm’s profit function then comes    	:
              		
In order to export its product, each firm has to incur in a constant unit transport cost from
one region to the other, which is given by   .
The timing of the game is the following:
(i) In the first stage, firms simultaneously decide about its location in two symmetric re-
gions, ! and ". If firms agglomerate, they will both benefit from a positive and symmet-
ric R&D spillover,     if firms disperse, no spillover will occur.
(ii) In the second stage, firms simultaneously decide about its cost-reducing R&D, inde-
pendently or under cooperation. Additionally, if firms cooperate in R&D, they must also
decide about the amount of know-how to disclose to the R&D cartel,     	, which
is uncertain if firms locate in different regions. For simplicity, we will focus on two ex-
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treme scenarios: either firms do not disclose any information to the R&D cartel   
(R&D cartel) or they will totally disclose its information     (Research Joint
Venture (RJV)).
(iii) In the last stage, firms compete in quantities.
The game will be solved by backward induction for its subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
We start by solving the last stage of the game where four subgames must be considered
according to wether firms are agglomerated or not and wether firms cooperate or nor in
R&D.
4.5 Agglomeration
Assume both firms locate in the same region. As regions are symmetric, we will assume,
without loss of generality, that firms choose to locate in region ! and export to region ".
We then have:
              (4.1)
              		
             
              		
4.5.1 Firms’ behavior in the product market
Taking first order conditions from (4.1) and solving for the equilibrium quantities:
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    	      	  	    	
 (4.2)
     	      	  	    	

    	  	     	     	

     	  	     	     	

If firms agglomerate, then in the second stage profit functions will be:
    	      	  	    (4.3)
   	      	  	   	   		
    	  	     	    
   	  	     	    	   		
4.5.2 R&D decision
4.5.2.1 R&D competition
If firms do not join the R&D cartel, they will carry out independent R&D and no disclo-
sure of information will occur, that is,      and they will maximize individual
profit functions. Taking first order conditions from (4.3) and solving for R&D output:
   
	 	      	
       (4.4)
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In order to have positive quantities, we must impose   	   for   	
 If firms
agglomerate in one region ! and compete in R&D , then its profit will be22:
  	             (4.5)


      	        	
	

      
4.5.2.2 R&D cooperation
Even if being competitors in the product market, firms may benefit from R&D coop-
eration. Under perfect information, firms will decide both about a cost-reducing R&D
through profit cartelization and about the amount of know-how to disclose to the R&D
cartel,  so that     .
For our purpose, we will assume that under agglomeration, firms have perfect information
about the know-how its partner discloses to the joint research. In fact, and as it is typical in
R&D cooperation literature (e.g. d’Aspremont and Jacquemin [48] and Kamien, Muller
and Zang [118]), we will assume that the disclosure effort is observable and contractible23.
Additionally, we will consider two disclosure efforts: either firms do not disclose any
information to the research joint project,      (R&D cartel) or they both disclose
its maximum know-how,       (RJV).
The R&D decision will then result from the following maximization problem:




               (4.6)
Second order condition for profit maximization implies 

  , which is true for  
   
Recently, some papers introduced asymmetries with respect to the disclosure effort. Pérez-Castrillo
and Sandonís [159] assumed that there is a moral hazard problem concerning the disclosure effort. They
have show that under certain circumstances, a profitable RJV do not start when the disclosure of know-how
is not contractible, and characterize the incentive contracts when they exists. In particular, they have show
that the inclusion of penalties can be a way of alleviating the incentive problem or the individual rationality
constraints. Moreover, they have also showed that a RJV can be an alternative to licensing contracts for the
transmission of know-how.
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where
 


   	      	  	   (4.7)
   	      	  	   
   	  	    	    
   	  	    	    
  		   		
Taking first order condition and solving for R&D output, we have:
   
	      	   
       (4.8)
In order to have positive quantities, we must impose   	   for   	. If
firms agglomerate in one region ! and cooperate in R&D , its profit will be24:
 



	      	    	     


           (4.9)
In addition, we expect to observe that the joint profit is higher if firms discloses its maxi-
mum know-how 
     . But although it would be optimal to play such strat-
egy, each firm has the belief that it could not hold, because firms’ individual profit is
higher if she breaches the contract. Actually, we have:
  
 
  

  
 

   
 
  

  


and
        
Second order condition for profit maximization implies 

  , which is true for  
        
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where # # denotes that both firms disclose its know-how (Research Joint-Venture), # 
that firm 1 discloses but firm 2 doesn’t, # that firm 2 discloses but firm 1 doesn’t and
 that none of them discloses its know-how (R&D cartel).
In order to compel firms to play the optimal strategy, we will impose that firms will incur
in a penalty if they do not disclose its know-how. In fact, and as it has been stated by
Pérez-Castrillo and Sandonís [159], the inclusion of penalties induce firms to share their
know-how when they are simultaneously competitors in the product market. The penalty
is then defined as:
           
As firms are symmetric, we just need to focus on one of them. Assume    and
   . We then have:
  
	 	              
	    	  	     	      	
	


	  	  
	    	       
Lemma 4.1 If firms cluster in the same region, the R&D disclosure effort is con-
tractible and a penalty imposed, then cooperation in R&D is a Nash equilibrium, if
  	.
Proof. From standard calculation
    	
	     	          	
   	 	    	
	

              	
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If firms make a R&D cartel, then none of them will disclose its know-how (  ) and
    	 	   
  	  
            	
where      for   	
If firms make a RJV, then all firms discloses its maximum know-how (   ) and
    	 	   
     
       	   

         	
As      for   	, then each firms’ profit is higher if firms discloses its
maximum know-how to the R&D cartel.
The relevance of proximity for the emergence of cooperative behaviors is supported by
several empirical and theoretical works. Research on the geography of innovation usually
supports the hypothesis of the relevance of proximity and knowledge spillovers for coop-
eration between firms [e.g. Cassiman and Veugelers [36], Belderbos et al [24] and Fritsch
and Franke [63]].
Baranes and Tropeano [19] developed a model in which two firms choose its location and
afterwards engage in R&D cooperation/competition while each firm’s researcher effort is
not observable. As a result, several equilibria might emerge, depending on the transport
cost from one region to another and on each researchers’ spillover. They concluded that
spatial agglomeration induces firms to voluntarily share knowledge and, at the same time,
as it induces tough competition between firms, it spurs knowledge sharing between firms.
That is, spatial agglomeration is a commitment on researchers’ behavior and thereby a
source of confidence between firms, which leads to cooperation and knowledge sharing.
Additionally, Long and Soubeyran [130] considered the implications of R&D spillovers
that are distance sensitive on the choice of locations by Cournot oligopolists. They also
considered the possibility of R&D cooperation within a subset of firms and concluded
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that agglomeration equilibria might emerge if the spillover function is convex and both
demand and cost functions were linear.
Example 4.1 Assume firms are agglomerated in one region and        
 We then have that, for every spillover rate and for every transport costs, firms’ individ-
ual profits are higher if firms cooperate in R&D when comparing with R&D competition,
provided a penalty is applied if firms do not exert the contractible disclosure effort (figure
4.1):
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Figure 4.1. Firm’s profit under spatial agglomeration: R&D competition and R&D cartel
Additionally, each firm’s profit is higher if a higher disclosure effort is supplied. In effect,
we have that firm’s individual profit is higher under a RJV (  ) than under a R&D
cartel (  ) (figure 4.2):
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Figure 4.2. Firm’s profit under spatial agglomeration: RJV and R&D cartel
4.6 Dispersion
Assume firms choose to locate in separated regions !". As regions are symmetric, we
will assume, without loss of generality, that firm  chooses to locate in region ! and firm
	 chooses to locate in region ". We then have:
           (4.10)
            		
          
           		
4.6.1 Firms’ behavior in the product market
Taking first order conditions from (4.10) and solving for the equilibrium quantities:
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So, if firms choose to locate in different regions, then they will face the following profit
function25:
     	      	 (4.12)
  	 	      		   		
    	   	  	  
     	  	  	   		
4.6.2 R&D decision
4.6.2.1 R&D competition
If firms run R&D independently, then they will maximize individual profit functions and
    :
Second order condition for profit maximization implies 

  , which is true for  
   
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     	      	 	  	 (4.13)
  		
    	   	       		
  		
Taking first order from (4.13) and solving for R&D output gives us
   
   
   (4.14)
In order to impose positive quantities, we must have   	   for   	.
If firms disperse $ and compete in R&D , then we have:
 
	               
	
    (4.15)
4.6.2.2 R&D cooperation
Although firms are dispersed, they may engage in R&D cooperation. However, they will
face uncertainty, as they do not know if their rival will disclosure its know-how. For our
purposes, we will assume two disclosure efforts: either firms do not disclose its know-how
to its partner 
      or firms totally discloses its know-how 
     .
Additionally, we will assume that firms are uncertain about each other’s disclosure effort,
but have information about the probability, %, that each firm discloses its know-how. For
simplicity, we will assume that both firms are symmetric and % is identical to both firms.
The R&D decision is then reduced to:




&   &    (4.16)
69
We then have:
&   &   &  (4.17)
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Taking first-order conditions and solving for R&D output:
   
   	 	% %  
  	% %   (4.18)
In order to have positive quantities, we must impose   	   for   	  If
firms disperse $ and cooperate in R&D , we then have26:
&



   %    %    %   (4.19)
	%  %    
%       
   	  	% %  
Lemma 4.2 If firms locate in different regions, the R&D disclosure effort is con-
tractible but uncertain and a penalty imposed, then cooperation in R&D is a Nash equi-
librium, if   	
.
Proof. From standard calculation
Second order condition for profit maximization implies 

  , which is true for  
       
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&   	

	      %   % 	 
	% % 
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where & 0, for %    and   	

Proposition 4.1 If the R&D disclosure effort is contractible and a penalty imposed,
then cooperation in R&D is a Nash equilibrium of the R&D game.
Proof. As results from lemma (1) and (2).
Example 4.2 Assume firms are dispersed in two regions and          
We then have that firms’ individual profits are higher if firms cooperate in R&D when
comparing with R&D competition, provided a penalty is applied if firms do not exert the
contractible disclosure effort. Additionally, each firm’s profit is higher if the probability
that both firms discloses its maximum know-how is higher (figure 4.3):
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Figure 4.3. Firm’s profit under spatial dispersion: R&D competition and R&D coopera-
tion
Proposition 4.2 If the R&D disclosure effort is contractible and a penalty imposed,
then, for a sufficiently high transport cost, the subgame perfect equilibrium for the loca-
tion - R&D game is {dispersion, cooperation}, if   	 .
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Proof. From standard calculations, we have:
 &   	 
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If firms disclose its maximum know-how to the RJV (  ), then &   
if   	 and for a sufficiently high  .
If firms do not disclose its know-how to the R/&D cartel (  ), then &   
if   	 and for sufficiently high 
Corollary 4.1 If the R&D disclosure effort is contractible and a penalty imposed,
then, for a sufficiently low transport cost and high uncertainty on the disclosure effort,
the subgame perfect equilibrium for the location - R&D game is {agglomeration, cooper-
ation}, if   	.
Example 4.3 Assume           We then have that, for a sufficiently
high transport costs, firms’ individual profits under R&D cooperation are higher if firms
disperse than when they agglomerate: &



  for   	 (figure 4.4):
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Figure 4.4. Firm’s profit under R&D cooperation: Agglomeration and dispersion
It is then possible to conclude that, for high transport costs, firms would prefer to disperse
between regions than to agglomerate. This conclusion is strongly support by the New
Economic Geography models (e.g. Fujita, Krugman and Venables [64]), which predict
that there is a monotonic decreasing relationship between the degree of agglomeration and
the level of transport costs. Additionally, we may observe that, for low transport costs,
cooperating firms prefer to firms agglomerate if the probability of disclosing its maximum
know-how is low. This conclusion is rather intuitive and results from the reduction of
uncertainty in R&D cooperation when firms are agglomerated. In effect, if the probability
that firms discloses its maximum know-how is high, then cooperating firms will disperse
and thus lessen the weight of transport costs. However, if this probability is low, then
firms will agglomerate, as uncertainty is reduced when they co-locate.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this research was to evaluate if spatial competition between firms inu-
ences its decision about location and R&D cooperation, when they benefit from knowl-
edge spillovers. Our model intends to improve previous research by assuming that com-
peting firms may engage in R&D cooperation and choose the disclosure effort, which is
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uncertain if firms were dispersed. We were able to demonstrate that, under spatial com-
petition, firms may take advantage of R&D cooperation to replicate the benefits of ag-
glomeration. In fact, we were able to conclude that, provided a penalty is applied for
any deviation behavior, firms will cooperate in R&D, either if they were agglomerated or
dispersed. Additionally, if firms cooperate in R&D and choose the disclosure effort be-
tween them, then the R&D spillovers are internalized, which lead firms to disperse for a
sufficiently high transport cost. However, and as firms face uncertainty with respect to
the disclosure effort if they were dispersed, we might observe agglomeration if transport
costs are sufficiently low.
Our results are therefore sufficiently intuitive and find confirmation in empirical research
and other economic models. In effect, several scholars claim that R&D cooperation net-
works might involve uncertainty and/or information asymmetry (e.g. Choi [39] [40],
Combs [44], Hauenschild [86], Morasch [142], Pastor and Sandonís [158]). Particu-
larly, the amount of know-how each firm discloses to the R&D cartel might be uncertain
and/or unobservable (Pérez-Castrillo and Sandonís [159], Rosenkranz [169]). Addition-
ally, proximity between firms seems to reduce uncertainty when competing firms are in-
volved in cooperation (Baranes and Tropeano [19]). It is, then, most likely that firms ag-
glomeration may reduce uncertainty and therefore uphold R&D cooperation if transport
costs are not too high. If transport costs are sufficiently high, we might expect to observe
dispersion, as it was realized by Krugman [124] and other new economic geographers.
In this case, firms may overcome the absence of knowledge spillovers by cooperating in
R&D if uncertainty with respect to disclosure effort is not too high.
Research on spatial competition and R&D cooperation is far from being concluded. We
expect to improve this research in several directions. One possible line of research is to
extended previous framework to a n-firms model, and evaluate agglomeration or disper-
sion equilibria under cooperation in R&D among a subset of firms. Another research
topic is to assume that firms may have private information about the degree of informa-
tion sharing. In this case, information asymmetry exists, which could be reduced if firms
locate in the same region. An incentive contract should then be developed, while it turns
to be a double moral hazard contract if firms were dispersed.
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Chapter 5
The Determinants of Firms’ Location Choice
5.1 Introduction
Understanding the determinants of business location choice is the subject of a large body
of literature, comprising both theoretical and empirical research. In fact, alongside with
renowned contributes for optimal location theory that claim the importance of cost factors,
demand variables and agglomeration economies for the decision about location, numerous
empirical studies have examined the relative significance of various factors in the business
site selection process. However, literature is scarce concerning both technological and
entrepreneurial features that might inuence plant location.
In this chapter, we intend to evaluate the importance of both geographical, sectorial and
technological determinants for firms’ decision about location. For that purpose, we make
use of micro-level data for the Portuguese manufacturing sector and focus on the location
choices made by new starting plants during 1992-2000 within 275 municipalities. We
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considered the entire manufacturing sector, and also samples according to both the num-
ber of plants and firms’ technological intensity. The set of explanatory variables includes
variables that are traditionally stressed by urban and regional theory, such as production
costs (land, labor and capital costs), demand indicators and agglomeration economies
(urbanization and localization economies), as well as technological variables, such as the
R&D expenditures.
The model is based on the random utility maximization framework and proceeds through
a Poisson model and a Negative Binomial regression. From our results, we were able to
conclude that for the total manufacturing sector, the main determinants for firms’ loca-
tion decision were the agglomeration economies and both labor and land costs. However,
when we consider the multi-plant versus the single-plant location choices, we were able to
conclude that new multi-plant firms are particularly sensitive to urbanization economies,
land costs and local market, while new single-plant firms are more responsive to labor
costs and agglomeration economies. Additionally, when considering the high-tech sam-
ple, we conclude that the cost determinants for location lose importance, whilst the ur-
banization economies and the R&D expenditures gain relevance.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Next section is devoted to an
overview of main contributes for location theory. Then, we focus on econometric studies
on industrial location choice and present our methodology that relies on the Random Util-
ity Maximization framework. Afterwards, we proceed through a detailed description of
data and variables we considered in our study and construct the main hypotheses. Finally,
we present the empirical results and concluding remarks.
5.2 Location Theory: A Brief Overview
According to Greenhut [75]27, location theory may be defined as a set of propositions that
aims at explaining the spatial organization of economic activities. Although it is possi-
ble to find rudiments of the location theory in the writings of many classical economists
In this section, we build on Figueiredo and Guimarães [58] for this overview.
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(Smith, Ricardo, Mill), the interest in plant location theory may be attributed to three Ger-
mans: Launhardt, Von Thünen and Weber, who proposed that the optimal location of the
firm corresponds to the least cost site (Least-cost theory). Another approach, launched by
Hotelling, focus on the demand side and postulates that the optimal location results from
the determination of the optimal market area in a context of spatial competition (Spatial
interaction theory). Finally, Lösch suggested that the optimal location depends both on
the costs and revenues that derives from each location (Profit maximization theory).
 The least cost theory
The cost minimizing theory emphasizes the search for the least cost site by abstracting
from demand and by assuming competitive pricing, different costs among locations and
a given buying center (Greenhut [73]). Early contributes are due to Von Thünen [193],
who was primarily concerned with agricultural locations (nevertheless, its theory is ap-
plicable to manufacturing locations). In the Von Thünen’s model, cost differences across
sites are due to the land rent and the transportation expense, while the cost of production
is the same everywhere. Therefore, the land rent and the cost of transporting goods are
the effective co-determinants of location. Focusing on industrial location, Weber [195]
highlighted the relationships between the input-output structure of the firm’s production
function and the inuences of input and output transportation costs on the firm’s optimum
location28. In Weber’s framework, the determinants of each firm’s location are the trans-
portation costs, labor costs and the agglomerating (deglomerating) forces. Within a fixed
technical coefficients framework, high transport costs tend to imply proximity, whereas
the prices of inputs and output goods play no role on the determination of the optimum
location of the firm.
 The spatial interaction theory
The increasing awareness of the limitations of the least-cost analysis led to the develop-
ment of the spatial interaction theory that focus on the demand side. Under the inuence
While similar to Launhardt’s theory, Weber’s theory of location is the opposite of von Thünen’s. In
the earlier writer’s scheme, the location is given and the type of production is to be determined in Weber’s
theory, the branch of industry is given and the place of location is sought (Greenhut [74]).
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of Fetter [57], Hotelling [98], Lerner and Singer [128] and Chamberlin [37], among oth-
ers, focus was made on the spatial competition between firms. Departing from oligopoly
models, they assumed that buyers were scattered over an area and production costs were
equal at all locations while delivered price varies with location. As a result, the optimal
location results from the determination of the optimal market area in a context of spatial
competition between firms. Among others factors, the optimal location of the firm is in-
uenced by the elasticity of the industrial demand curve, the height of the freight cost
and the characteristics of the marginal production costs. Additionally, the actual location
is also determined by entrepreneurial expectations about the rival firms’ location policies
and the type of interdependence between firms. By focusing on the demand side and ab-
stracting from cost analysis, the spatial interaction only yields a one-side theory.
 The profit maximization theory
Lösch [131] reached the core of the location problem when he noted that to seek the lowest
cost location is as wrong as looking for the largest market area, providing the fundaments
for the profit maximization theory. He developed the first systematic economic analysis
of the location decision which postulates that the optimal location is the one that assures
maximum profit for the entrepreneur. Lösch assumed that consumers were scattered along
a homogeneous landscape and support transport costs to achieve the good, which allow
him to derive a demand function over space. He then constructed a zero-profit market-area
for each seller and obtained a collection of hexagons that describe each seller’s market-
area. He concluded that the extent of the concentration of production depends both on the
increasing returns to scale and on the transportation costs.
According to Greenhut [74], although Lösch was the first to propose that the location of a
manufacturing plant depends both on production costs and market area it assigns to each
location, he failed to combine an analysis of intra-industry cost and demand differentials
in one model. In fact, Lösch’s theory fails to include costs differentials (others than those
attributable to advantages of agglomeration and transportation) or to regard the principles
of interdependence (which cause extraordinary concentrations of homogeneous business
units).
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In spite of adopting different approaches to the location choice problem, all these models
are based on neoclassical deductive micro-economic reasoning. In fact, they all represent
partial equilibrium, static and normative models, defining the ‘optimal’ behavior of the
firm under the assumptions of rationality and perfect information of the entrepreneur.
 Other approaches
Recently, other approaches to the location theory have been developed that contrast with
the assumption of the entrepreneur as a rational decision maker. According to Mariotti
[135], the behavioral location theory interprets firms as agents that have limited infor-
mation, are bounded rational and settle for sub-optimal outcomes rather than maximum
profits. It explores ‘internal’ factors (e.g., age and size) that are important in the decision-
making process of the firm, and that lead to a particular location.
Another approach is the institutional location theory, which starts from the assumption
that economic activity is socially and institutionally situated: it is shaped by society’s
cultural institutions and value systems rather than by firm behavior. In the institutional
theory, ‘external’ or ‘institutional’ factors (e.g., spatial adjustments such as expansion,
merger, acquisition and take-over, but also trust, reciprocity, cooperation and convention)
play a key role at all levels in the economy, from the structure and functions of the firm,
through the operation of markets, to the form of state intervention.
Finally, the evolutionary approach states the relevance of routine behavior founded on the
mechanism of selection and path dependence for location’s decisions.
In spite of their relevance for the location choice analysis, particularly when focusing on
particular location contexts (e.g. relocation), these approaches are still in an early stage
of development. Additionally, most empirical studies focus on the traditional approach
and so, in order to made possible the comparability of our results, we will adopt this line
of research.
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5.3 The Determinants of Firms’ Location: Related Literature
According to Figueiredo and Guimarães [58], empirical research on the determinants of
location choice may proceed either by using the survey method or by means of econo-
metric modeling. In the first case, firms are required to identify the determinants of its
actual location (stated preferences). The survey method allows us to obtain very rich data
and to understand the ranking among alternatives, being extremely relevant when histori-
cal information is unavailable. However, the stated preferences about location may differ
from the real ones, while the results are highly responsive to sample characteristics. The
second approach appeals to econometric models where the actual location of the firm is
put against a set of explanatory variables. In this case, the researcher uses historical data
that depict actual choices (revealed preferences) and intend to identify the factors inu-
encing choices. The robustness of the econometric approach and the recent advances in
econometric techniques led us to adopt this line of research.
There are two strands of the literature that use econometric modelling to evaluate firms’
location determinants. One tradition appeals to discrete choice modelling and derives
from the Random Utility Maximization framework (e.g. Carlton [34] and Bartik [22]).
Usually, the depend variable is a discrete or count variable, which is put against a set
of explanatory variables that includes cost, demand and agglomeration determinants for
firms’ location choice. Another approach focus on firms’ birth rate, either by adopting an
evolutionary approach (new firms/total firms) or a labor market approach (new firms/labor
force). In both cases, a linear regression model is usually adopted (e.g. Guesnier [78],
Audretsch and Fritsch [17], Keeble and Walker [122], Garofoli [68], Armington and Acs
[12], Sutaria and Hiks [181]). Typically, the set of explanatory variables includes the rate
of change of variables that capture the importance of agglomeration economies, govern-
ment policy, labor and market conditions for location choice. However, the compatibility
of this approach with the profit maximization framework has not been clarified, and, for
this reason, we will not adopt this line of research.
Early discrete choice models on the determinants of location decision focused on the lo-
cation choices made by new firms within a small set of alternatives. Carlton [34] was the
80
first to apply discrete choice models to the location problem. He estimates the decision
where to locate in three narrowly defined industries: plastic products, communication
equipment and electronic components in the United States. Using simple logit models,
Carlton concluded for the importance of agglomeration economies and energy costs for
the location choice. Subsequent research on spatial probability choice has relied on Carl-
ton’s approach29 .
Likewise, Bartik [22] uses a conditional logit model to estimate the location decision
of new manufacturing firms in United States. The empirical results suggests that the
rates of unionization and agglomeration economies has a strong effect on new business
activity. Similarly, Schmenner, Huber and Cook [173] look at the location choice of
new manufacturing firms in US but uses a two-stages logit model. They concluded for
the relevance of energy costs. Hansen [85] focus on the location of manufacturing firms
in São Paulo (Brazil) by means of a nested logit model. He made relevance of both
localization and urbanization economies for the location choice.
Following these early location studies, and as a consequence of the popularity of the dis-
crete choice analysis, several other studies were developed. Some researchers focus on the
location of new foreign firms and look for the importance of economic characteristics of
the host region, such as market variables, labor costs and government policy for location
choice. This was the case of Coughlin, Terza and Arrondee [46], Friedman, Gerlowski
and Silberman [61], Woodward [197], Shaver [175], Wei, Liu, Parker and Vaidya [196],
Wu [199] [200], Head, Ries and Svenson [88] and Guimarães, Figueiredo and Wood-
ward [79], among others. Usually, these studies support the relevance of agglomeration
economies (particularly, urbanization economies), market accessibility and the existence
of institutional support for foreigner investments for the location choice of foreigner firms,
while the importance of labour and land costs seems to be inconclusive.
Recently, some researchers claim that the sectorial and geographical variables affect dif-
ferently location choice according to firms’ size (e.g. Araúzo-Carod and Manjón-Antolín
[11]), firms’ industrial activity (e.g. Araúzo-Carod [10]) or technological intensity (e.g.
	Without any intention to be exhaustive, we present, in appendix, the main results of several empirical
studies that employ discrete choice models to evaluate firms’ location choice.
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Barrios, Görg and Strobl [20]), new and relocated firms (e.g. Holl [95]) and entrepre-
neur’s preference for the home base (e.g. Figueiredo, Guimarães and Woodward [59]).
Although some general tendencies still be evidenced (e.g. the relevance of agglomeration
economies for location choice), some location determinants seem to have a quite different
inuence on location choice according to firms’ characteristics.
The methodological approach to location choice has also evolved in recent years, and
for that reason, we next present a brief description of the main methodologies that were
implemented in previous studies on location choice.
5.4 Methodology
Research on firms’ decision about location usually appeals to discrete-choice models that
rely on the Random Utility Maximization framework of McFadden [141]. This method-
ology was first implemented on location choice by Carlton [34] and most subsequent re-
search on spatial probability choice has relied on his approach [e.g., Bartik [22], Hansen
[85], Schmenner, Huber and Cook [173], Coughlin, Terza and Arrondee [46], Friedman,
Gerlowski and Silberman [61] and Woodward [197], among many others).
In the conditional logit framework, decision probabilities are modelled in a partial equi-
librium setting where firms maximize profits subject to uncertainty that derives from un-
observable characteristics. As in Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [80], we will
consider an economy with ' industrial sectors (   ') and assume that there are
 investors (    ) who independently select a location  from a set of ( potential
locations (    (). The potential profit that a firm  assigns to each location  and
each industrial sector  is:
	  
  
 	  
)	  *	 (5.1)
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where ,  and  are vectors of unknown parameters,  is a vector of location specific
variables,  	 is a vector of sector specific variables and )	 is a vector of variables that
change simultaneously with the sector and the location. *	 is an identically and inde-
pendently random term with a Gumbel (or type I extreme value) distribution.
For every spatial option, the investor will compare expected profits and choose alternative
 if:
	  	    (5.2)
Due to the stochastic nature of the profit function, the probability that an investor  of the
industrial sector  chooses the location  is:
	  +	  	 (5.3)
Or, similarly
	 
   
)	
  
  
)	
(5.4)
which expresses the conditional logit model formulation.
According to Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [81], the lack of available data sets
led some scholars to model location decision among highly aggregated regions, such as
the US States (e.g. Bartik [22], Coughlin, Terza and Arrondee [46], Friedman, Gerlowski
and Silberman [61] and Head, Ries and Swenson [88]) or the Indian states (Mani, Par-
gal and Huq [134]). However, large geographical units encompass a lot of heterogeneity
within them. At the same time, this procedure ignores local characteristics that are usually
relevant for the location choice. Alternatively, some authors modeled the location choice
within a restricted area (e.g. Hansen [85] and Wu [200]). Instead, other researchers
choose to use detailed geographical information, and, as consequence, larger data sets
but followed McFadden’s suggestion to work with a small sample of location sites ran-
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domly chosen from the full data set (e.g. Woodward [197] and Guimarães, Figueiredo
and Woodward [79]). By this procedure, consistency is guaranteed, but estimators may
be inefficient, as this method still disregards relevant local information.
However, the conditional logit model assumes that the odds of choosing an alternative are
a function of its attributes but are independent of other alternatives, which is known as the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption (IIA) (Greene [71]). This proposition
may be implausible in location choice, as adjacent locations may have similar character-
istics, which make them interdependent. Moreover, if the IIA assumption is violated, then
it leads to biased coefficient estimates.
In order to accommodate the IIA assumption in the location choice, some researchers
recurred to the nested logit model, which presumes that alternatives are grouped in sub-
groups so that variance differs across groups while maintaining the IIA assumption within
the groups (Greene [71]). Let us suppose that the ( locations can be grouped into ,
groups. Thus, the probability of an investor  chooses to locate in region  is 	 
	  , where
	 


  
)	


 

  
)	
 (5.5)
 
 -  ./
  
-  ./
(5.6)
where - is the vector of characteristics specific to each group  and / represents the av-
erage profit that an investor expects to obtain from the alternatives within each group 
(note that /   if we intend to produce the original conditional logit model). Estimation
usually proceeds by means of a two-step limited information maximum likelihood proce-
dure (e.g. Hansen [85], Barrios, Görg and Strobl [20], Head and Mayer [87] and Pusterla
and Resmini [166]). However, to specify the nested logit model, it is necessary to define a
partition of the spatial choice set in upper and lower levels, which implies that the results
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might depend on the definition of those levels. In addition, this procedure is only valid if
the IIA assumption holds within the subgroup of the choice set.
A recent strand of the literature, launched by Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [80],
has modelled the location choice by means of a Poisson model (e.g. Wu [199], Guimarães,
Figueiredo and Woodward [81] and Araúzo-Carod [10]). Under this formulation, the
number of new firms that choose a specific location is a count variable and relates to a
vector of local characteristics30. So, the probability that the number of firms that chooses
location  is 0 is given by:
 0 
1 


0
(5.7)
Additionally, the coefficients of the conditional logit model can be equivalently estimated
by using a Poisson regression through maximizing the following log-likelihood, where
0	 denotes the number of investments carried out in sector  and region :
  

	


0	 	 (5.8)
which is equivalent to that of the Poisson model which takes 0	 as a dependent variable
and includes as explanatory variables  and )	 vectors plus a set of dummy variables for
each sector. That is, we will obtain the same results if we admit that 0	 follows a Poisson
distribution with
   	 
  
)	 (5.9)
where 	 is a dummy variable that takes the value  for sector  ( otherwise).
Moreover, and according to Araúzo-Carod [10], the number of alternatives in a condi-
tional logit model equals the number of observations in a Poisson model, which implies

Other authors used the logistic model to estimate count variables, as it allows to transform count-data
into a binary variable (e.g. Shaver [175] and Wu [200]).
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that increasing the number of alternative locations is not a major problem. The Poisson
model also allows to overcome any modelisation problems due to the existence of nill
observations (unlike conditional logit models).
It should be said that the Poisson regression model assumes that the conditional mean 
equals the conditional variance, that is, &0	  2 0	   . But, frequently, the
variance is larger than the one assumed by the Poisson model, a result called overdis-
persion. Overdispersion is a form of heteroscedasticity which yields downward biased
estimates of the standard errors, although consistent estimates of the parameters. In the
case of location choice, we expect to observe overdispersion due to the concentration of
firms in some locals. To overcome this problem, the Poisson model can be extended to a
negative binomial model(31)(32).
The negative binomial distribution is an extension of the Poisson model that allows the
variance of the process to differ from its mean. Thus, the probability that the number of
firms that choose location  is 0 is given by mixing the Poisson model with a gamma
distribution:
 0 
3  0
  03


  3
  3
  3

(5.10)
where  is the gamma distribution, &0	   and 2 0	     	3. The neg-
ative binomial model can be estimated by maximum likelihood (e.g. Wu [199], Coughlin
and Segev [45] and Holl [95]).
In this research, we intend to evaluate the importance of local and sectorial determinants
for firms’ location choice within a large set of spatial alternatives. For that purpose, we
will run on the steps of the Random Utility Maximization framework and take advantage
of the equivalence between the conditional logit model and the Poisson regression, which
Other solutions introduce a dispersion parameter  so that  	  	 or estimate the dis-
persion parameter as a ratio of the deviance or the Pearson Chi-Square to its degrees of freedom. However,
these procedures only gives a correction term for testing the parameter estimates under the Poisson model.
Additionally, Woodward, Figueiredo and Guimarães [198] proposed the Dirichlet-Multinomial model,
which is an extension of the conditional logit model that allows for overdispersion.
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allows us to overcome a potential IIA violation. Additionally, whenever overdispersion is
observed then the negative binomial model will be employed.
5.5 Data and Hypotheses
This research aims at evaluate the importance of local and sectorial characteristics for
firms’ location choice. For that purpose, we make use of micro-level data for the Por-
tuguese manufacturing sector and focus on the location choices made by new starting
plants during 1992-2000 within 275 municipalities. The set of explanatory variables in-
cludes variables that are traditionally stressed by location theory, such as production costs,
demand indicators and agglomeration economies, as well as technological variables.
In this section, we intend to explain the construction of our data-set and, having under
consideration both location theory and empirical studies on location choice, formulate
main hypotheses. First, we will focus on the explained variable - new plant births - and
afterwards, we will concentrate on the set of explanatory variables and formulate main
hypotheses.
5.5.1 Dependent variable
Plant births from 1992 and 2000 were calculated from Quadros do Pessoal (DEEP - MTE
[50]). This statistical database is built on a compulsory survey collected annually by the
Portuguese Ministry of Employment for all business firms operating in Portugal33. The
inquiry collects information at the firm, plant and worker level since 1982, including data
on firms’ location, economic activity, capital structure, number of plants, employees and
giving a particular emphasis to the workforce characteristics.
By using a unique identifying number addicted to each firm and its establishments and
employees, we were able to merge data about firms, plants and labor force. However,
Quadros do Pessoal does not cover public administration or domestic service and excludes firms
without wage-paid employees or start-ups with a very short life up to 12 months.
87
this identifying number was modified in 1991, leading us to limit our study to the period
1992 to 2000, the last available year in the data set. In our data-set, we adopted the
municipality as the geographic unit. By using the Code of the Administrative Division
(INE [99]), we were able to select 275 municipalities34. Additionally, we recur to the
Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities at two-digit level (CAE – Rev. 2 - 15
to 37) (INE [106]) to restrict for the manufacturing sector35. In our research, we first
considered the entire manufacturing sector, and also a division according to the number
of plants (single-plant and multi-plant firms) and technological intensity (high-technology
and low-technology industries).
A plant was identified as new if it was the first time it appeared in the merged data set36.
We identified 37 222 new manufacturing plants between 1992 and 2000. The geographical
and sectorial distribution of these newly created establishments are next presented:
We had under consideration the change of the Code of Administrative Division in 1998 that introduced
three new municipalities (Vizela, Trofa and Odivelas) and included them into the original ones, as our study
is largely previous to 1998. Additionally, we excluded the islands of Azores and Madeira, as the number of
new plants of the manufacturing sector born during 1992-2000 was quite small.
We had under consideration the change of the Code of Economic Activity from Revision 1 to Revision
2 in 1994.
We excluded possible temporary exits/errors by comparing the birth date of the plant with the age of
the oldest employee.
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NUTS 3, NUTS 2 New manufacturing plants   
Code Designation 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total % 
10101 Minho-Lima 119 79 104 84 89 109 86 92 116 878 2.36% 
10102 Cávado 327 219 399 355 342 347 368 305 393 3 055 8.21% 
10103 Ave 505 376 552 529 613 600 635 622 765 5 197 13.96% 
10104 Grande Porto 641 487 744 517 482 449 483 413 518 4 734 12.72% 
10105 Tâmega 470 368 567 363 228 569 285 616 509 3 975 10.68% 
10106 Entre Douro e Vouga 246 222 353 260 222 262 248 229 217 2 259 6.07% 
10107 Douro 25 64 61 42 34 30 48 50 45 399 1.07% 
10108 Alto Trás-os-Montes 55 55 67 49 57 44 57 54 63 501 1.35% 
101 Região Norte 2 388 1 870 2 847 2 199 2 067 2 410 2 210 2 381 2 626 20 998 56.41% 
10201 Baixo Vouga 191 154 193 123 160 158 153 141 193 1 466 3.94% 
10202 Baixo Mondego 80 76 92 65 69 66 64 54 101 667 1.79% 
10203 Pinhal Litoral 151 127 170 114 137 141 159 153 148 1 300 3.49% 
10204 Pinhal Interior Norte 55 56 62 47 49 52 48 33 56 458 1.23% 
10205 Dão-Lafões 99 64 111 87 80 73 101 105 96 816 2.19% 
10206 Pinhal Interior Sul 17 11 11 18 8 16 17 19 24 141 0.38% 
10207 Serra da Estrela 21 11 19 16 15 20 14 14 20 150 0.40% 
10208 Beira Interior Norte 35 36 45 23 22 27 28 28 30 274 0.74% 
10209 Beira Interior Sul 29 13 25 21 17 27 16 26 34 208 0.56% 
10210 Cova da Beira 34 31 41 22 26 21 25 27 37 264 0.71% 
102 Região Centro 712 579 769 536 583 601 625 600 739 5 744 15.43% 
10301 Oeste 186 137 193 126 129 138 148 144 166 1 367 3.67% 
10302 Grande Lisboa 574 458 624 365 379 384 404 344 460 3 992 10.72% 
10303 Península de Setúbal 225 165 226 146 155 147 172 172 188 1 596 4.29% 
10304 Médio Tejo 113 63 117 61 56 64 70 70 87 701 1.88% 
10305 Lezíria do Tejo 81 63 99 72 71 91 77 82 93 729 1.96% 
103 Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 1 179 886 1 259 770 790 824 871 812 994 8 385 22.53% 
10401 Alentejo Litoral 35 37 32 29 26 26 19 14 27 245 0.66% 
10402 Alto Alentejo 45 45 40 26 24 32 25 38 31 306 0.82% 
10403 Alentejo Central 58 52 62 48 41 96 57 51 71 536 1.44% 
10404 Baixo Alentejo 28 36 38 31 23 33 31 27 31 278 0.75% 
104 Alentejo 166 170 172 134 114 187 132 130 160 1 365 3.67% 
10501 Algarve 83 71 116 74 79 68 77 83 79 730 1.96% 
105 Algarve 83 71 116 74 79 68 77 83 79 730 1.96% 
 Portugal (mainland) 4 528 3 576 5 163 3 713 3 633 4 090 3 915 4 006 4 598 37 222 100.00% 
Source: DEEP - MTE (1991-2000), Quadros do Pessoal 
         
 
Table 5.1. New manufacturing plants (1992-2000), by region
As we can observe, the most dynamic region is Região Norte, which account for more
than 50% of total manufacturing plant births between 1992 and 2000. At NUTS3 level,
Grande Porto, Ave and Tâmega are responsible for more than 35% of total plant births
between 1992 and 2000. At the sectorial level (table 5.2), the manufacturing of wearing
apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur and the manufacturing of fabricated metal products
(except machinery and equipment) are responsible for more than 34% of total plant births
between 1992 and 2000.
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  New manufacturing plants   
CAE - 
Rev. 2 
Manufacturing Industry 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total % 
15 Manufacture of food products and 
beverages 
470 435 676 409 377 439 387 375 467 4035 10.84% 
16 Manufacture of tobacco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 
17 Manufacture of textile 270 224 276 269 225 288 287 303 306 2448 6.58% 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; 
dressing and dyeing of fur 
831 544 891 785 793 847 852 832 987 7362 19.78% 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; 
manufacture of luggage, handbags, 
saddlery, harness and footwear 
250 201 337 229 206 256 199 219 195 2092 5.62% 
20 Manufacture of wood and of 
products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of straw and 
plaiting materials 
375 307 461 348 339 382 421 371 415 3419 9.19% 
21 Manufacture of paper and paper 
products 
29 24 44 24 34 26 25 28 32 266 0.71% 
22 Publishing, printing and 
reproduction of recorded media 
258 212 322 209 215 240 226 199 281 2162 5.81% 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined 
petroleum products and nuclear 
fuel 
0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.01% 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products 
50 50 79 38 32 40 40 31 43 403 1.08% 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastics 
products 
83 63 73 46 66 47 41 56 41 516 1.39% 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic 
mineral products 
313 231 353 239 232 272 244 274 345 2503 6.72% 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 17 25 14 14 22 15 19 19 29 174 0.47% 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment 
685 567 720 516 509 557 586 631 736 5507 14.80% 
29 Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 
179 153 202 145 136 143 153 133 131 1375 3.69% 
30 Manufacture of office, accounting 
and computing machinery 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 0.01% 
31 Manufacture of electrical 
machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
58 39 51 37 45 47 31 39 34 381 1.02% 
32 Manufacture of radio, television 
and communication equipment and 
apparatus 
25 25 16 11 9 10 7 8 16 127 0.34% 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision 
and optical instruments, watches 
and clocks 
38 23 31 26 29 36 25 26 45 279 0.75% 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers 
15 20 33 15 15 16 15 15 22 166 0.45% 
35 Manufacture of other transport 
equipment 
18 10 24 18 29 23 31 23 23 199 0.53% 
36 Manufacture of furniture; 
manufacturing n.e.c. 
557 415 547 328 311 393 306 404 425 3686 9.90% 
37 Recycling 7 4 12 7 9 12 20 20 24 115 0.31% 
15-37 Total manufacturing  4528 3576 5163 3713 3633 4090 3915 4006 4598 37222 100.00% 
Source: DEEP - MTE (1991-2000), Quadros do Pessoal 
          
 
Table 5.2. New manufacturing plants (1992-2000), by economic activity
5.5.2 Explanatory Variables and Hypotheses
The traditional location theory suggests that the variables inuencing the choice of a par-
ticular location can broadly be classified into three categories: cost variables, market vari-
ables and agglomeration economies. In this section, we intend to formulate the main hy-
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potheses guiding our research, having under consideration empirical studies on location
choice (see appendix).
The least cost theory claims that the land, labor and capital costs affect firms’ decision
about location. Several studies revealed that land costs have a negative inuence on
firms’ decision to locate in a region. Bartik [22], Mani, Pargal and Huq[134], Figueiredo,
Guimarães and Woodward [59] and Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [81] used pop-
ulation density to evaluate land costs (37)(38) and concluded that its inuence on location
choice was negative. Similarly, Coughlin, Terza and Arrondee [46], Woodward [197] and
Wu [200] used land area and concluded that its inuence on the location choice was posi-
tive. Finally, some authors considered property taxes as a government policy variable that
affects land costs but almost concluded for its non significance (e.g. Carlton [34], Bartik
[22], Woodward [197], Coughlin and Segev [45] and Hogenbirk and Narula [94]).
Following Bartik’s approach, we will adopt population density in each municipality for
1991-2001 as a proxy for land costs (INE [102], [108] and [110]). We may then formulate
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.1 High land costs in a municipality negatively inuence new invest-
ments in that municipality.
In their location decisions, firms are motivated by labor market conditions, in particular,
labor costs and the qualifications of the workforce. The labor cost, measured by the
average wage rate, is included in almost all studies on location choice (see appendix),
while its coefficient is usually negative or non significant (except for the location decisions
of foreigner firms, as a positive coefficient frequently emerges, revealing the positive
effect of high wages, associated with high qualifications of the workforce, on location
choice).
Bartik [22] justifies this procedure as industrial and residential users compete for the same space.
Other authors used population density as a proxy for either agglomeration economies (Wei et al [196]
and Coughlin and Segev [45]) or labor market conditions (Araúzo-Carod [10] and Hogenbirk and Narula
[94]).
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To account for labor costs in each municipality and manufacturing sector, we recur to the
real wages per working hour, for each municipality and code of economic activity (CAE)
at 2-digit level (INE [106]). We used Quadros do Pessoal of the DEEP - MTE [50] to
compute total base wages (at constant prices) and regular working hours by municipality
and CAE for 1991 - 2000. We then consider the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.2 High labor costs in a municipality negatively inuence new invest-
ments in that municipality
Several researchers considered the unemployment rate as affecting firms’ location choice
(e.g. Carlton [34], Friedman, Gerlowski and Silberman [61], Woodward [197], Shaver
[175], Head, Ries and Svenson [88], Coughlin and Segev [45], Head and Mayer [87]
and Hogenbirk and Narula [94]). However, the impact of unemployment on the location
decision is not completely clear. On one hand, high unemployment rates can signal low
demand or the lack of suitable employees. On the other hand, it may indicate available
workforce, possibly, at a low cost. Additionally, the effects of the unemployment rate on
firms’ location may be biased, due to the inuence of government policies that are, in
UE countries, mainly employment oriented. For these reasons, we decided to avoid this
variable in our study.
Other scholars make use of unionization rates as a characteristic of the labor market that
might inuence location decisions (e.g. Bartik [22], Schmenner, Huber and Cook [173],
Coughlin, Terza and Arrondee [46], Friedman, Gerlowski and Silberman [61], Woodward
[197], Shaver [175], Head, Ries and Svenson [88] and Coughlin and Segev [45] ). The
point is that low unionization rates may attract firms as it allows them to pursue profit
maximization unencumbered by union activities and contract restrictions. However, and
as the institutional framework with respect to labor market legislation is invariant across
Portuguese municipalities, we did not considered this variable.
Labor productivity is also considered in some studies, either if measured directly (e.g.
Friedman, Gerlowsky and Silberman [61] and Woodward [197]) or by considering the
skill level of employees (Hansen [85], Kittiprapas and McCann [123], Guimarães, Figueiredo
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and Woodward [79]) and Holl [95]]. When having under consideration the issue of the
location choice determinants, the focus on the qualifications of the population seems to
be more adequate. Therefore, some authors considered the inuence of specific skills on
location choice [e.g. number of engineers (Carlton [34])], or, more often, the education
level of population (e.g. Bartik [22], Woodward [197] and Pusterla and Resmini [166]) or
even the inuence of high-degree education (Coughlin and Segev [45], Cheng and Kwan
[38] and Araúzo-Carod [10]).
In this work, we used the average years of schooling of the adult population as a proxy
for human capital stock in each municipally. By this procedure, we intend to capture the
population skills and abilities that affect the productivity of the workforce. We computed
the average years of schooling of the adult population for each municipality, according to
the methodology of Barro and Lee [21]:
4 

0


	
$0  $ $
	
0 $0


where
0 = Population with age 25 to 64
0 = Population with age 25 to 64 with education level  (complete)
0 = Population with age 25 to 64 with education level  (incomplete)
0 = Population with age 25 to 64 with education level  (attendance)
$ = Number of schooling years that corresponds to each education level 
The implementation of this methodology was made in few but arduous steps. First, we
compile statistical information about the number of individuals with age 25 to 64 (39) that
attained the various education levels for each municipality in 1991 (INE [101]) and 2001
(INE [108]). Then, we pondered the number of individuals that attained each education
	The availability of statistical information motivated the choice of this age cohort, which account for
about 86% of the active population in 2001 in Portugal (INE [107]).
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level with the corresponding schooling years, $, having under consideration Portuguese
legislation on the Education System [52] and the International Standard Classification
of Education (ISCED) [152]. We then considered the following education levels:  
 corresponds to the primary-1st cycle, with a duration of 4 years ($  )   	
corresponds to the primary - 2nd cycle (or ISCED level 1), with a duration of 2 years
($  )   
 is the primary - 3rd cycle (or ISCED level 2), with a duration of 3 years
($  )    corresponds to secondary education (or ISCED level 3), with a duration
of 3 years ($	  	)    corresponds to post-secondary non-tertiary education (or
ISCED 4), with, in general, a duration of 1 schooling year ($
  
)    corresponds
a Bachelor’s degree (ISCED level 5B) with, usually, a duration of 3 years ($  )
   corresponds to an under-graduate degree (ISCED 5A), with, usually, a duration of
4 or 5 years ($  )    corresponds to Master degree, with, usually, a duration of
1 schooling year ($  ) finally,    corresponds to a Ph.D. degree (ISCED level
6), with a duration of 2 or more schooling years ($  ).
Additionally, and in order to take into account if individuals complete or not the corre-
sponding education level, we presumed that if an individual complete an education level
, then its ponderer will be $. Alternatively, if an individual was attending at an educa-
tion level , then its ponderer will be $. Finally, if an individual did not complete an
education level , then its ponderer will be 

.
After computing the human capital stock for each municipality in 1991 and 2001, we
estimated the human capital stock between these years by computing the average annual
rate of growth of the human capital stock between 1991 and 2001 (40).
Although we would expect that the sign of the human capital coefficient to be positive,
there is no clear evidence of such fact, as we may conclude from previous studies (see
appendix). Nevertheless, we will formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.3 High human capital stock in a municipality positively inuences new
investments in that municipality.

Alternatively, the human capital stock could be introduced at the regional level (NUTS3), but some
local specificities could be lost. Also, we computed the human capital potential for each municipality, but
results were quite similar.
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Several studies use corporate taxes (or other local taxes) to evaluate capital costs’ inu-
ence on location choice (e.g. Carlton [34], Bartik [22], Friedman, Gerlowski and Silber-
man [61], Woodward [197], Shaver [175], Head, Ries and Svenson [88] and Head and
Mayer [87]), whilst its expected coefficient is often non significant.
In our research, capital costs are measured by the taxes over companies collected by mu-
nicipalities, which include both derrama41 and other taxes over firms. We first collected
information about local finances near Direcção-Geral das Autarquias Locais [51] for the
period 1991-2001. Then, the local taxes were deated by using the Consumer Price In-
dex (INE [103]). Afterwards, we divide it by the number of societies in each municipality
(INE [104]). We then consider the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.4 High capital costs in a municipality negatively inuence new invest-
ments in that municipality.
Another strand of the literature focus on the inuence of demand variables on the location
choice. The market size, measured by per capita income, is frequently included in loca-
tion studies (e.g. Coughlin, Terza and Arrondee [46], Coughlin and Segev [45], Cheng
and Kwan [38], Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [81] and Hogenbirk and Narula
[94]). Alternatively, some scholars used the gravitation personal income as a proxy for
the potential market, as it intends to capture both market size and its accessibility (e.g.
Friedman, Gerlowski and Silberman [61], Woodward [197] and Head and Mayer [87]).
Finally, others simply use residential population [e.g. Holl [95]]
In order to capture the inuence of market size on location choice, we considered two
variables: we first considered the Purchasing Power Index42 for each municipality be-
tween 1993-2002 (INE [105]), which intends to capture the inuence local market size
on location choice. Alternatively, and having under consideration the small size of most
The municipal surcharge (derrama) is a local municipal tax that can be charged annually by municipal
authorities up to maximum of 10% of the amount paid in corporate tax (IRC).
The Purchasing Power Index (IPPC) intends to capture the purchasing power in each municipality. It
is an index built by means of a model of factorial analysis and recurring to a set of 20 variables that were
selected according to an expenditure criteria upon a larger group of 70 variables (INE [111]).
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portuguese municipalities, we used the per capita Gross Domestic Product at regional
level NUTS3 for 1992-2000 as a proxy for the regional market size (INE [100]).
Most studies conclude for the positive inuence of market size on location choice, which
stimulate us to express the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5.5 High regional market size positively inuences new investments in a
municipality.
Hypothesis 5.6 High local market size positively inuences new investments in a
municipality.
Additionally, some authors consider the inuence of market accessibility on firms’ loca-
tion decision, by introducing the geographical or time distance to an important market
(city center or capital) or to an airport or port [e.g. Hansen [85], Wu [199], Guimarães,
Figueiredo and Woodward [79], Wu [200], Araúzo-Carod [10], Figueiredo, Guimarães
and Woodward [59] and Holl [95]]. Therefore, we employ the minor physical distance
between each municipality to Porto or Lisbon43 as a proxy for the accessibility of each
municipality (INE [109]). Having under consideration previous studies, we expect to
confirm the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.7 High distance to Porto or Lisbon in a municipality negatively inu-
ences new investments in that municipality.
Both location theory and empirical studies claim for the relevance of agglomeration
economies. Literature usually distinguishes between urbanization economies, which are
external to firms and industries but internal to a city (e.g. access to large population centres
and large and diversified service and manufacturing sectors) and localization economies,
which are external to firms but internal to an industry (e.g. access to specialized labor
force and communication economies).
Porto and Lisbon (capital) are the most important cities in Portugal, both equipped with international
airport, port and railway stations.
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Nearly all studies concluded for the positive inuence of localization economies on loca-
tion choice, usually measured by the number of firms or employment in each manufactur-
ing sector (e.g. Hansen [85], Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [79], Barrios, Görg
and Strobl [20], Head and Mayer [87], Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [81] and
Hogenbirk and Narula [94]) or by an industrial diversity index (e.g. Araúzo-Carod [10],
Holl [95] and Pusterla and Resmini [166]).
In what concerns urbanization economies, some researchers used a measure of global
industrial activity in the region (e.g. Carlton [34], Bartik [22], Coughlin, Terza and Ar-
rondee [46], Woodward [197], Mani, Pargal and Huq [134], Guimarães, Figueiredo and
Woodward [79], Araúzo-Carod [10] and Barrios, Görg and Strobl [20]), while others use
an indicator of the economic activity size, such as per capita income, population size or
density of industrial and services activities (e.g. Shaver [175], Wei et al [196], Coughlin
and Segev [45] and Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [81]). The relevance of urban-
ization economies was, in most cases, demonstrated.
In our research, we account for localization economies by considering the share of man-
ufacturing employment for each CAE - 2 digit in each municipally for 1991-1999 (DEEP
- MTE [50]). Urbanization economies are measured by the density of manufacturing and
service plants (CAE D, G, H, I, J, K) per square kilometer in each municipally for 1991-
2000 (DEEP - MTE [50] and INE [110]). We then expect to observe:
Hypothesis 5.8 High localization economies in a municipality positively inuence
new investments in that municipality.
Hypothesis 5.9 High urbanization economies in a municipality positively inuence
new investments in that municipality.
In addition to traditional location determinants, we add the Research and Development
(R&D) per capita expenditures at the municipality level. To our knowledge, few stud-
ies introduced R&D variables in location studies (e.g. Wei et al [196] and Woodward,
Figueiredo and Guimarães [198]). Having under consideration the composition of R&D
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expenditures and its geographical distribution44, we would expect to observe a small im-
pact of the R&D expenditures on location choice, but higher when considering the high-
tech sample.
For our purpose, we first collect information on R&D expenditures at the municipality
level for 1995 - 2001 by using a biannual national inquiry (OCES [147])45. Then, R&D
expenditures were deated (INE [103]) and, for the missing years, we averaged the nearest
years. Finally, we divide it by total inhabitants in each municipality (INE [102] and [108])
(46)(47). We then expect to demonstrate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.10 High R&D expenditures in a municipality positively inuence new
investments in that municipality.
Finally, and in order to control for unobservable region characteristics that might affect
firms’ location choice, we included dummy variables for each region NUTS (Nomencla-
ture of Territorial Units for Statistics) at 3-digit level48.
Table 5.3 summarizes main information about explanatory variables:
In Portugal, and for the year 1999, about 66.5% of the R&D expenditure was made by the Government
and High Education sector (OCES [147]).
The Scientific and Technological National Potential Survey (IPCTN) is carried out every two years by
the National Observatory of Science and Technology (OCES). The conceptual and methodological model
of the IPCTN agrees with the Frascati Manual [149]. In what concerns the R&D data, the inquiry covers
both the R&D expenditures carried out on the national territory in the year concerned and also the R&D
personnel, expressed in full-time equivalent. In Portugal, the census of the number of researchers affected
to R&D activities involves some difficulties, as there is some subjectivity on the evaluation of the percent
of time dedicated to research when the R&D units coexist with other activities (e.g. universities). The
survey covers four sectors of performance of R&D - High Education, Government, Business Enterprise and
Private Non-Profit Institutions. It comprises R&D in both natural sciences, engineering, social sciences and
humanities. R&D expenditures are divided into five sources of funds, from High Education, Government,
Business Enterprise, Private Non-Profit Institutions and abroad (OCES [148]).
We also used the potential R&D for each municipality, but no improvements were observed.
In spite of being optimal to use R&D stock, we recurred to R&D ow, which is highly correlated to
R&D stock.
Alternatively, we considered dummies at NUTS 2-digit, but a lot of statistical information at the local
level would be lost.
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Variable Proxy Expected 
sign 
Data Source 
Land costs Population density, by municipality, 
1992-2001                                                                              
Negative INE (1991-2000), Estimativas Definitivas da População 
Residente; INE (2001b), Recenseamento Geral da População e 
Habitação (Resultados Definitivos); INE (2003b), Referenciação 
Territorial 
Labor costs Real base-wage over regular working 
hours, by municipality and CAE, 
1992-2000 
Negative DEEP-MTE (1991-2000), Quadros do Pessoal 
Human capital Average years of schooling of the 
adult population, by municipality, 
1992-2000            
Positive INE (1991), Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação 
(Resultados Definitivos); INE (2001), Recenseamento Geral da 
População e Habitação (Resultados Definitivos) 
Capital costs Derrama plus other taxes over firms 
divided by total societies, by 
municipality, 1992-2000 
Negative DGAL (1991-2001), Finanças Municipais; INE (1992-2001), 
Ficheiro Central de Empresas e Estabelecimentos                                                           
Regional 
market 
Per capita Gross Domestic Product, 
by NUTS3, 1992-2000 
Positive INE (1990-2002), Contas Regionais 
Local market Purchasing Power Index (IPPC), by 
municipality, 1993-2002 
Positive INE (1993-2002), Estudo sobre o Poder de Compra Concelhio 
Market 
accessibility 
Minor geographical distance to 
Porto/Lisbon, by municipality 
Negative INE (2003), Base Geográfica de Referenciação da Informação 
Localization 
economies               
Share of manufacturing employment 
for each CAE - 2 digit, by 
municipality, 1991-1999 
Positive DEEP-MTE (1991-2000), Quadros do Pessoal 
Urbanization 
economies                                                     
Density of manufacturing and service 
plants (CAE D, G, H, I, J, K) per 
square kilometer, by municipality, 
1992-2000 
Positive DEEP-MTE (1991-2000), Quadros do Pessoal; INE (2003b), 
Referenciação Territorial                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
R&D R&D expenditures per capita, by 
municipality, 1994-2002                                                                                                                                                                   
Positive OCES (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001), Inquérito ao Potencial 
Científico e Tecnológico; INE (1991-2000), Estimativas 
Definitivas da População Residente; INE (2001), Recenseamento 
Geral da População e Habitação (Resultados Definitivos) 
 
Table 5.3. Explanatory variables
5.6 Empirical Results
In order to evaluate the importance of traditional and technological determinants for loca-
tion choice, we considered three data sets: first, we used total new manufacturing plants
second, we make difference between the single-plant and the multi-plant’s location de-
cisions finally, and by using OECD classification of industrial’s technological intensity
[151], we considered two data sets: the new plants that are low and medium-low technol-
ogy intensive and the new plants that are high and medium-high technology intensive.
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We modelled the location choice of new manufacturing plants between 1992-2000 within
275 municipalities through a discrete choice analysis. We take advantage of the equiv-
alence between the conditional logit model and the Poisson regression by using a set of
dummy variables for each combination of year and CAE 2-digit. Additionally, if data
contains overdispersion, the negative binomial model will be taken under consideration.
5.6.1 Total New Manufacturing Plants
Empirical results with respect to location choice of new manufacturing plants are pre-
sented in Table 5.4. Regressions49 (1) and (2) respect to a standard CLM by means of its
equivalence with Poisson model, which is guaranteed by using a set of dummy variables
for each combination of year and 2-digit CAE sector. Differences in both regressions are
due to the use of either a regional or a local market variable. Similarly, regressions (3)
and (4) respects to a CLM regression but includes a set of dummy variable for each region
NUTS3. In order to more effectively control for the potential violation of IIA assumption,
we estimated a Poisson panel regression with either random or fixed effects by munici-
pality [regressions (5) to (10)]. All explanatory variables are included in their logarithmic
form.
As we can observe, estimation results of regression (1) to (4) are quite similar. All vari-
ables are highly significant and with the expected signs, except for human capital, local
market and capital costs. We find evidence that production costs had a significant and
negative impact on location choice, except for capital costs. The regional market size has
a significant and positive impact on location choice, while the local market size has a sign
contrary to a priori expectation. Also, the municipalities’ accessibility to main markets is
significant and with the expected sign. Additionally, our results reveal that the most im-
portant location determinants are the agglomeration economies, namely, the urbanization
economies, which accords with existing literature. On the opposite side, the R&D vari-
able has the smallest impact on location choice. As it was expected, the inclusion of the
region dummy variable in regressions (3) and (4) improve the overall significance, as it
	Our methodological approach was motivated by Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [81].
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  POISSON MODEL 
 
  
With dummy by 
year*CAE 
With dummies by 
year*CAE and 
NUTS3  
With random effects 
by municipality 
and dummy by 
year*CAE 
With random effects 
by municipality 
and dummies by 
year*CAE  and 
NUTS3 
With fixed effects by 
municipality 
and dummy by 
year*CAE 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Land costs -0.596* -0.608* -1.188* -1.190* -0.962* -0.957* -1.032* -1.029* 0.001 -0.023 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.998) (0.941) 
Labor costs -0.913* -0.787* -0.866* -0.864* -1.088* -1.078* -1.079* -1.073* -1.096* -1.089* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Human capital -2.357* -1.590* -0.830* -0.806* -0.754* -0.503 -0.535 -0.453 -0.720 -0.626 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.082) (0.088) (0.153) (0.058) (0.100) 
Capital costs 0.050* 0.053* 0.065* 0.065* -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 0.001 -0.018 -0.011 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.600) (0.825) (0.751) (0.968) (0.298) (0.529) 
Regional 
market 0.440* --- 0.212 --- 0.434* --- 0.599* --- 0.680* --- 
 (0.000) --- (0.261) --- (0.004) --- (0.002) --- (0.001) --- 
Local market --- -0.233* --- -0.018 --- -0.074 --- -0.062 --- -0.121 
 --- (0.000) --- (0.617)  --- (0.303) --- (0.401) --- (0.106) 
Market 
accessibility -0.116* -0.141* -0.208* -0.209* -0.203 -0.220* -0.036 -0.037 --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.080) (0.053) (0.842) (0.838) --- --- 
Localization 
economies 0.722* 0.714* 0.722* 0.722* 0.739* 0.739* 0.739* 0.739* 0.742* 0.741* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urbanization 
economies 1.069* 1.089* 1.295* 1.298* 1.339* 1.351* 1.402* 1.399* 1.476* 1.470* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D 0.059* 0.060* 0.044* 0.049* 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.006 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.272) (0.266) (0.190) (0.199) (0.441) (0.434) 
Constant 11.113* 14.020* 13.175* 14.949* 11.664* 15.225* 9.032* 14.004* --- --- 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) --- --- 
Number of obs. 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14323 14323 
Log likelihood -25451.19 -25514.69 -22755.42 -22755.93 -19480.92 -19484.65 -19448.55 -19452.87 -18583.05 -18587.75 
Pseudo R2 0.5165 0.5153 0.5677 0.5677       
LR test 54370.89 54243.88 59762.42 59761.41       
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Pearson statistic 48886.8 49203.33 41550.2 41563.41       
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Wald test     27088.84 27081.16 27200.57 27198.29 26766.75 26763.27 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: p-values are in parentisis 
* significant at 0.05 level of significance 
Table 5.4. Total new manufacturing plants (1992-2000): Poisson model
can be deduced from the increase of the log likelihood, the likelihood-ratio index or the
"%15+,".
In order to more effectively control for the IIA assumption violation, we then consider
specific-effects by municipality, either random or fixed. We first introduced specific ran-
dom effects by municipality through a Poisson panel regression with or without dummies
by region [regressions (5) to (8)]. We then observe an increase of the corresponding log-
likelihood of the random effects model when comparing with the corresponding Poisson
regression, which maintains the hypothesis of random effects by municipality. At the
same time, the results remain quite similar, except for the R&D variable, which loses sig-
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nificance. Alternatively, we performed a Poisson regression with fixed effects by munic-
ipality [regressions (9) and (10)], with some perceptible changes in results. Actually, on
the costs side only labor costs maintain its significance, while on the demand side market
accessibility loses relevance. Agglomeration economies are still significant and with the
predicted sign.
However, the Pearson statistics for the goodness of fit lead us to reject the hypothesis that
the variance equals to the mean at 1 percent of significance. Therefore, it reveals that the
Poisson regression is not adequate to our data, suggesting that we should try the negative
binomial model. Table 5.5 resumes main results from our estimation.
As before, we ran several models, which performed quite well, as we can observe from
the log-likelihood, likelihood-ratio and Wald tests. Additionally, the likelihood-ratio test
of 6   indicates that the probability of observing this data conditional to a Poisson
distribution is nearly zero, which confirms that the negative binomial model is more suit-
able. We started with a simple negative binomial regression with a set of dummies for
each combination of year and 2-digit CAE sector [regressions (11) and (12)] and included
a dummy variable for each region NUTS3 [regressions (13) and (14)] in order to capture
other regions’ characteristics that might affect firms’ location choice. Finally, we esti-
mated a negative binomial panel regression with either random or fixed effects by munic-
ipality, with or without dummies for region [regressions (15) to (22)]50.
Let us consider the negative binomial model without "specific-effects" by municipalities
[regressions (11) to (14)]. As we can observe, some variables have a very regular behavior
across regressions: land and labor costs and agglomeration economies are always signif-
icant and with the expected signs. On the other side, capital costs and human capital are
almost never significant or with the correct sign. Demand variables are usually significant
and with the expected sign. The regional market variable has a positive and significance
inuence on location choice, except when dummies for region are included, while local
market is always significant and with the predicted sign. Additionally, the municipalities’
accessibility is also significant and with the expected sign. The R&D variable is signifi-

We may note that the coefficients estimated for the Poisson and for the negative binomial model are
quite similar.
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  NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL 
 
  
With dummy by 
year*CAE 
With dummies 
by year*CAE 
and NUTS3 
With random 
effects by 
municipality 
and dummy by 
year*CAE 
With random 
effects by 
municipality 
and dummies by 
year*CAE and 
NUTS3 
With fixed 
effects by 
municipality 
and dummy by 
year*CAE 
 
With fixed 
effects by 
municipality 
and dummies by 
year*CAE and 
NUTS3 
Variables (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
Land costs -0.692* -0.627* -1.060* -1.003* -0.480* -0.466* -0.491* -0.494* -0.591* -0.589* -0.467* -0.472* 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Labor costs -0.644* -0.607* -0.637* -0.647* -0.872* -0.859* -0.869* -0.863* -0.850* -0.837* -0.857* -0.852* 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Human 
capital -0.992* -1.097* 0.009 -0.310 2.297* 2.383* 0.558 0.573 2.864* 3.105* 0.237 0.277 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.953) (0.088) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.083) (0.082)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.493)  (0.429) 
Capital costs 0.014 0.015 0.029* 0.031* -0.018 -0.012 -0.028 -0.022 -0.032 -0.021 -0.034 -0.028 
 (0.303)  (0.282)     (0.039) (0.026) (0.358)  (0.539) (0.165)  (0.267) (0.120)  (0.290) (0.103)  (0.172) 
Regional 
market 0.288* --- 0.291 --- 0.592* --- 0.465* --- 0.734* --- 0.435 --- 
 (0.000) --- (0.326) --- (0.000) --- (0.052) --- (0.000) --- (0.066) --- 
Local  
market --- 0.227* --- 0.249* --- 0.287* --- 0.002 --- 0.307* --- -0.035 
 --- (0.002) --- (0.001) --- (0.002) ---  (0.983) ---  (0.002) ---  (0.688) 
Market 
accessibility -0.149* -0.170* -0.205* -0.201* -0.071 -0.113 -0.314* -0.322* -0.136 -0.182* -0.564* -0.571* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.328) (0.117) (0.027)  (0.023) (0.127)  (0.041) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Localization 
economies 0.525* 0.526* 0.531* 0.532* 0.571* 0.569* 0.545* 0.544* 0.556* 0.554* 0.532* 0.531* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Urbanization 
economies 1.096* 1.031* 1.150* 1.085* 0.506* 0.484* 0.711* 0.705* 0.392* 0.384* 0.663* 0.663* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
R&D 0.029* 0.027* 0.047* 0.044* 0.012 0.010 0.022* 0.022* 0.012 0.009 0.019* 0.019* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.161)  (0.257) (0.015)  (0.016) (0.201)  (0.307) (0.045)  (0.042) 
Constant 8.848* 10.06* 9.164* 10.80* 1.971 5.625* 7.031* 10.81* 0.812 5.367* 8.846* 12.49* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.130) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.566)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Number of obs. 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14323 14323 14323 14323   
Log likelihood -19689.8 -19699.1 -19160.9 -19155.7 -18639.2 -18645.6 -18536.3 -18538.2                    -17704.1 -17713.6                    -17559.5 -17561.1                    
Pseudo R2 0.1949 0.1945 0.2165 0.2167         
LR test 9530.95 9512.38 10588.7 10599.1         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Likelihood-ratio 
test of alpha=0 12000 12000 7189.05 7200.47         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Wald test     8922.58 8904.79            9212.34 9203.24                     8856.01 8837.73                     9242.52 9236.61                     
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: p-values are in parentisis 
* significant at 0.05 level of significance 
Table 5.5. Total new manufacturing plants (1992-2000): Negative binomial model
cant but has the smallest elasticity: we estimate that, everything else constant, a 1 percent
increase in urbanization economies leads to about 1.1 percent increase in the number of
new plants, while the same elasticity for the R&D variable is about 0.03-0.04. The inclu-
sion of dummy variables by region is supported by the increase of the log-likelihood or
the "%15+,".
We then consider "specific-effects" by municipalities through a negative binomial regres-
sion with either random or fixed effects [regressions (15) to (22)]. The difference in
the log-likelihoods between the model with specific-effects and the one without specific-
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effects is statistically significant and provides evidence that the inclusion of specific ef-
fects is convincing. At the same time, the inclusion of dummy variables by region is
supported by the increase of the log-likelihood, which gives reason for the existence of
regional characteristics that are not captured by other variables. Likewise, the inclusion
of the regional market, instead of the local market, is consistent with the increase of the
overall significance.
In order to test for the inclusion of random or fixed effects by municipality, we performed
an Hausman test, which tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the ef-
ficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed
effects estimator. We compared regressions (17) and (21) and the resulting statistic equals
0.71, which lead us to not reject the null hypothesis at 1 percent level of significance.
Therefore, our results supports the hypothesis of random specific effects by municipality.
Focusing on regression (17), we may then conclude that the most relevant determinants for
location choice are the labor and land costs and urbanization and localization economies.
In fact, we estimated that, everything else constant, a 1 percent increase in urbaniza-
tion or localization economies leads to about a 0.71 or 0.55 percent increase in the num-
ber of new plants, respectively. These results are supported by several empirical studies
[e.g. Carlton [34], Hansen [85], Coughlin, Terza and Arrondee [46], Woodward [197],
Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [79], Head and Mayer [87]]. Comparable elastic-
ities with respect to labor and land costs are 0.87 and 0.49, respectively. The negative
inuence of labor costs on location choice is evidenced in several studies [e.g. Coughlin,
Terza and Arrondee [46], Friedman, Gerlowski and Silberman [61], Coughlin and Segev
[45], Cheng and Kwan [38], Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [81] and Pusterla and
Resmini [166]]. At the same time, few authors confirmed the significance and negative
inuence of land costs [e.g. Mani, Pargal and Huq [134] and Guimarães, Figueiredo and
Woodward [81]]. On the contrary, capital costs are never statistically significant, which
can be justified by the absence of noteworthy differences in the cost of capital across
Portuguese municipalities. This result is also confirmed in several studies [e.g. Carlton
[34], Woodward [197], Shaver [175] and Head and Mayer [87]]. The lack of consistency
of results of the human capital variable may be justified by the aggregate nature of the
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indicator, which does not allow one to evaluate the importance of some specific skills
(e.g. engineers) for the location choice. Our result is supported by several other empirical
studies (e.g. Kittiprapas and McCann [123], Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [79],
Araúzo-Carod [10] and Pusterla and Resmini [166]).
On the demand side, we observed that the regional market size and the accessibility to
main markets and infrastructures have a significant and positive inuence on location
choice, which can be justified by the small size of most municipalities. These results
are confirmed by several studies [e.g. Coughlin, Terza and Arrondee [46], Friedman,
Gerlowski and Silberman [61], Head, Ries and Swenson [88], Cheng and Kwan [38],
Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [79], Araúzo-Carod [10] and Head and Mayer
[87]].
Finally, the R&D variable has a significant and positive inuence on location choice,
which evidences the presence of R&D spillovers. However, its elasticities is the lowest
one: in fact, we estimated that, a 1 percent increase in per capita R&D expenditures leads
to about 0.02 percent increase in the number of new plants.
Our results find confirmation in previous studies for the Portuguese case51. In fact, Figueiredo,
Guimarães and Woodward [59] also find that the agglomeration economies, labor and
land costs are the most important determinants for firms’ location choice, while capital
costs were not significant. Also, Holl [95] find relevance for the labour cost variable,
while agglomeration economies appeared to be non-significant for the location decision.
These scholars also claim the relevance of both market size and market accessibility for
location choice. Besides, in our study we distinguish between the regional and the local
market but our results only support the importance of the regional market for the loca-
tion choice. Our research also confirms the importance of the R&D activities for firms’
location choice, which was not considered in previous studies.
We restricted for the studies that used discrete choice modeling to evaluate the location decision of
new domestic plants, which are about 99,4% of total new plants in Portugal. Additionally, we excluded
other studies that used the survey method, such as Reis [167] and Santos [172].
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5.6.2 Multi-plants and Single-plants
Previous results show data in an aggregated way, without considering that start-ups differ
in features such as its size, technological intensity, sectorial characteristics or country of
origin. Literature on location choice have stressed the relevance of capital structure by fo-
cusing on decisions made by foreigner and domestic firms [e.g. Friedman, Gerlowski and
Silberman [61], Woodward [197], Shaver [175], Head, Ries and Swenson [88], Cough-
lin and Segev [45] and Guimarães, Figueiredo and Woodward [79], among others]. Also,
some scholars claim that firms’ location choice is inuenced by its size (e.g. Araúzo-
Carod and Manjón-Antolín [11]), firms’ industrial activity (e.g. Araúzo-Carod [10] and
Barrios, Görg and Strobl [20]), or entrepreneur’s preference for the home base (e.g. [59]).
In this section, we examine another feature that has received less attention in literature:
new single-plants and new multi-plants location choices. This distinction is important
because location decisions are taken on the grounds of incomplete information. We
might expect that multi-plants have access to more information about sites than single-
plants when they make their location’s decisions. Also, multi-plants might benefit from
economies of scale or from a more matured entrepreneurship. Therefore, and as the
birth of single-plant or a multi-plant results from two different spatial decision-making
processes, they should be treated separately.
We then aim at evaluate how sectorial and geographical characteristics affect single-plant
and multi-plant’s location decisions. We were able to identify 37 222 new starting plants
between 1992-2000, from which 89,35% were new single-plants and 10,65% were new
multi-plants. Geographical location of new single-plants and multi-plants is presented in
table 5.6.
As we can observe, there is a strong evidence that single-plants and multi-plants locate
differently: single-plants concentrate in Região Norte, while multi-plants distribute be-
tween Região Norte and Lisboa and Vale do Tejo.
We modelled the location choice of new single-plants and new multi-plants through a con-
ditional logit model by means of its equivalence with Poisson model, which is guaranteed
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NUTS 3, NUTS 2 New Single-Plants (1992-2000) New Multi-Plants (1992-2000) 
Code Designation Total % Total % 
10101 Minho-Lima 774 2.33% 104 2.62% 
10102 Cávado 2 850 8.57% 205 5.17% 
10103 Ave 4 863 14.62% 334 8.43% 
10104 Grande Porto 4 211 12.66% 523 13.19% 
10105 Tâmega 3 808 11.45% 167 4.21% 
10106 Entre Douro e Vouga 2 146 6.45% 113 2.85% 
10107 Douro 348 1.05% 51 1.29% 
10108 Alto Trás-os-Montes 457 1.37% 44 1.11% 
101 Região Norte 19 457 58.50% 1 541 38.87% 
10201 Baixo Vouga 1 342 4.04% 124 3.13% 
10202 Baixo Mondego 565 1.70% 102 2.57% 
10203 Pinhal Litoral 1 167 3.51% 133 3.36% 
10204 Pinhal Interior Norte 423 1.27% 35 0.88% 
10205 Dão-Lafões 747 2.25% 69 1.74% 
10206 Pinhal Interior Sul 132 0.40% 9 0.23% 
10207 Serra da Estrela 143 0.43% 7 0.18% 
10208 Beira Interior Norte 242 0.73% 32 0.81% 
10209 Beira Interior Sul 176 0.53% 32 0.81% 
10210 Cova da Beira 231 0.69% 33 0.83% 
102 Região Centro 5 168 15.54% 576 14.53% 
10301 Oeste 1 225 3.68% 142 3.58% 
10302 Grande Lisboa 3 233 9.72% 759 19.15% 
10303 Península de Setúbal 1 274 3.83% 322 8.12% 
10304 Médio Tejo 599 1.80% 102 2.57% 
10305 Lezíria do Tejo 624 1.88% 105 2.65% 
103 Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 6 955 20.91% 1 430 36.07% 
10401 Alentejo Litoral 185 0.56% 60 1.51% 
10402 Alto Alentejo 242 0.73% 64 1.61% 
10403 Alentejo Central 421 1.27% 115 2.90% 
10404 Baixo Alentejo 237 0.71% 41 1.03% 
104 Alentejo 1 085 3.26% 280 7.06% 
10501 Algarve 593 1.78% 137 3.46% 
105 Algarve 593 1.78% 137 3.46% 
 Portugal (mainland) 33 258 100.00% 3 964 100.00% 
Source: DEEP - MTE (1991-2000), Quadros do Pessoal 
  
 
 
Table 5.6. New single and multi-plant firms (1992-2000), by region
by using a set of dummy variables for each combination of year and 2-digit CAE sector.
Additionally, we estimated a CLM with a set of dummy variables for regions (NUTS3) in
order to capture the inuence of other non-observable variables. Results are presented in
table 5.7.
As we can observe, location factors that affect single-plants and multi-plants act differ-
ently. In fact, while some location factors have a similar performance (land and labor
costs, agglomeration economies and R&D are always significant and with the expected
sign capital costs never have the expected sign), we may identify different features. In
fact, labor costs, urbanization and localization economies have always higher elasticities
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  SINGLE-PLANT FIRMS MULTI-PLANT FIRMS 
 Poisson model Poisson model 
 
  
With dummy by 
year*CAE 
With dummies by year*CAE 
and NUTS3 
With dummy by 
year*CAE 
With dummies by year*CAE 
and NUTS3 
Variables (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
Land costs -0.599* -0.615* -1.198* -1.207* -0.656* -0.493* -1.130* -0.992* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Labor costs -1.003* -0.868* -0.926* -0.924* -0.382* -0.314* -0.536* -0.561* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
Human 
capital -2.742* -1.866* -1.064* -0.990* 0.549* 0.309 0.744* 0.052 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.216) (0.005) (0.872) 
Capital costs 0.051* 0.054* 0.064* 0.065* 0.072* 0.074* 0.072* 0.072* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) 
Regional 
market 0.472* --- 0.130 --- 0.406* --- 0.039 --- 
 (0.000) --- (0.522) --- (0.000) --- (0.942) --- 
Local market --- -0.271* --- -0.054 --- 0.386* --- 0.604* 
 --- (0.000) --- (0.147) --- (0.001) --- (0.000) 
Market 
accessibility -0.116* -0.141* -0.226* -0.225* -0.135* -0.165* -0.075 -0.079 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.283) (0.258) 
Localization 
economies 0.747* 0.738* 0.744* 0.743* 0.498* 0.499* 0.534* 0.538* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urbanization 
economies 1.099* 1.125* 1.311* 1.323* 0.887* 0.718* 1.206* 1.038* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D 0.059* 0.060* 0.047* 0.047* 0.066* 0.061* 0.078* 0.071* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 11.857* 14.987* 14.522* 15.711* 1.527* 2.694* 7.364 5.832* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.134) (0.004) (0.102) (0.000) 
Number of obs. 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 
Log likelihood -23517.82 -23575.48 -21093.24 -21092.42 -6386.72 -6389.46 -6104.79 -6094.89 
Pseudo R2 0.5259 0.5247 0.5748 0.5748 0.2260 0.2256 0.2601 0.2613 
LR test 52168.80 52053.48 57017.96 57019.61 3729.18 3723.68 4293.03 4312.83 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pearson statistic 47920.95 48024.28 41136.69 41138.76 18926.82 18975.18 18671.02 18638.48 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: p-values are in parentisis 
* significant at 0.05 level of significance 
Table 5.7. New Single and Multi-plant Firms (1992-2000): Poisson model
when talking about the single-plant sample. On the contrary, the R&D and the human
capital variables have always a better performance in the multi-plant case. Additionally,
the local market is only relevant in the multi-plant sample. As before, the increase of the
log-likelihood sustains the hypothesis of inclusion of dummies by NUTS3. Finally, we
performed a Pearson test to evaluate the goodness of fit, which evidenced overdispersion
and justified the estimation of a negative binomial model.
In tables 5.8 and 5.9 we present main estimation results for both single-plants and multi-
plants. As before, we ran a simple negative binomial model with and without specific-
effects by municipality. We also consider dummies by regions NUTS3 and both local and
regional market inuence.
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  NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL 
 
 
With dummy by 
year*CAE 
With dummies 
by year*CAE 
and NUTS3 
With random 
effects by 
municipality 
and dummy by 
year*CAE  
With random effects 
by municipality 
and dummies by 
year*CAE and 
NUTS3 
With fixed 
effects by 
municipality 
and dummy by 
year*CAE 
 
With fixed 
effects by 
municipality 
and dummies by 
year*CAE and 
NUTS3 
Variables (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) 
Land costs -0.659* -0.614* -1.041* -0.997* -0.501* -0.500* -0.489* -0.492* -0.650* -0.660* -0.462* -0.464* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008) 
Labor costs -0.742* -0.689* -0.715* -0.722* -0.957* -0.945* -0.957* -0.952* -0.929* -0.917* -0.940* -0.936* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Human 
capital -1.286* -1.255* -0.191 -0.444* 2.072* 2.238* 0.453 0.503 2.749* 3.085* 0.177 0.250 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.238)  (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.184) (0.150) (0.000) (0.000) (0.632) (0.505) 
Capital costs 0.004 0.004 0.022 0.023 -0.028 -0.022 -0.037 -0.032 -0.042* -0.031 -0.044* -0.039 
 (0.779) (0.766) (0.135)  (0.109) (0.167) (0.276) (0.075) (0.121) (0.051) (0.144) (0.044) (0.074) 
Regional 
market 0.301* --- 0.189 --- 0.595* --- 0.433 --- 0.746* --- 0.419 --- 
 (0.000) --- (0.545) --- (0.000) --- (0.088) --- (0.000) --- (0.096) --- 
Local 
market --- 0.144 --- 0.197* --- 0.227* --- -0.036 --- 0.250* --- -0.076 
 --- (0.055) --- (0.010) --- (0.019) --- (0.681) --- (0.014) --- (0.392) 
Market 
accessibility -0.151* -0.174* -0.212* -0.209* -0.122 -0.165* -0.293* -0.298* -0.206* -0.254* -0.568* -0.571* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.113) (0.031) (0.052) (0.048) (0.031) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
Localization 
economies 0.550* 0.549* 0.551* 0.552* 0.599* 0.599* 0.574* 0.573* 0.583* 0.582* 0.558* 0.557* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urbanization 
economies 1.091* 1.046* 1.143* 1.093* 0.535* 0.525* 0.719* 0.719* 0.424* 0.428* 0.664* 0.669* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D 0.029* 0.026* 0.045* 0.043* 0.015 0.014 0.026* 0.026* 0.015 0.013 0.022* 0.023* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.095) (0.144) (0.007) (0.007) (0.120) (0.174) (0.026) (0.022) 
Constant 9.600* 11.05* 10.60* 11.56* 3.169* 7.06* 7.78* 11.40* 2.01 6.827* 9.38* 12.99* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000  (0.001) (0.000) (0.183) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of obs. 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14323 14323 14323 14323 
Log likelihood -18390 -18402.1 -17895.1 -17891.9 -17406.2 -17413.8 -17318.9 -17320.2 -16492.6 -16502.8 -16366.3 -16367.3 
Pseudo R2 0.2017 0.2011 0.2231 0.2233         
LR test 9290.14 9265.84 10279.98 10286.27         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Likelihood-ratio 
test of alpha=0 10000 10000 6396.39 6401.03         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Wald test      8444.84 8428.34 8615.28 8606.52 8346.90 8329.83 8563.91 8558.37 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: p-values are in parentisis 
* significant at 0.05 level of significance 
Table 5.8. New single-plant firms (1992-2000): Negative binomial model
As we can observe, the increase of the log-likelihood supports the addition of dummies by
region and the inclusion of specific effects by municipality. The statistics of the Hausman
test for the inclusion of random versus fixed effects [regressions (37) and (41)] equals
0.02, which leads us to consider random effects by municipality. We may then observe
that single-plants are strongly inuenced by agglomeration economies, land and labor
costs and market accessibility. At the same time, market size and human capital have high
elasticities but are only significant and with the expected sign if dummies for regions are
not included. Furthermore, regional market have clearly a higher inuence on location
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choice than local market. Finally, the R&D variable, while significant, has the lowest
elasticity.
Wald test     1931.14 1933.12 2031.17 2044.03 1872.40 1852.39 1791.07 1790.89 
 
 NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL 
 
  
With dummy by 
year*CAE 
With dummies by 
year*CAE and 
NUTS3 
With random 
effects by 
municipality 
and dummies by 
year*CAE  
With random 
effects by 
municipality 
and dummy by 
year*CAE and 
NUTS3 
With fixed effects 
by municipality 
and dummy by 
year*CAE 
 
With fixed effects 
by municipality 
and dummies by 
year*CAE and 
NUTS3 
Variables (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) 
Land costs -0.772* -0.568* -1.146* -0.991* -1.205* -1.043* -1.226* -1.104* -0.480 -0.487 -0.320 -0.368 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.249) (0.232) (0.545) (0.484) 
Labor costs -0.293* -0.278* -0.440* -0.468* -0.597* -0.597* -0.603* -0.606* -0.686* -0.681* -0.653* -0.649* 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Human 
capital 0.830* 0.213 0.988* 0.227 1.085* 0.291* 0.736 0.065 -0.518 -0.436 -0.659 -0.677 
 (0.000) (0.480) (0.001) (0.532) (0.030) (0.609) (0.206) (0.918) (0.632) (0.681) (0.516) (0.503) 
Capital costs 0.074* 0.078* 0.071* 0.072* 0.071 0.075 0.079 0.083* 0.049 0.054 0.053 0.062 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.019) (0.016) (0.092) (0.074) (0.058) (0.043) (0.347) (0.294) (0.323) (0.240) 
Regional 
market 0.367* --- 0.121 --- 0.390 --- 0.271 --- 0.100 --- 0.439 --- 
 (0.001) --- (0.838) --- (0.128) --- (0.633) --- (0.858) --- (0.450) --- 
Local market --- 0.628* --- 0.644* --- 0.783* --- 0.683* --- 0.483 --- 0.321 
 --- (0.000) --- (0.000) --- (0.002) --- (0.007) --- (0.111) --- (0.266) 
Market 
accessibility -0.146* -0.169* -0.136 -0.134 -0.156 -0.184 -0.160 -0.170 0.683 0.678 -1.139 -1.154 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.089) (0.093) (0.216) (0.144) (0.429) (0.393) (0.123) (0.115) (0.087) (0.079) 
Localization 
economies 0.459* 0.467* 0.503* 0.507* 0.523* 0.523* 0.526* 0.526* 0.542* 0.539* 0.520* 0.519* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urbanization 
economies 0.990* 0.780* 1.193* 1.011* 1.453* 1.278* 1.465* 1.293* 1.368* 1.303* 1.557* 1.496* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D 0.053* 0.047* 0.073* 0.065* 0.007 0.004 0.021 0.019 -0.016 -0.018 -0.021 -0.022 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.719) (0.842) (0.305) (0.372) (0.491) (0.434) (0.377) (0.355) 
Constant 1.256 1.744 6.041 5.028* 7.104* 7.648* 8.561 8.552* 6.017 4.533 10.716 13.262 
  (0.291) (0.108) (0.224) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.084) (0.000) (0.308) (0.229) (0.217) (0.064) 
Number of obs. 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 14332 13674 13674 13674 13674 
Log likelihood -6224.49 -6219.82 -6026.789 -6017.92 -5907.96 -5903.73 -5880.27 -5876.46 -5381.55 -5380.19 -5357.97 -5357.61 
Pseudo R2 0.1680 0.1686 0.1944 0.1956         
LR test 2514.12 2523.47 2909.53 2927.27         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Likelihood-ratio 
test of alpha=0 324.45 339.29 156.00 153.94         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: p-values are in parentisis 
* significant at 0.05 level of significance 
Table 5.9. New multi-plant firms (1992-2000): Negative binomial model
When talking about the location decision of new multi-plants, we may observe that al-
though main location determinants are still the agglomeration economies and both land
and labor costs, there are some noteworthy differences. The first remarkable difference
is the relevance of the local market variable, instead of the regional market, which may
be deduced from both overall and individual significance tests. In fact, we estimate that
everything else constant, a 1 percent increase in local market size leads to about 0.7 per-
cent increase in the number of new plants, while the regional market variable is often
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non-significant. As before, our estimation results support the inclusion of dummies by
region and the existence of specific effects by municipality. Also, the statistics of the
Hausman test for the inclusion of random versus fixed effects [regression (50) and (54)]
equals 0, which supports the hypothesis that the specific effects are not correlated with
the explanatory variables. We may also remark that, when considering random effects by
municipality [regressions (47) to (50)], the elasticities of plant births with respect to land
costs, local market and urbanization economies are the highest ones in multi-plant sam-
ple, while for the single-plant sample, the highest elasticities are due to labor costs and
agglomeration economies.
We may then conclude that, as we suspected, the location determinants affect unevenly
single-plants and multi-plants. In fact, we observed that new multi-plants are particularly
sensitive to urbanization economies, land costs and local market, while new single-plant
firms are more responsive to labor costs and agglomeration economies. Other differences
concern market accessibility, which is not significant for multi-plants’ location decision,
and the R&D variable, which is only significant if no specific effects were considered,
and, in this case, with higher elasticities than in the single-plant sample.
5.6.3 High-Technology and Low-Technology Industrial Plants
Literature on R&D spillovers usually supports the strong propensity for the clustering
of innovation-related activities (e.g. Jaffe et al [115], Audrestch and Feldman [16]) and
the relevance of R&D spillovers for innovation activities, which might depend on firms’
industrial sector or size (e.g. Anselin et al [9], Varga [189], Arundel and Geuna [14],
among others).
In this section, we will look at the role of R&D activities for the decision to locate new
manufacturing firms, according to firms’ technological characteristics. More precisely,
we aim at evaluate if the birth of a new business is inuenced by the location and size
of R&D activities. Additionally, we questioned if the importance of R&D activities for
location choice is different according to firms’ technological characteristics.
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To our knowledge, few works have addressed this topic. Araúzo-Carod [10] evaluated
the importance of agglomeration economies, cost and demand variables for the location
choice of new manufacturing firms according to firms’ industrial sector. He observed
that, for the R&D intensive sector, industrial diversity is the main location determinant,
while the traditional sectors are more inuenced by commuting costs. Also, Barrios,
Görg and Strobl [20] focused on the determinants of location choice for foreigner high-
tech and low-tech firms. They concluded that high-tech firms are particularly inuenced
by urbanization economies and access to transport infrastructure, while low-tech firms
are more inuenced by localization economies and public policies. In our study, we
have also looked for the relevance of technological variables, particularly, R&D activities,
for the location choice. Woodward, Figueiredo and Guimarães [198] focused also on
the relevance of a particular type of R&D - the University R&D expenditures in science
and engineering - for the location choice of new high-tech manufacturing firms. They
concluded that the R&D expenditures at universities exert a positive but modest inuence
on firms’ location decisions. The authors also estimated the distance from university R&D
in which economic spillovers can be detected.
In this section, we intend to evaluate the importance of traditional as well as technolog-
ical determinants for firms’ location choice but assuming that firms behave differently if
they have different technological capabilities. For that purpose, we recur to the OECD
classification of industrial’s technological intensity [151] (52) and consider two data-sets:
the low and medium-low technological industries and the high and medium-high techno-
logical industries. A brief characterization of new plant births by technological-industrial
sector is next presented (table 5.10).
As we can observe, the low and medium-low technological industries account for about
93% of total new manufacturing plants between 1992 and 2000, while the high and
medium-high technological industries only account for about 7% of total new manufac-
turing plants.
The OECD’s classification of manufacturing industries based on technology (OECD [150]) uses two
indicators of technology intensity: i) R&D expenditures divided by value added ii) R&D expenditures
divided by production. Industries are classified according to its average intensity in both indicators, having
also under consideration both temporal and country median stability.
112
  New manufacturing plants (1992-2000) 
ISIC-Rev. 3 Manufacturing Industry Total % 
 High-technology industries 455 1.22% 
2423 Pharmaceuticals 31 0.08% 
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 3 0.01% 
32 Radio, TV and communciations equipment 127 0.34% 
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 279 0.75% 
353 Aircraft and spacecraft 15 0.04% 
 Medium-high-technology industries 2 318 6.23% 
24 excl. 2423 Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 372 1.00% 
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 1 375 3.69% 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 381 1.02% 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 166 0.45% 
352 + 359 Railroad equipment and transport equipment, n.e.c. 24 0.06% 
 Total high and medium-high technology industries 2 773 7.45% 
 Medium-low-technology industries 8 864 23.81% 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 4 0.01% 
25 Rubber and plastics products 516 1.39% 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 2 503 6.72% 
27-28 Basic metals; fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
5 681 15.26% 
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats 160 0.43% 
 Low-technology industries 25 585 68.74% 
15-16 Food products, beverages and tobacco 4 035 10.84% 
17-19 Textile, wearing apparel and dressing and dyeing of fur; Tanning 
and dressing of leather; Luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and 
footwear 
11 902 31.98% 
20-22 Wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; Straw 
and plaiting materials; Paper and paper products; Publishing, 
printing and reproduction of recorded media  
5 847 15.71% 
36 Furniture and manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 3 801 10.21% 
 Total low and medium-low technology industries 34 449 92.55% 
15-37 Total manufacturing  37 222 100.00% 
Source: DEEP - MTE (1991-2000), Quadros do Pessoal 
  
 
Table 5.10. New manufacturing plants (1992-2000), by technological intensity
In order to evaluate the importance of geographical, sectorial and technological variables
for location choice, we performed a conditional logit model by means of its equivalence
with Poisson model, which is guaranteed by using a set of dummy variables for each
combination of year and 2-digit CAE sector. Additionally, we estimated a CLM with a
set of dummy variables for regions (NUTS3) in order to capture the inuence of other
non-observable variables. Results are presented in table 5.11.
As we can observe, the increase in the log-likelihoods support the inclusion of dummy
variables by regions NUTS3 [regressions (57), (58) and (61), (62)]. We may also perceive
some remarkable differences in the location determinants of low and medium-low tech-
nology (LMLT) plants and high and medium-high technology (HMHT) plants. In fact,
the location choice of new LMLT plants is very sensitive to agglomeration economies,
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  LOW AND MEDIUM-LOW TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRIES 
HIGH AND MEDIUM-HIGH TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRIES 
 Poisson model Poisson model 
 
  
With dummy by year*CAE With dummies by 
year*CAE and NUTS3 
With dummy by year*CAE With dummies by 
year*CAE and NUTS3 
Variables (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) 
Land costs -0.610* -0.623* -1.179* -1.180* -0.419* -0.197 -0.689* -0.650* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) 
Labor costs -1.056* -0.924* -0.962* -0.960* 0.0004 0.119 -0.036 -0.037 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.997) (0.212) (0.729) (0.719) 
Human 
capital -2.465* -1.688* -0.871* -0.859* -0.528* -0.127 0.559 0.413 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.668) (0.091) (0.267) 
Capital costs 0.065* 0.068* 0.079* 0.079* 0.014 -0.006 -0.011 -0.013 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.632) (0.846) (0.745) (0.704) 
Regional 
market 0.428* --- 0.165 --- 0.973* --- -0.157 --- 
 (0.000) --- (0.407) --- (0.000) --- (0.801) --- 
Local 
market --- -0.243* --- -0.008* --- 0.294* --- 0.132 
 --- (0.000) --- (0.822) --- (0.033) --- (0.389) 
Market 
accessibility -0.132* -0.153* -0.213* -0.214* 0.042 -0.045 -0.169* -0.165* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.406) (0.357) (0.044) (0.049) 
Localization 
economies 0.766* 0.758* 0.769* 0.769* 0.286* 0.290* 0.233* 0.232* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urbanization 
economies 1.092* 1.114* 1.294* 1.296* 0.709* 0.490* 0.669* 0.623* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D 0.063* 0.064* 0.050* 0.050* 0.037* 0.026 0.087* 0.085* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.081) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 12.397* 15.174* 14.222* 15.590* -5.768* -0.658 4.162 2.380 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.520) (0.430)  (0.096) 
Number of obs. 10440 10440 10440 10440 3753 3753 3753 3753 
Log likelihood -21502.51 -21551.58 -18933.62 -18933.94 -3282.40 -3319.16 -3089.03 -3088.67 
Pseudo R2 0.5201 0.5190 0.5775 0.5775 0.2644 0.2561 0.3077 0.3078 
LR test 46613.01 46514.86 51750.79 51750.15 2359.29 2285.77 2746.04 2746.75 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pearson statistic 36807.3 37192.43 29686.54 29693.3 5386.3 5482.05 4777.48 4769.39 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: p-values are in parentisis 
* significant at 0.05 level of significan*ce 
Table 5.11. New low and high-technology plants (1992-2000): Poisson model
labor and land costs and market accessibility, while capital costs and market size loses
relevance. When considering the new HMHT plants, its elasticities with respect to tradi-
tional location factors is much lower. We may also observe that new HMHT plants are not
sensitive to labor costs. At the same time, they are more sensitive to R&D expenditures
than new LMLT plants. However, the Pearson statistics for the goodness of fit suggests
that data comprises overdispersion and, for this reason, we should estimate a negative bi-
nomial model.
Tables 5.12 and 5.13 show main estimation results for both low and medium-low technol-
ogy (LMLT) plants and high and medium-high technology (HMHT) plants.
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  NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL 
 
  
With dummy by 
year*CAE 
With dummies 
by year*CAE 
and NUTS3 
With random 
effects by 
municipality 
and dummy by 
year*CAE 
With random 
effects by 
municipality 
and dummies by 
year*CAE and 
NUTS3 
With fixed effects 
by municipality 
and dummy by 
year*CAE 
 
With fixed effects 
by municipality 
and dummies by 
year*CAE and 
NUTS3 
Variables (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) 
Land costs -0.739* -0.672* -1.090* -1.020* -0.553* -0.542* -0.581* -0.583* -0.664* -0.666* -0.550* -0.557* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Labor costs -0.842* -0.804* -0.780* -0.790* -1.031* -1.019* -1.036* -1.030* -1.009* -0.996* -1.023* -1.017* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Human capital -0.981* -1.145* 0.004 -0.389* 1.917* 1.956* 0.625 0.626 2.509* 2.717* 0.376 0.410 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.978) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000) (0.065) (0.070) (0.000) (0.000) (0.310) (0.274) 
Capital costs 0.019 0.020 0.037* 0.040* -0.015 -0.011 -0.028 -0.023 -0.032 -0.024 -0.037 -0.031 
 (0.201) (0.183) (0.013) (0.007) (0.449) (0.581) (0.171) (0.263) (0.137) (0.275) (0.091) (0.149) 
Regional 
market 0.259* --- 0.327 --- 0.485* --- 0.457 --- 0.649* --- 0.442 --- 
 (0.000) --- (0.306) --- (0.000) --- (0.074) --- (0.000) --- (0.081) --- 
Local market --- 0.249* --- 0.308* --- 0.254* --- 0.023 --- 0.280* --- -0.012 
 --- (0.001) --- (0.000) --- (0.011) --- (0.799) --- (0.008) --- (0.894) 
Market 
accessibility -0.193* -0.213* -0.218* -0.213* -0.082 -0.120 -0.227 -0.236 -0.118 -0.165 -0.469* -0.479* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.300) (0.126) (0.132) (0.117) (0.249) (0.107) (0.011) (0.009) 
Localization 
economies 0.588* 0.590* 0.595* 0.597* 0.642* 0.641* 0.615* 0.614* 0.624* 0.623* 0.596* 0.596* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urbanization 
economies 1.132* 1.065* 1.185* 1.107* 0.616* 0.596* 0.787* 0.778* 0.493* 0.487* 0.728* 0.725* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D 0.033* 0.031* 0.047* 0.044* 0.009 0.007 0.018 0.018 0.007 0.005 0.013 0.014 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.336) (0.469) (0.060) (0.068) (0.447) (0.589) (0.169) (0.169) 
Constant 10.799* 11.746* 10.051* 11.806* 4.903* 7.885* 8.186* 11.832* 3.407* 7.453* 9.784* 13.432* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of obs. 10440 10440 10440 10440 10440 10440 10440 10440 10431 10431 10431 10431 
Log likelihood -16215.3 -16219.9 -15738.4 -15731.2 -15217.1 -15220.3 -15138.5 -15140.1 -14299.5 -14305.6 -14185.5 -14187.0 
Pseudo R2 0.1861 0.1858 0.2100 0.2104         
LR test 7413.52 7404.33 6390.46 8381.67         
 (0.000)  (0.000)          
Likelihood-ratio 
test of alpha=0 11000 11000 6390.46 6405.43         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Wald test     6756.61 6750.7 6889.30 6878.54 6576.96 6567.49 6791.38 6782.90 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: p-values are in parentisis 
* significant at 0.05 level of significance 
Table 5.12. New low and medium-low technology plants (1992-2000): Negative bino-
mial model
As before, we performed several models, which performed quite well, as it can be settled
from the overall significance tests. In both samples, the increase in the log-likelihoods
supports the inclusion of both dummies by regions NUTS3 and specific effects by munic-
ipality. Additionally, in both samples, LMLT and HMHT, the inclusion of random rather
than fixed effects by municipality is justified by the Hausman test, which equals to 0.62
[regressions (69) and (73)] and 0.39 [regressions (81) and (85)], respectively.
Focusing on the LMLT sample, we may observe that the most significant location factors
are the traditional ones: agglomeration economies, land and labor costs. In fact, if we
introduce random effects by municipality [regressions (67) to (70)], then we estimate that,
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  NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL 
 
  
With dummy by 
year*CAE 
With dummies 
by year*CAE 
and NUTS3 
With random 
effects by 
municipality 
and dummy by 
year*CAE  
With random effects 
by municipality 
and dummies by 
year*CAE and 
NUTS3 
With fixed 
effects by 
municipality 
and dummy by 
year*CAE 
With fixed effects 
by municipality 
and dummies by 
year*CAE and 
NUTS3 
Variables (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) 
Land costs -0.505* -0.312* -0.698* -0.651* -0.391 -0.331 -0.514 -0.497 0.479 0.457 1.509 1.574 
 (0.000) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000) (0.154) (0.242) (0.059) (0.072) (0.378) (0.396) (0.082) (0.072) 
Labor costs 0.018 0.079 -0.032 -0.035 0.055 0.072 0.082 0.081 0.056 0.053 0.040 0.039 
 (0.877) (0.508) (0.786) (0.767) (0.657) (0.563) (0.509) (0.514) (0.669) (0.682) (0.757) (0.764) 
Human 
capital -0.491 -0.413 0.618 0.418 -0.224 -0.045 0.447 0.344 -1.194 -1.093 -2.247 -2.175 
 (0.102) (0.302) (0.128) (0.371) (0.694) (0.945) (0.522) (0.644) (0.356) (0.405) (0.125) (0.140) 
Capital costs 0.026 0.016 0.012 0.011 0.003 0.007 0.050 0.047 0.017 0.014 0.0154 0.012 
 (0.480) (0.667) (0.766) (0.786) (0.960) (0.896) (0.329) (0.349) (0.795) (0.836) (0.818) (0.859) 
Regional 
market 0.864* --- -0.075 --- 0.639* --- -0.239 --- -0.334 --- -0.245 --- 
 (0.000) --- (0.919) --- (0.023) --- (0.718) --- (0.580) --- (0.709) --- 
Local 
market --- 0.429* --- 0.165 --- 0.151 --- 0.097 --- -0.186 --- -0.191 
 --- (0.022) --- (0.386) --- (0.519) --- (0.676) --- (0.423) --- (0.419) 
Market 
accessibility 0.011 -0.055 -0.185 -0.179 -0.047 -0.084 -0.226 -0.226 -0.002 0.082 -3.607 -3.535 
 (0.863) (0.385) (0.071) (0.081) (0.737) (0.552) (0.295) (0.295) (0.997) (0.873) (0.359) (0.382) 
Localization 
economies 0.234* 0.240* 0.201* 0.200* 0.182* 0.181* 0.180* 0.180* 0.166* 0.168* 0.161* 0.162* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urbanization 
economies 0.825* 0.643* 0.684* 0.632* 0.809* 0.767* 0.698* 0.675* 0.319 0.352 0.430 0.460 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.450) (0.406) (0.315) (0.283) 
R&D 0.036* 0.023 0.084* 0.082* 0.056* 0.054* 0.069* 0.069* 0.045 0.046 0.040 0.042 
 (0.052) (0.205) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.020) (0.002) (0.002) (0.084) (0.075) (0.133) (0.117) 
Constant -4.799* -0.359 3.224 2.030 -1.626 2.608 5.402 3.145 3.944 1.515 26.700 23.424 
  (0.001) (0.784) (0.601) (0.223) (0.575) (0.229) (0.354) (0.174) (0.570) (0.740) --- --- 
Number of obs. 3753 3753 3753 3753 3753 3753 3753 3753 3485 3485 3485 3485 
Log likelihood -3131.03 -3147.62 -3023.13 -3022.75 -2955.17 -2957.47 -2933.15 -2933.12 -2560.80 -2560.65 -2546.10 -2545.86 
Pseudo R2 0.1588 0.1544 0.1878 0.1879         
LR test 1182.31 1149.12 1398.11 1398.87         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Likelihood-ratio 
test of alpha=0 302.74 343.06 131.79 131.84         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Wald test     1277.48 1263.52 1418.90 1419.29 1189.51 1192.11 --- --- 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) --- --- 
Notes: p-values are in parentisis 
* significant at 0.05 level of significance 
Table 5.13. New high and medium-high technology plants: Negative binomial model
(1992-2000)
everything else constant, a 1 percent increase in labor costs lead to about 1.03 percent
increase in the number of new plants. However, if we consider the HMHT sample, than we
may retain an opposite behavior: cost factors and demand variables lose relevance, while
agglomeration economies gain importance. In fact, we observed that the most relevant
location determinant for high-tech firms are the urbanization economies, which accords
with existing literature.
We may also observe that in both samples, capital costs are not significant or do not have
predicted sign. On the demand side, we may conclude that, for the LMLT sample, the mar-
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ket size inuence is much clear when dummies for regions are not included, while market
accessibility is only significant if no specific effects by municipality were included. Con-
versely, both the local market and the market accessibility are not significant for location
decisions made by new high and medium-high technology plants.
Finally, we may observe that the elasticity of plant births with respect to R&D expendi-
tures is higher in the HMHT sample than in the LMLT one. We may then conclude that,
in their location decisions, high and medium-high technology plants are strongly inu-
enced by urbanization economies and R&D spillovers, while new LMLT plants are more
responsive to agglomeration economies and cost factors.
5.7 Concluding remarks
Using micro-level data on manufacturing plants, this chapter examines the importance
of geographical, sectorial and technological characteristics for firms’ birth in Portugal
between 1992 and 2000, according to firms’ technological intensity and number of plants.
Our main conclusions are summarized in table 5.14.
Our results confirm the relevance of agglomeration economies for firms’ location choice,
which accords with the existing literature. In fact, either when considering the entire
manufacturing sector or when allowing for a division according to the number of plants
or firms’ technological intensity, the most important location determinants are the ag-
glomeration economies. Additionally, urbanization economies seems to have a particular
relevance for the location decision of new multi-plant firms and high-tech firms.
Estimation results also evidence that, with the exception of the high-tech sample, firms’
location choice is inuenced by labor and land costs. On the contrary, the hypothesis
concerning the negative inuence of capital costs on location choice is not confirmed in
our study, which might be justified by the absence of significant differences in the cost of
capital across Portuguese municipalities.
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 Total new plants* New single-plants* 
New multi-
plants* 
New low-tech 
plants* 
New high-tech 
plants* 
Hypotheses 
Without 
NUTS3 
dummies 
With 
NUTS3 
dummies 
Without 
NUTS3 
dummies 
With 
NUTS3 
dummies 
Without 
NUTS3 
dummies 
With 
NUTS3 
dummies 
Without 
NUTS3 
dummies 
With 
NUTS3 
dummies 
Without 
NUTS3 
dummies 
With 
NUTS3 
dummies 
High land costs negatively 
influences new investments           
High labor costs negatively 
influences new investments           
High human capital 
positively influences new 
investments 
          
High capital costs negatively 
influences new investments           
High regional market size 
positively influences new 
investments 
          
High local market size 
positively influences new 
investments 
          
High distance to Porto or 
Lisbon negatively influences 
new investments 
          
High localization economies 
positively influences new 
investments 
          
High urbanization economies 
positively influences new 
investments 
          
High R&D expenditures 
positively influences new 
investments 
          
* Negative binomial model with random effects by municipality 
 
Table 5.14. Location determinants of new manufacturing plants: Hypotheses
Our research also evidences that, in spite of an irregular behavior, the regional market is
much more significant than local market for firms location choice, except when consid-
ering the location decision made by new multi-plant firms. Also, the accessibility to the
main important cities in Portugal is only relevant for the location choices made by new
single-plant firms. Finally, we have also observed that the human capital stock has an
uneven behavior, which might be explained by the aggregate nature of the indicator.
In what concerns the technological variable, we might conclude that the elasticity of plant
births with respect to the R&D expenditures was quite small, while it becomes higher
when taking under consideration the high-tech sample. That is, in their location decisions,
firms take into account R&D activities, which evidences the presence of R&D spillovers.
The study of location choice may proceed with some improvements in our research. An
appealing research topic is to focus on the human capital variable and try to evaluate the
inuence of different types of human capital on firms’ location choice. Another topic is to
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extend our research to the problem of firms’ relocations: what determines firms’ reloca-
tion decisions Additionally, we could extend our research to assess the size of knowledge
spillovers. Finally, we aim at evaluate the inuence of firms’ geographical and technolog-
ical distance on R&D cooperation.
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5.8 Appendix: Firms’ location determinants - Empirical studies
 
1967-71 Logit model
Localization economies Man-hours in production
Labor variables Average wage
Number of engineers
Average unemployment rate
Government policy Corporate and income taxes
Property tax
Infrastructure Electricity price
Natural gas price
1972-78 Labor variables Unionization
Wage rate
Education  level of population
Agglomeration economies Existing manufacturing activity
Land costs Population density
Geographic variables Land area
Government policy Corporate tax
Property tax
Infrastructure Energy prices
Road density
Construction costs
1977-79 M anufacturing Localization economies Employees in each own manufacturing sector
Urbanization economies Employees with 10 or more years of education
Labor variables Wage rate
Land costs Price of industrial land
Accessibility Road time distance to the city of S. Paulo
1970-80 States (USA) M anufacturing Input costs Unionization
Wage rates
Education  enrollments per production worker
Building costs
Energy costs
Government policy Property taxes revenues per personal income
State and local spending per personal income
Geographic variables Mean January temperature
Demographic variables Population density
Nested multinomial 
logit
Two-stages logit model
M anufacturing Conditional logit model
Economic 
activities
M ethodological 
approach
Schmenner, 
Huber and 
Cook (1987)
M ain explanatory variablesAuthor(s) Dependent 
variable
Time 
Period
Spatial Unit
Carlton 
(1983)
SIC - 3079 
(Fabricated 
Plastic Products), 
3662 
(Communication 
Transmitting 
Equipment), 3679 
(Electronic 
Components)
New firms in 
USA
Standard 
M etropolitan 
Statistical 
Areas (SMAS) 
(USA)
Bartik (1985)
Hansen 
(1987)
New and re-
located firms 
in S. Paulo 
(Brazil)
Cities in S. 
Paulo State 
(Brazil)
States (USA)New domestic 
firms in  USA
New firms in 
USA
 1981-83 States (USA) Manufacturing Agglomeration economies Manufacturing employment per square mile
Labor variables Average wage in manufacturing
Unemployment rate
Unionization
Land costs Land area
Market variables Per capita income
Government policy Taxes per capita
State effort to attract FDI
Infrastructure Highway road density
Railroad density
Airport density
Market size Gravity adjusted personal income
Labor variables Unionization
Unemployment benefits
Productivity
Wage rate
Poverty level
Unemployment rate
Education level
Government policy Corporate tax
Property tax
Domestic unitary tax
Worldwide unitary tax
Home country support office
Population density
State effort
Geographic variables Land area
Climate
Agglomeration economies Manufacturing establishments
Infrastructure Interstate connection
M ethodological 
approach
M ain explanatory variables
1980-89Woodward 
(1992)
Coughlin, 
Terza and 
Arrondee 
(1991)
Author(s) Dependent 
variable
Foreign firms 
(new and 
others) in 
USA
Time 
Period
Economic 
activities
Spatial Unit
ManufacturingNew foreign 
(Japanese) 
firms in USA
Counties and 
States (USA)
Conditional logit model
Conditional logit model
(with small sample of 
alternatves)
 FD I origins
Access to markets Gravity adjusted personal income
Access to a container port
Labor variables Unionization
Productivity
M anufacturing average wage
Unemployment rate
Government policy Corporate tax
Local taxes
State effort
Environmental regulation
Geographic variables Land area
1994 States (India) M anufacturing Land costs Population density
Labor cost M anufacturing wage
Labor force quality M an-days lost due to disputes
Energy cost Electricity cost
Infrastructure Proportion of electricity demand (power shortage)
Agglomeration effects Total manufacturing firms' output
Environmental regulation Share of environment spending in total expenditures
Environmental cases per number medium+large firms
O ther attractive factors Per capita income
1982-87 M anufacturing O LS Agglomeration economies Gross state product
Per capita income
Labor variables Unionization
Unemployment
Government policy Corporate tax
Domestic unitary tax
State effort to attract FDI
1985-95 All
International trade Export+import
Labor variables Average wage rate adjusted by productivity
Technological variables R&D  employment
M arket size GDP growth rate
Infrastructure Post and telecommunication services output
Agglomeration economies Population density
Foreign firms/ 
domestic 
firms in U SA
M ain explanatory variables
New firms in 
India
Economic 
activities
M ethodological 
approach
Shaver (1998)
Author(s) D ependent 
variable
Time 
Period
Spatial Unit
Friedman, 
Gerlowski and 
Silberman 
(1992)
M ani, Pargal 
and Huq 
(1997)
Wei, Liu, 
Parker and 
Vaidya (1999)
States (USA) M anufacturing1977-88New foreign 
firms in U SA
States (USA)
FDI inflow 
(pledged and 
realized) in 
China
27 provinces 
(China)
(plus regional 
dummies)
B inomial logistic model
O LS and Errors 
Components model for 
panel data
Conditional logit model
Conditional logit model
 1991 Electronics Market variables Share of domestic sales in total sales
Entrepreneurial culture Share of local proprietors
Number of workers per establishment
Labor variables Skills level of employees
Regional wage rate
1980-1992 States (USA) M anufacturing Market size State income
Adjacent state income
Labor variables M anufacturing wage
Unionization rate
Unemployment rate
Government policy Corporation tax
Labor subsidy
Capital subsidy
Unitary tax
Home country support office
Foreign trade zones
W u (1999) 1981-91 All
Labor variables Population potentiality
Strategic accessibility Distance to the city center
Dummy if the site is nearby a hotel
Policy variable Dummy if site is in the Economic/Technological zone
1989-1994 M anufacturing Market variables Personal income per manufacturing employee
Labor variables M anufacturing average wage/average productivity
Percent of population with a high degree
Unionization rate
Share of manufacturing employment in total labor force
Percent of black population
Unemployment rate
Government policy Per capita property taxes
State and local taxes as percent of gross state product
Foreign office to promote FDI
Infrastructure Counties with interstate highway
Agglomeration economies Percent of urban population
Population
Number of 
foreign firms 
in Guanzhou 
(China)
Number of 
new foreign 
firms in USA
M ain explanatory variables
2 (4) regions 
(Thailand)
Metropolitan 
area of 
Guanzhou 
(China)
Time 
Period
Spatial Unit
Conditional logit model
Author(s) Dependent 
variable
New foreign 
firms 
(Japanese) in 
USA
Kittiprapas 
and M cCann 
(1999)
Firms 
(electronic 
industry) in 
Thailand
Economic 
activities
Head, Ries 
and Svenson 
(1999)
Coughlin and 
Segev (2000)
Negative Binomial 
model
M ethodological 
approach
Counties 
(USA)
Negative Binomial 
model
Poisson model;
M ultinomial logit 
model
 1985-95 GM M model Agglomeration economies Lagged FDI stock
M arket size Per capita income
Labor variables Wage rate
Education level - Senior high
Education level - Junior and primary high
Government policy State effort
Infrastructure Road density
Railway density
Geographic variables Geographic location (costal area)
1985-92 M anufacturing Agglomeration economies M anufacturing employment per km2
% manufacting employment in the same 3-digit industry
Share of employment in foreign plants
Share of employment in tertiary sector
Labor variables Index of manufacturing wage
Proportion of labor force with elementary education
Proportion of labor force with secondary education
Land costs Population density
Accessibility Distance to Porto and Lisbon
Wu (2000) 1981-91 All M acro-location Distance to the city center
Transport accessibility Dummy if the site has access to a railway terminal
Dummy if the site has access to a river transport
Distance to the nearest road
Distance to the nearest highway
Strategic accessibility Distance to the nearest high-ranking hotel
Dummy if the site is nearby Garden Hotel
Dummy if the site is nearby Convention Centre
Land use factors Land area
Built-up area as a percentage of total usable land area
Industrial land as a percentage of total land area
Labor variables Population potentiality
Policy variable Dummy if site is in the Economic/Technological zone
1995-1997 M anufacturing Localization economies Share of manufacturing employment in same industry
Urbanization economies Total manufacturing employment per square km
Labor costs Average manufacturing wage
Land costs Population density
M ajor urban accessibility Time distance to Porto and Lisbon
M inor urban accessibility Time distance to distrito
Investor's home base Dummy = 1 if concelho  coincides with investor's home base
Dependent 
variable
Time 
Period
Spatial Unit Economic 
activities
M ethodological 
approach
M ain explanatory variables
Foreign firms 
in Guanzhou 
(China)
FDI (Stock) 
in China
275 
municipalities 
(Portugal)
New foreign 
firms in 
Portugal
Logistic regression 
model
Metropolitan 
area of 
Guanzhou 
(China)
New domestic 
firms in 
Portugal
Cheng and 
Kwan (2000)
Author(s)
Guimarães, 
Figueiredo 
and 
Woodward 
(2000)
275 
municipalities 
(Portugal)
Conditional logit model
29 regions 
(China)
(with small sample of 
alternatives)
Conditional logit modelFigueiredo, 
Guimarães 
and 
Woodward 
(2002)
 1987-1996 M anufacturing
Urbanization economies Total workers/km2
Urbanization diseconomies (Total workers/km2)^2
Market size Population density
Industrial diversity Hirschmann-Herfindahl index
Poisson Human capital Population with medium and high education level/km2
Localization economies Workers in each industrial sector/km2
1989-97 M anufacturing Poisson model Labor costs Wage and salary earnings per job
Land costs Population density
Taxes Per capita property taxes
Market size County personal income
Localization economies Density of manufacturing and service plants per km
Urbanization economies Number of plants per km2 in the same 2-digit SIC industry
1984-95 M anufacturing
Labor variables Wage by employee
Nested logit model Unemployment rate
Government policy Region Obj. 1
Regional land area
Social charges rate (non-wages labor costs)
Corporate tax rate
Geographic variables Regional GDP
Market variables Index of market potential
Agglomeration economies Number of establishments in the 2-digit industry region
Japanese affiliates in the 3-digit industry region
All
Agglomeration economies Agglomeration of foreign firms
Agglomeration of domestic firms
Market variables Market size
Labor variables Population density
Unemployment rate
Government policy Property taxes
Infrastructure Road density
Land area
Araúzo-Carod 
and M anjón-
Antolín 
(2004)
New firms 
(number) in 
Catalonia
Provinces (4), 
comarques (41) 
and 
municipalities 
(942)
Dependent 
variable
Time 
Period
Number of 
new firms in 
USA
New foreign 
firms in 
Netherlands
Spatial Unit
New foreign 
firms 
(Japanese) in 
Europe (BE, 
FR, GERM , 
IREL, ITAL, 
NETHERL, 
Spain, PORT 
and UK)
Netherlands 
regions
M ethodological 
approach
Conditional logit model
Author(s) M ain explanatory variables
[Multinomial logial 
model]
[Conditional Logit 
model]
Conditional logit model
Guimarães, 
Figueiredo 
and 
W oodward 
(2004)
Hogernbirk 
and Narula 
(2004)
Head and 
Mayer (2004)
57 regions (EU)
Economic 
activities
3066 counties 
(USA)
1992-96 
(1995-96)
 Holl (2004) 1986-1997 M anufacturing
Market variables Municipality population
Index of potential population accessibility
Motorway access
Lack of diversity (employment specialization index)
Industry share in total manufaturing employment
Producer services share
Labor variables Index of manufacturing wage
% of labour force with low qualifications
1987-96 M anufacturing Poisson Urbanization economies Jobs/km2
Dis-urbanization disecon. (Jobs/km2)2
Economic activity % jobs at the industrial sector
% jobs at the services sector
Industrial diversity Index HHI of diversity of industrial jobs
Human capital % Population with university degree
Accessibility Distance to capital/nearest city
Commuting (Km traveled daily by employee)
Labor market Population density
M anufacturing Agglomeration economies Hoover’s concentration index: domestic firms
Hoover’s concentration index: foreign firms
Labor conditions Per capita wages
Level of education
Economic size Share of manufacturing employment in total population
Land costs Population density
Infrastructure Infrastructure public road density
M anufacturing
Localization economies Sector share of total employment in the county
Urbanization economies Sum of square sectoral employment share in the county
Transportation infrastructure Distance to the nearest international airport and port
Agglomeration diseconomies Population density
Foreign share Foreign employment/total employment
Firms of own nationality Number of foreign firms with the same nationality
Labor skills Real wage rate for the manufacturing industry
1997-2000 Labor costs Wage and salary earning per job
Land costs Population density
Taxes Per capita property taxes
Market size (weighted) Total county personal income (gravity measure)
Localization economies Density of manufacturing and service plants per km
Urbanization economies Number of plants per km2 in the same 2-digit SIC industry
Qualified labor % of high school graduates or higher
Natural amenities Index of physical characteristics
Weighted University R&D University related R&D expenditures in science and engineering
Portuguese 
municipalities
Poisson and negative 
binomial models with 
fixed effects
Economic 
activities
M ethodological 
approach
M anufacturing 
(high technology)
Dirichlet-Multinomial 
model
Number of 
new and 
relocated 
firms in 
Portugal
Counties 
(USA)
Number of 
new firms in 
Catalan 
(Spain)
Number of 
new high-
technology 
firms
1973-82 + 
1983-98
New foreign 
firms in 
Ireland
Municipalities 
(Catalan) [Poisson by industrial 
groups (OECD)]
New foreign 
firms in 
Bulgaria, 
Hungary, 
Poland and 
Romania
1995-2001
[Conditional logit 
model]
Nested logit model
Nested logit model
M ain explanatory variables
Agglomeration economies
Author(s) Dependent 
variable
Woodward, 
Figueiredo 
and 
Guimarães 
(2006)
Barrios, Gorg 
and Strobl 
(2006)
28 Irish 
counties
Araúzo-Carod 
(2005)
37 NUTS II - 
Bulgaria, 
Hungary, 
Poland and 
Romania
Pusterla and 
Resmini 
(2005)
Time 
Period
Spatial Unit
Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
Understanding the decision processes by which firms decide about its geographical loca-
tion and R&D cooperation is the main purpose of this thesis. More precisely, we aim
at clarify how firms competing in the product market and benefiting from know-how
spillovers decide about its geographical location and about cooperation in R&D.
We adopted a twofold approach: first, and inspired on location choice models and R&D
cooperation literature, we proceed through theoretical modelling to evaluate how compet-
ing firms decide about location and R&D cooperation second, we developed an empirical
evaluation about the importance of geographical, sectorial and technological determinants
for firms’ location choice using micro-level data for the Portuguese manufacturing start-
ups. Our main research conclusions are the following ones:
- The relation between R&D output and firms’ geographical distance under R&D cooper-
ation or competition was our first concern. As cooperation in R&D allows firms to inter-
nalize its knowledge spillovers, then its R&D output will be larger if firms agglomerate.
However, if firms compete in R&D, its R&D output will be larger if firms disperse, as a
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lower proportion of its results ow over the other firms. So, in order to promote firms’
innovation, policy makers should have under consideration both cooperative agreements
between firms and its clustered or dispersed location.
- Firms’ location choice is strongly inuenced by knowledge spillovers and cooperation
in R&D. In fact, if firms cooperate in R&D, the best location choice for an entrant firm
is agglomeration, for every shape of the R&D spillover. However, if firms run R&D
independently, then the entrant firm will cluster only if the R&D spillover is convex in
distance. These conclusions allow us to clarify the competition-cooperation environment
that characterizes the industrial clusters.
- R&D cooperation agreements between competing firms might involve uncertainty with
respect, for instance, the amount of know-how each firm discloses to its partner. We as-
sumed that geographical proximity between firms augments the confidence between en-
trepreneurs and reduces uncertainty. Our results supports an inverse relationship between
transport costs and agglomeration. In fact, we concluded that if transport costs are signif-
icantly high, firms will prefer to disperse between regions and overcome the absence of
knowledge spillovers by cooperating in R&D. On the contrary, if transport costs are low,
cooperating firms will agglomerate if uncertainty with respect to the disclosure of know-
how is high, and disperse if uncertainty is low. So, proximity between firms is a crucial
determinant for R&D cooperative agreements between firms, as it reduces uncertainty.
- Location choice theory usually claims that the optimal location depends on production
costs, demand variables and agglomeration economies. Additionally, we have under con-
sideration the inuence of technological variables on firms’ location choice. Similarly to
other empirical studies, we concluded that, for the Portuguese case, the main determinants
for firms’ location choice are the agglomeration economies and both labor and land costs.
In addition, we observed that R&D expenditures, while significant, has a minor role on
the attractiveness of business investments but evidence the presence of R&D spillovers.
At the same time, the human capital is rarely significant.
- Location determinants may affect differently firms with different technological intensi-
ties. When considering the high-tech sample, we notice that the cost variables lose im-
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portance, while the agglomeration economies and the R&D expenditures gain relevance.
On the contrary, costs variables and agglomeration economies are the major determinants
for the location choice of low-technological firms.
- Finally, we focus on firms’ structure and investigate the determinants of multi-plant
and single-plant firms location choice. We then observed that new multi-plant firms are
particularly sensitive to urbanization economies, land costs and local market, while new
single-plant firms are more responsive to labor costs and agglomeration economies.
- In sum, Portuguese manufacturing starting plants are mostly sensitive to agglomeration
economies and cost factors, while technological variables seems to be more relevant in
attracting high-technological plants. At the same time, the capital cost and market vari-
ables revealed to be non-significant in most cases, which might be explained by the small
dimension of our geographical unit. Finally, a last reference to human capital, which is
not decisive for the attractiveness of new businesses.
Research on firms’ location and R&D cooperation is far from being concluded. We ex-
pect to improve our research in several directions. In what concerns spatial competition
and R&D cooperation between firms, and applying for contracts theory, our next step is
to introduce information asymmetry by assuming that the disclosure effort is non observ-
able if firms disperse, while it becomes observable if firms agglomerate. Additionally, we
could extend our framework by assuming that firms may choose its technological profile,
instead of its geographical location, and afterwards compete or cooperate in R&D. Claim-
ing for agent-based computational economics, another possibility is to extend our model
to a n heterogenous firms framework, where firms make their decisions about techno-
logical (or geographical) location and cooperation repeatedly. Empirically, an appealing
research topic is to evaluate de determinants of firms’ relocation decisions. Another pos-
sibility is to evaluate the inuence of firms’ geographical and technological distance on
R&D cooperative agreements between firms.
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